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INEXTRICABLY POLITICAL: RACE, MEMBERSHIP, 
AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Sarah Krakoff 
Abstract: Courts address equal protection questions about the distinct legal treatment of 
American Indian tribes in the following dichotomous way: are classifications concerning 
American Indians “racial or political?” If the classification is political (i.e., based on 
federally recognized tribal status or membership in a federally recognized tribe) then courts 
will not subject it to heightened scrutiny. If the classification is racial rather than political, 
then courts may apply heightened scrutiny. This Article challenges the dichotomy itself. The 
legal categories “tribe” and “tribal member” are themselves political, and reflect the ways in 
which tribes and tribal members have been racialized by U.S. laws and policies. 
First, the Article traces the evolution of tribes from pre-contact independent sovereigns to 
their current status as “federally recognized tribes.” This history reveals that the federal 
government’s objective of minimizing the tribal land base entailed a racial logic that was 
reflected in decisions about when and how to recognize tribal status. The logic was that of 
elimination: Indian people had to disappear in order to free territory for non-Indian 
settlement. The Article then examines two very distinct tribal places, the Colorado River 
Indian Tribes’ (CRIT) reservation and the former Dakota (Sioux) Nation of the Great Plains. 
The United States’ policies had different effects on the CRIT (where four distinct ethnic and 
linguistic groups were consolidated into one tribe) and the Sioux (where related ethnic and 
linguistic groups were scattered apart), but the causal structures were the same. Indian people 
stood in the way of non-Indian possession of land and resources, and federal policies defined 
tribes and their land base with the goal of shrinking both. Despite these goals, the CRIT and 
Sioux Tribes have exercised their powers of self-governance and created homelands that 
foster cultural survival for their people. Like other federally recognized tribes, they have used 
the given legal structure to perpetuate their own forms of indigenous governance, 
notwithstanding the law’s darker origins. 
The legal histories of CRIT and the Sioux Tribes reveal that unraveling the logic of 
racism in American Indian law has less to do with tinkering with current equal protection 
doctrine than it does with recognizing the workings of power, politics, and law in the context 
of the United States’ unique brand of settler colonialism. The way to counter much of the 
prior racial discrimination against American Indians is to support laws that perpetuate the 
sovereign political status of tribes, rather than to dismantle tribes by subjecting them to 
judicial scrutiny in a futile attempt to disentangle the racial from the political. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts address equal protection questions about the distinct legal 
treatment of American Indian tribes in the following dichotomous way: 
are classifications concerning American Indians “racial or political?” If 
the classification is political (i.e., based on federally recognized tribal 
status or membership in a federally recognized tribe), then courts will 
not subject the classification to heightened scrutiny. If the classification 
is racial rather than political, then courts may apply heightened scrutiny. 
This Article challenges the dichotomy itself. 
The legal categories “tribe” and “tribal member” reflect the ways that 
tribes and tribal members have been racialized by U.S. laws and policies. 
The racialization of American Indians, which served the purposes of 
justifying expropriation of their lands and imposing policies of forced 
assimilation, is today embedded in their separate political status. The 
political and the racial are therefore hopelessly intermingled in current 
legal definitions of tribes in ways that nonetheless point to the same 
deferential conclusion that courts currently reach. In general, courts 
uphold laws and policies that further the separate, and constitutionally 
based, political status of American Indian tribes. The upshot of this 
Article is that this is the best that courts can do, and to the extent they 
are tempted to untangle the racial from the political with respect to the 
status of American Indian tribes, they tread well beyond their 
competence and risk perpetuating the very policies that have 
discriminated against American Indians, and that, in general, the 
political branches have abandoned. To illustrate and excavate the “racial 
and political” conclusion, the Article visits two very distinct tribal 
places, the Colorado River Indian Tribes’ (CRIT) reservation and the 
former Dakota (Sioux) Nation of the Great Plains. 
The CRIT reservation straddles the Colorado River several hours west 
of Phoenix, Arizona. The CRIT is a single federally recognized 
American Indian tribe whose members include people of Mojave, 
06 - Krakoff Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:37 PM 
1044 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1041 
 
Chemehuevi, Navajo, and Hopi descent. Today the CRIT is a successful 
Indian nation, with established water rights, a model riparian restoration 
project, and a well-functioning tribal government.1 But at the time of its 
founding in 1865, the multi-ethnic composition of the CRIT and the idea 
that it could one day constitute a coherent polity was an afterthought at 
best. The federal government’s intent in establishing the CRIT 
reservation was to clear the surrounding area for white settlement.2 The 
government’s objective was a political one—to gather the many tribes 
that called the Colorado River basin home and concentrate them in a 
single place. Doing so, federal officials hoped, would quiet non-Indian 
concerns about coming to the region. With the Indian threat removed, 
the southwest desert, and in particular the areas proximate to the only 
major water source, could be open for white business.3 
In the Plains, the many bands and groups that once comprised the 
Great Dakota (Sioux) Nation4 are today concentrated into ten federally 
recognized tribes in North and South Dakota.5 Unlike the CRIT, who 
                                                     
1. See About the Mohave, Chemehuevi, Hopi and Navajo Tribes, COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, 
http://www.crit-nsn.gov/crit_contents/about/ (last visited June 30, 2012). 
2. See UNIV. OF ARIZ. BUREAU OF ETHNIC RESEARCH, DEP’T OF ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC STUDIES, COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION; REPORT NO. TWO: HISTORY OF THE 
COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION 7 (1958) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER 
RESERVATION].  
3. See infra Part II.A.  
4. Europeans derived the name “Sioux” from the Ojibwa name for the tribes to their west, na-
towe-ssiwa, which has been variously translated to mean: “people of an alien tribe,” GUY GIBBON, 
THE SIOUX: THE DAKOTA AND LAKOTA NATIONS 2 (2003); “rattlesnake,” HERBERT T. HOOVER, 
THE YANKTON SIOUX 13 (Frank W. Porter III ed., 1988); “a diminutive of snakes, adders, and, by 
extension, enemies,” ROY W. MEYER, HISTORY OF THE SANTEE SIOUX: UNITED STATES INDIAN 
POLICY ON TRIAL 5 (rev. ed. 1993); and “the Lesser Adders,” ROYAL B. HASSRICK, THE SIOUX: 
LIFE AND CUSTOMS OF A WARRIOR SOCIETY 6 (1964). Some scholars have criticized these 
translations as misconstruing the “actual historical etymology of the name,” asserting instead that 
na-towe-ssiwa was used by Ojibwa in reference to the Sioux as a purely “ethnic designation” to 
mean “speaker of a foreign language” or “member of an alien tribe,” and only later developed a 
secondary meaning connoting snakes. See Douglas R. Parks & Raymond J. DeMallie, Sioux, 
Assiniboine, and Stoney Dialects: A Classification, 34 ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS 233, 234 
(1992). Many Sioux people (and most anthropologists) prefer to use the term Dakota, see Stephen 
A. Feraca & James H. Howard, The Identity and Demography of the Dakota or Sioux Tribe, 8 
PLAINS ANTHROPOLOGIST 80, 81 (1963), or the native word OCeti Sakawin, see JESSICA DAWN 
PALMER, THE DAKOTA PEOPLES: A HISTORY OF THE DAKOTA, LAKOTA AND NAKOTA THROUGH 
1863, at 41 (2008). This Article uses both Sioux and Dakota because most tribes still use Sioux in 
their official, federally recognized tribal names. 
5. There are Sioux Tribes and First Nations (Canada) outside of the Dakotas as well. In Canada, 
there are nine reserves in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and in the United States there are tribes in 
Montana (Ft. Peck), Minnesota (Upper Sioux, Lower Sioux, Prior Lake, and Prairie Island), and 
Nebraska (Santee). See MICHAEL JOHNSON, TRIBES OF THE SIOUX NATION 9 (2001). The history, 
infra Part II.B, refers to the Sioux’s larger geographical presence, but information about current 
tribal enrollment and demographics was collected only for the ten tribes in North and South Dakota. 
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were forced together despite their distinct linguistic and ethnic 
backgrounds, the Dakota share a common linguistic and ethnic heritage 
and were, in some instances, scattered apart and in others mixed 
together. Today, an individual Sioux Indian is likely to simultaneously 
identify with the greater Dakota Nation; with one of the three 
subdivisions of the nation (Santee, Yankton, or Teton); with one of the 
language dialects associated with each subdivision (Dakota, Lakota, or 
Nakota); with one of the seven “Council Fires” (bands) under those 
subdivisions; with the geography and culture of her band; and, finally, 
with her tribe.6 This self-identification occurs regardless of the federally 
recognized tribe in which the Dakota/Sioux Indian happens to be 
enrolled. 
The United States’ laws and policies with respect to establishing 
reservations and designating which Indian peoples would reside on them 
had different effects on the CRIT (consolidating) and the Sioux 
(scattering and concentrating), but the causal structures were the same.7 
Indian people stood in the way of non-Indian settlement, and U.S. 
policies constructed tribes themselves, as well as their rights to land, 
consistent with the political objectives of minimizing tribal presence and 
claims. The laws with respect to the treatment of Native peoples in these 
two regions, and throughout the country, followed what Patrick Wolfe 
has termed “the logic of elimination.”8 Understanding this logic, and the 
legal forms it generated, is necessary for a clear assessment of 
contemporary legal doctrines affecting American Indians, in particular 
equal protection analysis as applied to tribes and Indian people. An 
important body of scholarship on racism and American Indian law 
makes the point that the racialization of American Indians has taken 
different forms, and sometimes requires different remedies, than the 
                                                     
6. See PALMER, supra note 4, at 41; see generally JAMES SATTERLEE & VERNON D. MALAN, 
U.S.D.A. REPORT #SD-PAM-126: HISTORY AND ACCULTURATION OF DAKOTA INDIANS (1972) 
(recounting history of the Dakota groups from historical times to the present and including 
discussion of the three subdivisions, language groupings, and bands). 
7. This Article focuses on the CRIT and the Sioux Tribes of the Dakotas, but similar policies of 
concentrating and consolidating are evident in many tribal histories. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, Politics, History and Semantics: The Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes, 82 N.D. L. 
REV. 487, 502–03 (2006) (describing attempts to bind all of the Ottawa and Chippewa Bands with a 
single treaty). Professor Fletcher concludes, “The purpose for combining the various disparate and 
discrete bands was to allow the American negotiators to bind all the Ottawa and Chippewa bands at 
one time—and to manipulate the negotiations in a divide and conquer strategy.” Id. at 503.  
8. Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 387, 
387 (2006) (citing Patrick Wolfe, Nation and miscegeNation: Discursive Continuity in the Post-
Mabo Era, SOC. ANALYSIS, Oct. 1994, at 93–152; PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY (1999) [hereinafter WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM]).  
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racialization of African-Americans, Latinos, and other subordinated 
groups.9 This Article furthers the project by examining how federal 
Indian policies constructed the federally recognized tribe consistent with 
the government’s eliminationist agenda (including its racial logic) and 
thereby entangled the racial and the political within tribal communities 
in ways that defy ahistorical formulations, like color-blindness, as a 
means of redress.10 
The eliminationist construction of the Indian “race” has crucial, yet 
poorly understood, implications for equal protection doctrine in 
particular. In Morton v. Mancari,11 the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
federal classifications singling out American Indians for “particular and 
special” treatment should be upheld so long as “the special treatment can 
be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation 
toward the Indians . . . .”12 The Court’s adoption of a modified form of 
rational basis review rests, at least in part, on the justification that tribal 
membership is a political category rather than an ethnic or racial one.13 
While this ruling has so far stood the test of time, questions have arisen 
about Mancari’s underpinnings and its future.14 The Court has indicated 
that the incorporation of blood quantum and lineage into tribal 
membership criteria makes the “political versus racial distinction” less 
than convincing,15 and scholars have suggested that the dichotomy 
                                                     
9. See VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 171 (Univ. 
Okla. Press 1988) (1969); Bethany Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 591 (2009); Addie Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial 
Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958 (2011); see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED 
WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN 
AMERICA (2005) (arguing that all of American Indian law, even its doctrine of tribal sovereignty, is 
tainted with its racist origins). Other scholars have made similar arguments in the context of 
explaining why American Indian law and race law should continue to be viewed and analyzed 
distinctly. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian 
Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 155 (2008) (acknowledging racist origins of much of American 
Indian policy, but arguing that “virtually all elements of Indian affairs can be traced to the decision 
of the United States to recognize Indian tribes as political entities”).  
10. For a recent example of the Supreme Court’s embrace of a color-blind approach to remedying 
discrimination, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).  
11. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
12. Id. at 555. 
13. See id. at 553 n.24.  
14. A federal district court recently openly criticized Mancari’s approach and outlined how it 
would have approached classifications based on tribal status had it been freed from precedent to do 
so. See KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Mass.), aff’d in part, vacated 
and remanded in part, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
15. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519–20 (2000) (noting that the Mancari Court found it 
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unnecessarily entrenches a racially exceptionalist understanding of 
American Indians.16 In terms of Mancari’s future, the Court has hinted 
that legislation treating tribal members as a class in ways that are distinct 
from non-tribal members could raise at least colorable equal protection 
concerns, even when the congressional action furthers tribal self-
government.17 
If the federal courts reassess Mancari, they are unlikely to do so 
consistent with an anti-subordination agenda.18 To the contrary, the 
Court’s increasingly strong embrace of a colorblind jurisprudence, 
which views all current racial categorization in the same light 
irrespective of ongoing and historically distinct structural effects of 
racial subordination,19 is likelier to lead to heightened judicial scrutiny of 
many forms of distinctive treatment of American Indian tribes. Courts 
might then second-guess even laws and policies rooted in the long-
standing, constitutionally based commitment to tribes’ separate political 
existence.20 Striking down classifications that support tribal self-
                                                     
“important” that a preference was “not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians,’” but 
rather, “only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes”) (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24); 
cf. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (questioning the continuing vitality of 
Mancari).  
16. See Rolnick, supra note 9. Professor Rolnick’s argument is a nuanced one. She does not urge 
courts to abandon the Mancari rule. Rather, she contends that Mancari stands for a rift between 
civil rights approaches to equality and Indian law approaches to equality, and urges a contextualized 
and historicized understanding of the ways that Indians have been racialized. Rolnick’s aims are 
compatible with those of this Article, though to some extent the diagnoses and prescriptions 
diverge. Other scholars simply conflate classifications designed to redress the unique forms of 
discrimination against American Indians with other kinds of racial classifications and criticize them 
on that basis. See, e.g., RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE 86 (2005); RANDALL KENNEDY, 
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES 499 (2003) (both criticizing the Indian Child Welfare Act based on 
misplaced race-matching concerns). 
17. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 208–10 (2004) (refusing to consider improperly 
raised equal protection challenge, but inviting future litigants to raise the issue).  
18. Scholars have urged such a reinterpretation. See Rolnick, supra note 9, at 967, 1036; Rose 
Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 801 (2008). In general, an anti-subordinationist approach toward racial and ethnic 
classifications interrogates whether the classifications perpetuate historical structural forms of 
subordination that hinder substantive equality today, whereas a color-blind formalist approach 
simply asks whether the classifications check people off by race, irrespective of the law’s purpose to 
correct or remedy racial inequality.  
19. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1991) (reviewing and critiquing earlier development of the color-blind paradigm in equal protection 
analysis); Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero Sum 
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (2010) (canvassing recent cases 
embracing a color-blind approach to discrimination cases).  
20. For a compelling argument in support of the constitutional legitimacy of the political 
relationship doctrine, see Fletcher, supra note 9, at 165–71. 
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determination would be very harmful to tribes and their members. There 
are, therefore, practical reasons to support the current doctrinal 
formulation, despite its conceptual flaws. 
In addition to the pragmatic benefits of the Mancari doctrine, 
Mancari was right, even if for reasons not appreciated by the Court. The 
legal categories “federally recognized tribe” and “tribal member” are 
inextricably political. The federal government’s policies with respect to 
creating Indian reservations and establishing federally recognized tribes 
included the following actions: forcing distinct linguistic, ethnic, and 
political groupings of indigenous peoples onto the same reservation; 
dispersing cohesive groups apart on separate reservations; and requiring 
that these politically-assembled groups become a single political entity 
in order to retain their pre-constitutional, pre-contact sovereignty. Some 
or all of these practices are evident in the legal histories of the two tribal 
groups examined here. The histories of the CRIT and the ten federally 
recognized tribes of the Great Sioux Nation that are now located in the 
Dakotas reveal the disjunction between pre-contact ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural, and territorial affiliation on the one hand and legal status as a 
federally recognized tribe on the other. 
The legal categories of tribe and tribal member are therefore political 
in both a negative and positive sense. They are products of the politics of 
subordinating indigenous peoples and accessing their land and 
resources.21 Yet they derive from tribes’ pre-contact inherent 
sovereignty, a political status that has been recognized since the 
founding of the United States.22 Throughout history, and particularly in 
recent times, tribes have used their political status as sovereigns to 
protect their land, livelihood, and culture.23 Tribal membership gives 
important legal and political protection for ethnic, cultural, and linguistic 
affiliation, even if those categories do not track perfectly along the lines 
of the particular federally recognized tribe.24 But even if American 
Indian tribes and tribal members, as agents of their own political and 
legal fate, have made the best possible use of a legal construct, the 
                                                     
21. See infra Part III.  
22. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 164–72 (documenting the original understanding, embraced by 
the framers in the Constitution, of the federal government’s political relationship with Indian tribes). 
23. See Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic 
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1195 (2004) (concluding that tribes are enacting 
sovereignty on the ground in ways that foster and protect unique group identity that stems from 
place-based wisdom and culture). “The Navajo Nation experience indicates that domesticating 
federal Indian law, warts and all, can be part of the process of enacting tribal sovereignty.” Id.  
24. See infra text accompanying notes 337–47 (discussing CRIT today).  
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darker aspects of its origins remain.25 
This Article unearths the inherently political construction of the legal 
categories “federally recognized tribe” and “tribal member” in the 
following way. Part I provides legal background in equal protection 
doctrine and in the history of federal recognition of tribal status, 
including how federal recognition became a prerequisite for tribes’ 
retention of their political and legal sovereignty. Part II examines the 
legal history of federal recognition and membership composition of the 
CRIT and the Sioux tribes of the Dakotas. 
Part III locates these histories in theories about racial formation and 
colonialism in the American Indian context. Specifically, it examines the 
social construction of the American Indian “race” according to the 
approach developed by Michael Omi and Howard Winant.26 Omi and 
Winant’s racial formation theory “emphasizes the social nature of race, 
the absence of any essential racial characteristics, the historical 
flexibility of racial meanings and categories, the conflictual character of 
race at both the ‘micro-’ and ‘macro-social’ levels, and the irreducible 
political aspect of racial dynamics.”27 Patrick Wolfe, applying a similar 
theoretical approach to the context of indigenous peoples, has 
documented the ways that racial regimes are deployed to achieve 
distinctive ends in settler-colonialist societies, like the United States and 
Australia.28 The object of settler colonialism is to separate indigenous 
                                                     
25. Understanding those origins sheds necessary light on structures that, to this day, constrain 
American Indian law and civil rights law from achieving their promise of self-determination and 
anti-subordination. Some scholars argue this point more strenuously than others. See WILLIAMS, 
supra note 9 (arguing that federal Indian law will never result in true self-determination for tribes 
unless the foundational cases, which rely on racialized understandings of tribes, are reversed); 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L. REV. 295, 303 
(2011) (“In sum, federal Indian law is both about race and not about race.”); see also Robert B. 
Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize American Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 899 (1998) (arguing that core aspects of federal Indian law are infected with the 
subordinating process of colonization and therefore require thorough revision).  
26. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 
1994); see also IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev. 
ed. 2006) (analyzing the role of law in the formation of racial hierarchies in the United States); 
Laura E. Gómez, Race Mattered: Racial Formation and the Politics of Crime in Territorial New 
Mexico, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1395 (2002) (extending racial formation theory to territorial New 
Mexico).  
27. OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 4. 
28. See Patrick Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race, 106 AM. 
HIST. REV. 866, 867 (2001) [hereinafter Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference] (“[R]ace is but one 
among various regimes of difference that have served to distinguish dominant groups from groups 
whom they initially encountered in colonial contexts . . . . American Indians and Aboriginal people 
in Australia share much more than the quality of attracting assimilation policies. Above all, they are 
both sets of peoples whose territorial expropriation was foundational to the colonial formations into 
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peoples from their land, rather than to extract labor from them.29 The 
racial formation of American Indians was therefore very different from 
that of African-American slaves.30 With respect to the former, the racial 
logic followed the path of elimination: the fewer indigenous peoples 
standing between settler colonists and claims to land, the better.31 With 
respect to the latter, the racial logic was that of proliferation: “one drop” 
of African blood resulted in blackness, because the more slaves (or, 
post-slavery, legally disenfranchised blacks), the larger the labor force.32 
As Part III discusses, the legal histories of the CRIT and the Great Sioux 
Nation support the settler colonialist theory in various uncanny ways, in 
that tribes were constructed and racialized consistent with the agenda of 
clearing the territory for non-Indians. 
Part IV applies the insights from the previous sections to 
contemporary equal protection issues. Federal policies defining tribal 
status and limiting tribal territory furthered the political goals of fixing 
tribes in time and space in order to effectuate non-Indian settlement. 
Each “federally recognized tribe” still reflects that eliminationist policy, 
even though each tribe also has legitimate pre-contact claims to an 
inherent sovereignty that was never relinquished. Recently, some federal 
                                                     
which Europeans incorporated them.”). Settler-colonialism, the term for the type of colonization 
that occurred in North and South America, Australia, and New Zealand, is characterized primarily 
by a population of settlers who came to stay and who, in relatively short order, outnumbered the 
aboriginal inhabitants of the land. See generally PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra 
note 8; see also AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 12–13 (2010) (defining 
settler empire and describing key features and consequences of that status). 
29. See Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, at 868 (“As opposed to franchise-
colonial relationships (such as the British Raj, the Netherlands East Indies), settler colonialism seeks 
to replace the natives on their land rather than extract surplus value by mixing their labor with a 
colony’s natural resources.”). 
30. See id. at 866–67, 881. 
31. See id. at 867–68. 
32. See WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 8, at 2. As Wolfe explains, settler 
colonialism establishes a logic of race for indigenous peoples that differs from that of other colonial 
societies, and also differs from the logic applied to African slaves. This is because settler colonialist 
societies, including the United States and Australia, were faced with the problem of a minority 
aboriginal population from whom the settlers desired, foremost, to extract land. By contrast, African 
slaves were racialized in ways that comported with the primary goal of extracting labor:  
The relationship between Native and African Americans illustrates the distinction particularly 
well. In the main, Native (North) Americans were cleared from their land rather than exploited 
for their labour, their place being taken by displaced Africans who provided the labour to be 
mixed with the expropriated land. . . . The ramifications of this distinction flow through, 
particularly in so far as they affect the different constructions of ‘miscegenation’ that have 
been applied to the two communities. Briefly, whilst the one-drop rule has meant that the 
category ‘black’ can withstand unlimited admixture, the category ‘red’ has been highly 
vulnerable to dilution. 
Id. at 1–2.  
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courts have indicated that they would rethink Mancari’s rational basis 
approach if they were not constrained by precedent.33 For example, a 
federal district court in Massachusetts recently upheld a state gaming 
law against an equal protection challenge, but only because Mancari 
required that outcome.34 If the court could have started from scratch, it 
would have adopted a tiered approach, subjecting classifications 
“relating to native land, tribal status or Indian culture” to “minimal 
review,” but subjecting “[l]aws granting gratuitous Indian preferences 
divorced from those interests, [such as] a law granting tribes a quasi-
monopoly on casino gaming . . . to more searching scrutiny.”35 
Judicial attempts to untangle the racial from the political by deferring 
to policies that the courts think are consistent with traditional Indian 
affairs (land, status, culture), but scrutinizing those that the courts deem 
“gratuitous preferences,” such as regulations of economic activity that 
treat tribes as sovereign governments (as the gaming laws do), are more 
likely to perpetuate the racialized agenda of eliminating tribes than to 
reverse it. Tools already exist for federal courts interested in scrutinizing 
federal laws and classifications that harm tribes and tribal members by 
exceeding the bounds of the trust relationship.36 Dismantling Mancari’s 
rational basis approach to classifications that recognize tribal self-
governance and allow tribes to move beyond stereotypical assumptions 
about Indian status and culture would put the federal courts, to 
paraphrase Professor Phil Frickey, in the role of modern-day colonizer.37 
The legal histories of the CRIT and the Sioux Tribes, analyzed in the 
context of race, sovereignty, and tribal membership, reveal that 
unraveling the logic of racism in American Indian law has much less to 
do with tinkering with the Mancari rule than it does with facing squarely 
the workings of power, politics, and law in the context of the United 
States’ unique brand of settler colonialism. The way to counter the logic 
of elimination is to support laws and policies that perpetuate the separate 
                                                     
33. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005); KG Urban Enters., LLC v. 
Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Mass.), aff’d in part, vacated and remanded in part, 693 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2012), discussed infra Part IV.A.  
34. See KG Urban Enters., 839 F. Supp. 2d 388. 
35. Id. at 404. 
36. See Bethany Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1165, 1187 (2010) (making a similar argument about Mancari, and describing the failure of 
subsequent cases to “explain [Mancari’s] rationale or build on its potential.”); Nell Jessup Newton, 
Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 279 
(1984) (arguing that there is room, under the existing Mancari formulation, for courts to scrutinize 
legislation that harms tribal rights). 
37. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 76 (1999).  
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sovereign political status of tribes as peoples, rather than to dismantle 
tribes by subjecting them to judicial scrutiny in a futile attempt to 
disentangle the racial from the political. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF EQUAL PROTECTION, TRIBAL 
RECOGNITION, AND TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP 
According to a number of indicia, the United States is well on its way 
to becoming a “post-racial” society.38 Yet the considerable legal and 
political machinery devoted, since the Civil Rights era, to stamping out 
racial discrimination has nonetheless failed to eliminate the structures 
that legalized forms of racism set in motion.39 The structures themselves 
are complicated, taking root in law, culture, and politics in ways that 
require deep and sustained attention to arrive at approaches that may 
finally deliver on the promise of equality.40 Furthermore, the very 
definition of equality may vary depending on the origins and forms of 
prior subordination.41 For Native people in the U.S., equality 
encompasses the right to continue as members of their own sovereign 
Indian nations, as well as the right to be free from racial discrimination 
perpetrated by state or federal actors.42 
                                                     
38. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau announced recently that, for the first time, there were 
more minority children under the age of one than there were white children. See Most Children 
Younger Than Age 1 are Minorities, Census Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 17, 
2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb12-90.html. California, 
Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas have majority-minority populations. See Census Bureau Releases 
State and County Data Depicting Nation’s Population Ahead of 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (May 14, 2009), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb09-
76.html. 
39. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLOR BLINDNESS (2010); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, NOT EVEN PAST: BARACK OBAMA AND THE 
BURDEN OF RACE (2010); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography 
in Legal Analysis, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 
449, 450 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY].  
40. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 39; SUGRUE, supra note 39; see also WILLIAM JULIUS 
WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR IN THE INNER CITY (2009) (attributing 
the persistence of poverty for urban African-Americans to the legacies of legalized racism, race-
neutral changes in the economy that disproportionately affected black urban areas, as well as to 
cultural factors that were inevitable adaptations to legal and de facto isolation).  
41. See Berger, supra note 9; Fletcher, supra note 25; Carole Goldberg, American Indians and 
“Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943 (2002); Juan Perea, The Black/White Binary 
Paradigm of Race: Exploring the “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1213 (1997); Rolnick, supra note 9. 
42. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.03[2][a], at 918–19 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2005 ) [hereinafter COHEN] (“Federal constitutional protections for individual 
rights against state or federal action do not differentiate Indians from other claimants . . . . Yet 
Indians, especially when they are invoking tribal interests, continue to fit uneasily into the 
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From a certain (perhaps naïve) vantage point, one might expect that 
the complicated and varied manifestations of inequality would have 
resulted in more nuanced forms of legal redress. The federal courts, 
however, have followed a steady course away from recognizing broad 
structural forms of discrimination and their varied effects. Instead, the 
courts have adopted a model of individualized harm, which requires 
showings of individual racist intent.43 This is true even in the context of 
remedies for historical patterns of intentional discrimination. The 
trajectory of equal protection analysis in school desegregation cases is 
illustrative. In the years following Brown v. Board of Education,44 
federal courts enforced a wide variety of remedies aimed at 
desegregating school districts where intentional racial discrimination had 
been found. Gradually, remedies that reached beyond the school districts 
themselves, or that aimed prophylactically to achieve racial integration, 
were rejected by the courts.45 As the federal judiciary’s heroic civil 
rights era receded into the past, the notion that courts should resolve 
societal harms caused by structures of racial discrimination receded with 
it.46 
In parallel with the courts’ withdrawal from implementing broad 
remedies to racial discrimination, the judiciary imposed increasingly 
exacting scrutiny on voluntary programs aimed at increasing 
representation of racial minorities. White plaintiffs successfully 
challenged affirmative action programs in the contexts of employment, 
education, and other state or federal benefits.47 While to date the 
                                                     
constitutional framework for protection of individual rights.”). 
43. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND POLICIES 710 (3d ed. 
2006); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 1009 (2002); Norton, 
supra note 19; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 (2004) (“[E]qual protection 
law has expressed anticlassification, rather than antisubordination, commitments as it has developed 
over the past half-century.”).  
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
45. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (striking 
down a school district’s use of race as a tiebreaker in magnet school applications in order to achieve 
racial balance); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (rejecting inter-district bussing as a 
remedy for segregation within an inner-city school district, even when “white flight” was a 
consequence of the intra-city desegregation remedy).  
46. See Norton, supra note 19.  
47. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding policy of racial preference in 
admissions at state law school); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down policy of 
racial preference for undergraduate admissions at state university); City of Richmond v. Croson, 
488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down affirmative action program in city contracting); Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down school board’s policy of extending 
preferential protection against layoffs to some employees because of their race); Regents of Univ. of 
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Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that achieving racial 
and ethnic diversity can be a constitutional objective in certain narrow 
contexts, the circumstances that justify race-conscious programs have 
little to do with the history of the legally sanctioned racial caste system 
that constructed our past.48 In today’s doctrinal landscape, discrimination 
on the basis of race is not a claim made against the backdrop of history 
but in the context of an individual encounter, independent of time and 
space. Yet it is impossible to understand American Indian law without 
knowing its history.49 The entirety of the constitutionally based 
government-to-government relationship between Indian nations and the 
United States rests on that history.50 Equal protection challenges to laws 
and programs that benefit American Indian tribes and tribal members lie 
at this crossroads of ahistorical doctrine and historically-dependent 
context. 
A.  The Mancari Equal Protection Framework 
In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court upheld a Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) employment preference against a challenge brought by 
non-Indian plaintiffs.51 The Court held that federal classifications that 
benefit American Indians should be upheld so long as they can be tied to 
Congress’s “unique obligations toward the Indians.”52 To put this in the 
context of equal protection doctrine generally, the Supreme Court has 
settled on a three-tier system for the judicial review of equal protection 
challenges to federal or state actions that burden or benefit particular 
groups.53 First, the Court subjects most classifications to rational basis 
                                                     
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking down quantitative means to achieve racial diversity in 
state medical school).  
48. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323–33 (reaffirming Bakke’s rejection of remedying past or societal 
discrimination as compelling interest but affirming limited use of race as a factor to enhance 
educational environment).  
49. See COHEN, supra note 42, § 1.01, at 6–7 (describing the centrality of history to American 
Indian law); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 1 
(1983) (“It is impossible to understand American Indians in their contemporary setting without first 
gaining some knowledge of their history as it has been formed and shaped by the Indian experience 
with Western civilization.”); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 4–
5 (1987) (describing commitment to historical promises and relationships as the key recurring theme 
in modern Indian law).  
50. See COHEN, supra note 42, § 1.01, at 8 (“The centuries-old relationship between the United 
States and Indian nations is founded upon historic government-to-government dealings and a long-
held recognition of Indians’ special legal status.”).  
51. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).  
52. Id. at 555.  
53. Equal protection challenges to federal action are brought under the Due Process Clause of the 
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review, meaning that if the legal distinction is based on any facially 
plausible rationale, the Court will not second-guess the legislative 
decision.54 Second, a middle-tier of review (known as “intermediate 
scrutiny”), applied most commonly to classifications based on sex, asks 
whether the distinction is reasonably related to an important 
governmental objective.55 And third, classifications based on race or 
ethnicity are subject to the Court’s most exacting review (“strict 
scrutiny”), which asks whether there is a compelling state interest that 
supports the classification and whether the government’s means of 
achieving that interest are narrowly tailored to the government’s 
objective.56 Overtly discriminatory classifications—those that deprive 
racial or ethnic groups of access to programs or benefits because of their 
racial or ethnic status—nearly automatically fail strict scrutiny.57 The 
harder cases, alluded to above, involve either actions that do not overtly 
sort people based on race or ethnicity, but that nonetheless result in 
disparate effects on minority racial or ethnic groups, or actions that sort 
people by race or ethnicity with the benign purpose of either remedying 
past discrimination or promoting diversity.58 Challenges to affirmative 
                                                     
Fifth Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
applies only to states, but the “Court repeatedly has held that the Fifth Amendment imposes on the 
Federal Government the same standard required of state legislation by the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981) (citing 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768–70 (1975); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971)).  
54. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding state law requiring police 
officers to retire at age fifty); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding 
school funding system that discriminated against poor districts); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
43, at 669–74 (summarizing tiers of judicial review). But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
(applying strengthened version of rational basis review to equal protection challenge involving 
distinctions based on sexual orientation).  
55. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), for the latest articulation of the gender 
standard of intermediate scrutiny. On very rare occasions, the Supreme Court has applied 
heightened review based on an ad-hoc mix of factors. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) 
(factors warranting heightened scrutiny included childhood, education, and minority status).  
56. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (strict scrutiny must be used in 
evaluating the routine racial segregation of new intake prisoners); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (federal affirmative action programs must meet strict scrutiny); Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down school board’s policy of extending 
preferential protection against layoffs to some employees because of their race); CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 43, at 694–95.  
57. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (state court acted unconstitutionally by taking into 
account a stepfather’s race in child custody case); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state 
miscegenation statute unconstitutional); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down 
statute requiring the race of candidates for office to be listed on ballots); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
43, at 671 (“Strict scrutiny is virtually always fatal to the challenged law.”).  
58. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); 
Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 
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action programs in education and employment fall into the latter 
category.59 
In Mancari, the Court adopted a form of the first type of review—
rational basis review—for federal classifications singling out members 
of American Indian tribes for distinctive treatment. According to 
Mancari, if the classification is based on tribal members’ political 
affiliation with a recognized American Indian tribe60 and furthers 
Congress’s “unique obligation” to American Indians, then the Court will 
not subject it to a heightened form of judicial review.61 For a host of 
practical and legal reasons, the Mancari rule makes sense. As the 
Mancari Court noted, the federal government has been treating 
American Indian tribes and their members distinctively since the 
country’s founding.62 License for distinctive treatment exists in the 
Constitution,63 in the history of federal–tribal legal relations,64 and in 
international law norms that formed the basis for domestic federal Indian 
law.65 Further, if the Court had held otherwise, federal courts could be 
subjecting scores of treaties, statutes, and policies to heightened judicial 
scrutiny.66 Professor Carole Goldberg has argued that the federal courts’ 
institutional limitations and biases make it at least plausible that much of 
federal Indian law would fail to survive this more exacting form of 
review.67 As she put it, “it seems unmanageable and unpredictable to 
rely on strict scrutiny survival as the basis for a response to the current 
                                                     
U.S. 279 (1987) (proof of racially disproportionate impact in administration of death penalty did not 
constitute equal protection violation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding police 
department’s use of a test that disproportionately disadvantaged African-American applicants).  
59. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S. 
469. 
60. 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (“The preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of 
‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes.”).  
61. Id. at 555. 
62. See id. at 551–53; see also Fletcher, supra note 9, at 164–72.  
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes”).  
64. See William W. Quinn, Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: The Historical 
Development of a Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 338–47 (1990). 
65. See ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 218 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 31 (1996); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) 
(relying on the discovery doctrine, including its origins in international law, as basis for U.S. 
relations with tribes).  
66. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. 
67. See Goldberg, supra note 41, at 955–57. 
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challenges to federal Indian law.”68 
Of course, Mancari’s practicality cannot constitute its sole defense. 
Scholars and courts have struggled with Mancari’s political-versus-
racial distinction for reasons that are, on the surface, understandable. For 
example, what does it mean for a classification to be based on tribal 
membership, as opposed to race or ethnicity? Mancari involved a 
challenge by four non-Indian BIA employees to a Bureau policy 
implementing a long-standing statutory preference for Indian 
employment in the agency.69 The preference, included in the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA),70 was a small part of a larger 
legislative program aimed at restoring self-governance to tribes.71 The 
connection in the IRA between membership in a political entity (an 
Indian tribe) and the employment preference was all but self-evident, 
given the overriding statutory scheme.72 Nonetheless, the IRA’s goal of 
improving tribal participation in the federal agency that oversees tribal 
affairs was largely neglected in the following decades. When the BIA, 
prompted by a lawsuit brought by tribal members in the 1970s,73 
implemented a policy to enforce the IRA’s mandate, it supplied the 
following definition of Indian: “To be eligible for preference in 
appointment, promotion, and training, an individual must be one-fourth 
or more degree Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized 
tribe.”74 The Mancari Court described this categorization as political, not 
racial: 
Contrary to the characterization made by appellees, this 
preference does not constitute “racial discrimination.” Indeed, it 
is not even a “racial” preference. Rather, it is an employment 
criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-
government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs 
of its constituent groups.75 
The Court’s distinction was not unjustified. As the Court explained, 
                                                     
68. Id. at 957. 
69. See 417 U.S. at 538–39. For a detailed history of Mancari, see Carole Goldberg, What’s Race 
Got to Do With It? The Story of Morton v. Mancari, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 389 (Carole Goldberg 
et al. eds., 2011).  
70. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79 
(2006)). 
71. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 542. 
72. See id.  
73. See Goldberg, supra note 69, at 389. 
74. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24 (quoting 44 Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual 335, 3.1).  
75. Id. at 553–54. 
06 - Krakoff Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:37 PM 
1058 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1041 
 
people who are Indian by descent (i.e., “racially” Indian), but not 
members of recognized tribes, are not eligible for the preference. What 
triggers the preference is the political status of being a tribal member.76 
The rub, however, was that the BIA guidelines required, in addition to 
tribal membership, one-fourth or more “Indian blood.”77 The BIA 
narrowed the political category (tribal members) further with the blood 
quantum requirement. And this mixing of membership and blood 
quantum has caused courts, especially those lacking background in 
American Indian law, to question Mancari’s neat distinction between 
political membership and racial/ethnic category.78 
Courts and scholars have also struggled with what it means for 
Congress to act in furtherance of its “unique obligation” to American 
Indians. As Carole Goldberg and Addie Rolnick have pointed out, 
Mancari has failed to fulfill its promise as an equal protection approach 
that upholds the political relationship between tribes and the United 
States but still scrutinizes federal actions that imposed unique burdens 
on American Indians.79 Instead, courts have applied Mancari’s rational 
basis analysis regardless of whether the distinctive treatment of 
American Indians furthered the political relationship between tribes and 
the federal government or not. For example, in United States v. 
Antelope,80 the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the Major 
Crimes Act,81 which subjects Indian defendants to federal prosecution 
for crimes occurring on tribal lands and often results in harsher 
convictions and sentences than would be meted out in state courts.82 The 
Court cited and quoted Mancari, but failed to provide any analysis of 
why a federal jurisdictional scheme for crimes by and against Native 
people fell within the government’s unique obligations to tribes.83 
                                                     
76. See id. at 553 n.24.  
77. The archaic use of the term “blood quantum” has become naturalized, but itself is a racialized 
term. See, e.g., ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN 
AMERICA (2008); Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 
51 S.D. L. REV. 1 (2006).  
78. See infra Part IV (discussing cases questioning Mancari’s distinction).  
79. See Goldberg, supra note 41, at 950, 959; Rolnick, supra note 9, at 993; see also Berger, 
supra note 36, at 1187 (reviewing post-Mancari cases and concluding that “these cases recite the 
language of Mancari while utterly failing to explain its rationale or build on its potential”).  
80. 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).  
82. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 648–50. 
83. See id. at 644–47. The precise issue in Antelope was whether subjecting two Indian 
defendants to a felony-murder prosecution under the Major Crimes Act violated the Equal 
Protection Clause when the state in which the crime occurred had no felony-murder provision. 
Under state law, the prosecution would have had to prove premeditation and deliberation, which are 
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Instead of applying Mancari in a way that distinguished between the 
federal government’s discriminatory or baseless actions toward 
American Indians on the one hand and actions that furthered the political 
and trust relationship with tribes on the other, the Court collapsed the 
analysis into a simple one-line formula: if the distinction is based on 
tribes or tribal membership, it will be upheld.84 Mancari has therefore 
become an extension of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs 
rather than a way to thoughtfully plumb the distinctions between 
oppressive federal treatment of Indians and treatment that furthers tribal 
sovereignty and self-determination.85 
Finally, Mancari unwittingly furthers a dichotomy between 
race/ethnicity and tribal membership that obscures the political nature of 
race and ethnicity themselves. Blackness, as scholars have argued, is a 
politico-legal category, as is whiteness.86 The legal constructions of race 
have served political ends, and in this sense all racial categories are also 
political categories. Thus while it is true that federal classifications 
based on tribes and tribal membership are “political,” it does not 
necessarily follow that they are not racial, as that term is defined to 
include the processes by which society has sorted people into racial 
castes.87 
Legal doctrine flattens and obscures the politics that inhere in racial 
categories, and tends, therefore, to perpetuate misconceptions about how 
to redress discrimination across groups. Because racial categories have 
unique histories, however, the legal implications that flow from them are 
necessarily distinct.88 By extension, strategies to address the ongoing 
structures of discrimination and subordination embedded in those legal 
categories are likewise distinct. Unearthing the racialization of American 
Indians that lies beneath the surface of the political classifications of 
                                                     
not elements under the federal felony-murder statute. See id. at 644. 
84. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, 501–02 (1979); Del. 
Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (rejecting equal protection challenge to 
congressional action distributing judgment award to Delaware descendants that excluded Kansas 
Delawares); see also Berger, supra note 36, at 1187 (canvassing the cases).  
85. The formulaic application of Mancari’s rule is part of what has led some courts astray in 
more recent applications of equal protection analysis. These cases are discussed infra Part IV. 
86. See LÓPEZ, supra note 26; OMI & WINANT, supra note 26; Devon W. Carbado, Racial 
Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633 (2005); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1707 (1993); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499–1504 (2005) 
(describing socio-legal process of designation, delineation, and assignment of meaning of racial 
categories).  
87. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966).  
88. See Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28.  
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tribes and tribal members, therefore, serves at least two purposes. First, 
it aligns American Indians more clearly with all other groups that have 
been subordinated by race. Second, it clarifies that each group’s path to 
anti-subordination must be as distinctive as the form of the racialization 
itself. 
Law plays a starring role in the construction of racial categories and 
in how they are interpreted through the lens of equal protection today. 
What it means to be African-American in the United States includes the 
history of slavery, reconstruction, the dismantling of reconstruction, Jim 
Crow, and the Civil Rights era.89 Likewise, what it means to be 
American Indian, and even more obviously a member of a “federally 
recognized tribe,” is a product of the legal history of the United States’ 
interaction with and policies toward indigenous peoples. Therefore, to 
understand Mancari’s rule and where it fits in the larger socio-legal 
landscape it is necessary to review the evolution of the “federally 
recognized tribe.” 
B.  From Independent Sovereigns to Federally Recognized Tribes 
Today, the Department of the Interior maintains a list of tribes that are 
recognized as political sovereigns by the federal government.90 This 
status places American Indian tribes and their members in a different 
legal category (for certain purposes, and with important exceptions) 
from other racial and ethnic groups.91 To understand Mancari’s political 
relationship doctrine one must understand the history of how the federal 
government arrived at the list of federally recognized tribes as well as 
what does and does not flow from being on the list. With respect to the 
former, the historical record reveals that the need for increasingly formal 
definitions of tribes often (though not always) coincided with federal 
policies aimed at one or more of the following goals: consolidating the 
                                                     
89. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation 
in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39, at 103, 112–16 (summarizing 
history of legal, social and economic forms of constructing blackness as subordinate). 
90. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.5(a) (2012) (requiring the Department of the Interior to publish a list of all 
federally recognized tribes no less frequently than once every three years); Indian Entities 
Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 75 
Fed. Reg. 60,810 (Oct. 1, 2010) (most recently published list).  
91. Members of unacknowledged and terminated tribes are, in some instances, entitled to similar 
programs and benefits as federally recognized tribes. See Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With 
Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1470–76 
(1991). At the same time, Native Americans are also eligible, as members of underrepresented 
minority groups, for federal programs aimed at remedying past discrimination on similar terms as 
other minority groups. See id. at 1488–89. 
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federal government’s authority over Indian affairs, pushing tribes onto 
well-defined (and smaller) territories, and assimilating tribes and tribal 
members into the majority society. With respect to what does and does 
not flow from federal recognition, the most significant implications are 
acknowledgement of tribal self-government and inherent sovereign 
powers (and all of the legal implications, including freedom from state 
laws, that result from that status),92 and the federal government’s trust 
obligation (as troubled as the trust relationship may be).93 In addition, 
with federal recognition comes eligibility for federal programs that 
benefit tribal members.94 
1.  History of Federal Recognition 
Legal scholars point to several key judicial, legislative, and executive 
decisions when they describe the criteria and definitions for federally 
recognized tribes. With respect to case law, the Supreme Court’s 
definitions in Montoya v. United States,95 United States v. Sandoval,96 
and the First Circuit’s in Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton97 provided the 
basic framework for the common law definition of a recognized Indian 
tribe. In terms of legislation, the IRA purported to sort tribes into two 
groups, those eligible for the federal government’s services and trust 
relationship, and those not. And finally, in 1978 the Executive Branch, 
responding to a wave of litigation over land claims and the attendant 
issue of federal recognition, promulgated regulations requiring a list of 
all federally recognized tribes and criteria for unrecognized tribal groups 
                                                     
92. See generally COHEN, supra note 42, at ch.4–ch.7 (providing a detailed overview of these 
areas of American Indian law).  
93. The trust relationship includes specific legal and fiduciary obligations as well as a general 
duty to protect and safeguard tribes as separate governments. But the trust obligations are also 
amorphous and difficult to enforce, and have sometimes been used against tribes due to a 
formulation that imports the dated understandings of dependency and subordination. See Alex 
Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Trust We Can Trust: The Role of the Trust Doctrine in the 
Management of Tribal Natural Resources, in TRIBES, LAND, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (Sarah 
Krakoff & Ezra Rosser eds., 2012).  
94. Though, some federal programs are available to Indians who are not members of federally 
recognized tribes, and in the case of federal criminal jurisdiction, “membership” is defined more 
expansively than in other contexts. The varied definitions for eligibility for programs and criminal 
prosecution hint at the difficulty of cabining the federal government’s obligations to indigenous 
peoples to the formally defined list of recognized tribes. It is, nonetheless, an important starting 
point for excavating the inextricably political relationship between tribes and the federal 
government. 
95. 180 U.S. 261 (1901). 
96. 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
97. 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).  
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to obtain recognition through an administrative process.98 These legal 
moments and definitions are embedded in the gradual historical process 
of tribes evolving from free and independent sovereigns that predated 
European settlement into entities locked, by legal and extralegal acts, 
into an exclusive relationship with the United States. 
a.  1783–1871: Sorting “Friends” from “Enemies” 
Given the United States’ early and recurring interest in resolving 
indigenous land and resource claims, one might expect the early 
appearance of some sort of legal definition of an Indian tribe. Yet 
according to legal historian William W. Quinn, “In fact, the historical 
record reveals a consistent uncertainty and even confusion on the part of 
the several branches of government of the United States about its 
relations with and legal responsibilities toward certain Indian tribes 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”99 Quinn divides 
the history into three phases prior to 1978, when the federal 
acknowledgment criteria were promulgated.100 The first phase, from 
1783–1871, was characterized largely by what Quinn labels the 
“cognitive” type, meaning that the use of the terms “recognized” and 
“acknowledged” did not have a jurisdictional meaning but rather 
indicated that the federal government knew of the tribe’s existence.101 
Within this cognitive type, the federal government had several 
categories. The fifth iteration of the Trade and Intercourse Act,102 for 
example, included the following designations for Indians and Indian 
tribes: 
[T]hose whose lands were “secured by treaty with the United 
States” (as against those whose lands were not); those “in amity 
with” the United States; “friendly Indian tribes”; and “Indians 
                                                     
98. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 43 
Fed. Reg. 39361 (Aug. 24, 1978) (codified as amended at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83 (2012)). 
99. Quinn, supra note 64, at 332. 
100. See id. A necessary precursor to the first phase is the colonial recognition of American 
Indian sovereignty. See id. at 336–38 (summarizing the legacy of the colonial period as “a heritage 
that recognized, albeit sometimes grudgingly, the sovereignty of Indian tribes relative to the 
continent”). Quinn’s three phases are 1783–1871, 1871–1934, and 1934–1978. See id. This Article 
uses the same dates to organize the discussion here, but emphasize different aspects of the United 
States’ developing definition of “federally recognized tribes.” Quinn emphasizes the increasing 
formality of the definition, in largely descriptive fashion. The analysis here takes a more critical 
look at the components of the evolving definition of tribes and the forces behind the need for 
formalization.  
101. See id. at 339.  
102. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139. 
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living on lands surrounded by settlements of the citizens of the 
United States, and being within the ordinary jurisdiction of any 
of the individual states.”103 
As the nineteenth century proceeded and the United States gradually 
expanded its territory across the continent, the need arose for a more 
precise accounting of which indigenous peoples might stand in the way 
of western settlement. To meet this need, in 1822, Jedidiah Morse 
published a report commissioned by the Secretary of War that undertook 
to list and categorize all tribes as well as report on their conditions.104 
Morse distinguished so-called civilized from uncivilized tribes, the 
former being those on the western edge of American settlement and the 
latter the New England tribes, whose earlier encounter with colonists 
and settlers had resulted in their subjugation and assimilation. For 
example, Morse described the Osage as being in “moral darkness” with 
no knowledge of god,105 prone to “mischievous and atrocious 
expedition[s],”106 and having little hope for improvement without the 
influence of religious instruction.107 By contrast, the Passamaquoddy of 
Maine were described favorably, under the care of the Catholics, and 
with a governor who is “pious, and well disposed to receive 
instruction.”108 This same alignment of negative characteristics 
(uncivilized, wild, lacking god, etc.) with persistent tribal affiliation, and 
positive characteristics (pious, receptive to instruction, etc.) with 
assimilation, was relied on in the 1860 Census to sort Indians into the 
categories of “civilized” or “retaining their tribal character.”109 This 
dichotomy, which reflects the distinct ways in which Indians were 
racialized,110 would also emerge and recur later as the federal 
government attempted to impose greater juridical meaning on the 
distinction between “tribes” and groups of assimilated Indians.111 
In the 1830s, the United States’ removal policies heightened the need 
                                                     
103. Id. at 341 (quoting Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 12, 2 Stat. 139). 
104. JEDIDIAH MORSE, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF THE UNITED STATES ON 
INDIAN AFFAIRS (1822), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044014221147. 
105. Id. at 233. 
106. Id. at 234. 
107. Id. at 235. 
108. Id. at 65. 
109. See O’Brien, supra note 91, at 1464 n.8 (citing CENSUS OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, 
REPORT ON INDIANS TAXED AND INDIANS NOT TAXED IN THE UNITED STATES (EXCEPT ALASKA) 
AT THE ELEVENTH CENSUS: 1890, at 15 (1894)).  
110. See Berger, supra note 9, at 606. 
111. See infra notes 155–63 and 174–80 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. 
Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876) and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)). 
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to label and categorize Indian tribes.112 Removal of the Cherokee, Creek, 
Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Seminole from their homelands in the 
Southeast required, at a minimum, the identification of which tribes still 
had possessory interests in their lands.113 Similarly, the removal and 
consolidation of tribes throughout the west onto smaller homelands 
necessitated categorizing tribes into those that would be provided federal 
services and Indian agents and those that would not.114 During this 
period, Chief Justice Marshall decided the last two cases in his Indian 
law trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia115 and Worcester v. Georgia.116 
Cherokee Nation, which held that Indian tribes were “domestic 
dependent nations” retaining aspects of their pre-contact sovereignty but 
implicitly divested of their powers over foreign affairs, took steps 
toward defining the jurisdictional implications of being a tribe but did 
not otherwise shed light on the criteria necessary to achieve that 
status.117 Likewise, Worcester, which held that state laws had no force or 
effect within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation even in the midst of 
the Removal era, shed significant light on the legal effects of tribal 
sovereign status.118 Yet Worcester, like Cherokee Nation, had no need to 
address the criteria for being a tribe because the Cherokee had entered 
into treaties with the United States.119 
In the decades following the Civil War, all three branches of 
government began to use “acknowledged” and “recognized” in ways that 
accord with the present jurisdictional meaning, rather than in the 
cognitive sense that predominated previously.120 In The Kansas 
Indians,121 the Supreme Court made the first foray into defining tribes 
for jurisdictional purposes. The case involved whether Kansas could tax 
lands owned by individual Indians from the Shawnee, Wea, and Miami 
tribes.122 In rejecting Kansas’ imposition of the tax, the Court explained 
                                                     
112. See COHEN, supra note 42, § 1.03[4].  
113. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 342–43.  
114. Id. at 343–44 (discussing the Indian Removal Act, Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 
411; the Act establishing the post of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Act of July 9, 1832, ch. 174, 
§ 4, 4 Stat. 564; and the final Trade and Intercourse Act, Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 
729). 
115. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).  
116. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
117. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
118. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. 
119. See id. at 551–52 (describing Treaty terms). 
120. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 347. 
121. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866). 
122. Id. at 737. 
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that if each tribe’s political organizations were preserved intact and 
“recognized by the political department of the government as existing, 
then they are a ‘people distinct from others,’ capable of making treaties, 
separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas, and to be governed 
exclusively by the government of the Union.”123 The Court’s conclusion 
rested on the tribes’ treaty with the United States as well as on the tribes’ 
degree of political and legal organization: 
The treaty of 1854 left the Shawnee people a united tribe, with a 
declaration of their dependence on the National government for 
protection and the vindication of their rights. Ever since this 
their tribal organization has remained as it was before. They 
have elective chiefs and an elective council; meeting at stated 
periods; keeping a record of their proceedings; with powers 
regulated by custom; by which they punish offences, adjust 
differences, and exercise a general oversight over the affairs of 
the nation. This people have their own customs and laws by 
which they are governed.124 
The Court’s language, while occasionally exhibiting the assumption 
of Indian inferiority endemic to the times,125 nonetheless embraced a 
political understanding of the definition of an Indian tribe. The Court 
concluded that “the action of the political department of the government 
settles, beyond controversy, that the Shawnees are as yet a distinct 
people, with a perfect tribal organization.”126 
b.  1871–1934: Assimilation of the Individual and Racialization of the 
Tribe 
Most Indian law scholars define the years from 1887–1928 as the 
Allotment and Assimilation period in federal Indian policy.127 Like most 
                                                     
123. Id. at 755.  
124. Id. at 756. 
125. See id. The Court’s language is disparaging, yet it is also embedded in an overall recognition 
of the tribes’ well-functioning governmental status and structures.  
Because some of those customs have been abandoned, owing to the proximity of their white 
neighbors, may be an evidence of the superior influence of our race, but does not tend to prove 
that their tribal organization is not preserved. There is no evidence in the record to show that 
the Indians with separate estates have not the same rights in the tribe as those whose estates are 
held in common. Their machinery of government, though simple, is adapted to their 
intelligence and wants, and effective, with faithful agents to watch over them. 
Id. Both its content and tone are therefore far less overtly discriminatory than in United States v. 
Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), and Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901), discussed below.  
126. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 756. 
127. See ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 105 
(2d ed. 2010); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 49, at 8. 
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historical periodization, there is an arbitrary quality to the dates. Some 
Allotment and Assimilation policies predated 1887.128 In addition, in 
1871, Congress enacted a statute purporting to limit the President’s 
power to enter into treaties with tribes.129 For the topic at hand, the 1871 
date is an appropriate starting point. It marks the beginning of a period 
that necessitated definitions of tribes in order to freeze their numbers 
and, eventually, eliminate them. Similarly, 1934 is the better ending 
point, because it marks the official end of allotment with the passage of 
the IRA, which also included the first attempt to list all federally 
recognized tribes.130 
The 1871 Act announced that “hereafter no Indian nation or tribe 
within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or 
recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty.”131 The legislation was initiated by 
members of the House of Representatives who resented that treaties 
ratified by the Senate repeatedly forced the House’s hand with respect to 
appropriations.132 Yet declaring that the government would no longer 
enter into treaties did nothing to alter the fact that there were many 
Indian tribes remaining with valid claims to territory and self-
governance: “The BIA, if not Congress, was acutely aware of the 
existence of numerous Indian Tribes in the western states with no treaty 
relations between them and the United States. Some new criterion or 
criteria would have to be adopted to determine from henceforth which 
tribes would be provided services.”133 Congress’s attempt to end treaty 
making with tribes did not, in other words, erase the existence of tribes 
themselves. The 1871 Act, therefore, begged the question of some 
further way to define and take account of those tribes. In 1872, a year 
after the legislation was enacted, Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Francis Walker “asked this rhetorical question: ‘How are Indians, never 
                                                     
128. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 49, at 8 (describing pre-1887 allotment policies and 
laws).  
129. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. § 71 
(2006)). While the statute appeared to bring an end to treaty making, in reality, the federal 
government continued to enter into various agreements, carried out through executive order or 
legislation, with Indian tribes as political bodies. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 90–91. 
Furthermore, scholars and at least one Justice have raised questions about the constitutionality of the 
provision. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); David P. Currie, Indian Treaties, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 445 (2007).  
130. See infra notes 181–96 and accompanying text (discussing the Indian Reorganization Act). 
131. 16 Stat. at 566.  
132. See Currie, supra note 129, at 447.  
133. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 347.  
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yet treated with, but having every way as good and as complete rights to 
portions of our territory as had the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and 
Chickasaws, for instance . . . to establish their rights?’”134 Solving the 
perennial “Indian problem” by revoking the treaty power created a new 
one: how otherwise to address and resolve outstanding Indian claims. 
Most scholars describe Allotment as beginning in 1887 because this 
was the year that the Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act,135 was 
passed. East Coast organizations and Western politicians agitated for the 
break-up of tribal governments and, in particular, the tribal land base 
that made tribal cultural and political life possible.136 According to these 
constituencies, tribes’ separate status, which allowed them to perpetuate 
their traditions and culture, had to be destroyed in order to allow 
individual Indians to assimilate successfully in to American society. As 
Professor Berger has described, during this period “[f]ederal Indian 
policy, which previously vacillated between sovereign and racialized 
views of tribes, moved decisively toward the latter.”137 E.P. Smith, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs during 1874–1876, opined that “the 
difficulty of Indian ‘civilization’ is ‘[n]ot so inherent in the race-
character and disposition of the Indian . . . as in his anomalous relation 
to the Government.’”138 The racialized tribe was seen as the locus of 
Indian backwardness and inferiority. Destruction of the tribe was 
therefore prerequisite to liberating the individual Indian.139 
The Dawes Act’s primary means for accomplishing the goal of tribal 
destruction was to shatter the tribally held land base. The Act authorized 
the break-up of tribal land into individually held allotments for tribal 
members and the declaration of any surplus lands as open for non-Indian 
settlement.140 In order to allot the lands, the Act and related allotment 
statutes required many tribes to develop membership rolls.141 As one of 
                                                     
134. Id. (quoting ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 83 (1872)).  
135. Indian General Allotment Act, chs. 105, 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 331–358 (2006)). 
136. See AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN”: 
1880–1900 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973) [hereinafter AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS] 
(collected writings and speeches by the Friends of the Indian in support of allotment and 
assimilation); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 49, at 8–9. 
137. Berger, supra note 9, at 629. 
138. Quinn, supra note 64, at 347 (quoting ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 374 (1874)).  
139. See id. at 347 (describing attitudes of federal officials towards tribes during allotment).  
140. 24 Stat. 388.  
141. See Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612, 645 (authorizing the Dawes commission 
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the Friends of the Indians put it at their annual gathering in Mohonk, 
New York, the Allotment policy was “a mighty pulverizing engine for 
breaking up the tribal mass.”142 Much of this work would be 
accomplished through allotment, as well as the subsequent process of 
releasing individual Indian allotments from restrictions on alienability.143 
As Paul Spruhan has documented, the criteria for determining who 
should be released from restrictions on alienation was based on intricate 
and byzantine rules about blood quantum, particularly for the Cherokee, 
Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw of Oklahoma.144 
The process of developing tribal rolls, and then using those rolls to 
disburse land as individual allotments in order to eliminate their trust 
status, has had lingering harmful effects on tribes and individual 
Indians.145 In some instances, people of unquestionable tribal affiliation 
were omitted from the rolls simply by oversight or unseemly 
bureaucratic delay. Professor Eva Marie Garroutte has described how 
“[t]he compilation of some tribal rolls . . . took so long that a significant 
number of registrants died before the paperwork was 
completed. . . . Even when an applicant did manage to live long enough 
to complete the entire process of enrollment, she frequently found 
herself denied.”146 In other cases, tribal people refused to be listed on the 
government’s rolls as acts of protest against the allotment process: “For 
instance, among Oklahoma Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and 
Choctaws conservative traditionalists or ‘irreconcilables’ fought a hard 
fight against registration with the Dawes commission.”147 The tragic 
                                                     
to establish tribal membership for Five Civilized Tribes); see also Spruhan, supra note 77, at 40–41 
(discussing the Dawes Commission’s process for these tribes). 
142. AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 136, at 342. 
143. See Spruhan, supra note 77, at 40–41. 
144. See id. at 41 (“With each group accounted for, Congress moved to make lands alienable 
based on the race and blood quantum of the allottees. First, Congress released whites and freedmen 
in 1904, called ‘Indians who are not of Indian blood’ in the statute, from restrictions on the sale of 
all their allotted land except their homesteads. In 1906 Congress extended the time for restrictions 
for full bloods, and required that the Secretary of Interior approve full-blood leases, sales, and wills 
devising allotments. In 1908 Congress released Indians from restrictions on the sale of their 
allotments by their amount of Indian blood. Those Indians of less than one-half Indian blood, along 
with intermarried citizens and freedmen, were released from all restrictions. Those of one-half or 
more Indian blood, but less than three-quarters Indian blood, were released from restrictions on all 
their land but their homestead. Those of three-quarters or more Indian blood retained restrictions on 
all their land.”) (citations omitted).  
145. See EVA MARIE GARROUTTE, REAL INDIANS: IDENTITY AND THE SURVIVAL OF NATIVE 
AMERICA 21–22 (2003); Spruhan, supra note 77, at 41 n.352 (describing freedmen litigation).  
146. GARROUTTE, supra note 145, at 21.  
147. Id.  
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irony is that “the descendants of those traditionalists find themselves 
worse off, in the modern, legal context,” because today they cannot be 
enrolled members of their tribes.148 
Sometimes tribal rolls were constructed explicitly to facilitate tribal 
approval of land cessions to the federal government. According to 
Professor Garroutte, “Prior to 1892, agents of American government had 
judged mixed bloods more cooperative than full bloods on a variety of 
issues, particularly in the signing of legal documents allowing for land 
cessions. The agents had therefore specifically sought them out for such 
purposes.”149 Garroutte quotes the Annual Report of Thomas J. Morgan, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, which urged the recognition of mixed 
bloods as tribal members for just this purpose: 
Where by treaty or law it has been required that three-fourths of 
an Indian tribe shall sign any subsequent agreement to give it 
validity, we have accepted the signature of mixed bloods as 
sufficient, and have treated said agreements as valid for the 
purpose of relinquishment of the rights of the tribe. . . . To 
decide at this time that such mixed bloods are not 
Indian . . . would unsettle or endanger the titles to much of the 
lands that have been relinquished by Indian tribes and patented 
to citizens of the United States.150 
Taking this approach a step further, David H. Jerome, Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs in 1892, advocated including non-Indians on the tribal 
rolls in order to increase the chances of a vote in support of allotting the 
Kiowa Tribe’s reservation.151 
Given the aims and assumptions of the 1871 Act and the Dawes Act, 
it is not surprising that their contributions to defining American Indian 
tribes were indirect. The 1871 Act aimed to freeze the definition in time, 
notwithstanding the existence of many tribes with obvious claims to 
territory still outstanding. The Dawes Act (and accompanying laws) 
defined members of tribes only in order to eventually extinguish the 
tribes through the process of eliminating tribal land and culture. The 
goals of both were to eliminate the federal government’s obligations to 
                                                     
148. Id. at 22.  
149. Id. at 36. 
150. Id. (omission in original) (emphasis added) (quoting THOMAS J. MORGAN, U.S. 
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, SIXTY FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 36 (1892)). 
151. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 116 (quoting Ann Laquer Estin, Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock: The Long Shadow, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 
SINCE THE 1880’S 215, 216 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984)). 
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treat tribes and their members as distinct peoples, with rights and 
statuses separate from those of ordinary U.S. citizens. As such, the fewer 
tribes the better, and likewise the fewer individuals affiliated with tribes 
the better. During this period, the inverse racial logic that applied to 
Indians as opposed to African-Americans was at its height.152 At the 
same time that the federal government was eliminating special 
protections for Indian individuals on the basis of their insufficient blood 
quantum (and sometimes constructing tribal rolls deliberately in order to 
diminish the number of “full blood” Indians), the Supreme Court 
sanctioned the “one drop” approach to defining black identity in Plessy 
v. Ferguson.153 Elimination of Indians as a “race” would result in more 
land held as private property by non-Indians, whereas strict and 
purportedly biological separation between whiteness and blackness, as 
determined by blood quantum even in minute degrees, served the ends of 
maintaining free and low-wage labor even after the Civil War.154 
During this same historical period, the Supreme Court decided several 
cases that necessitated some working definition of what constituted a 
tribe. In United States v. Joseph,155 the Court considered the question of 
whether the Pueblo of Taos was a “tribe” under the Nonintercourse 
Act,156 which prohibited non-Indian settlement on Indian lands and 
subjected violators to fines.157 The Court determined that the Pueblo was 
not a tribe under the Act because the Pueblo people were too civilized to 
                                                     
152. See Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, at 881–82, 887.  
153. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See also Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, at 882 
(noting that the trend after Plessy “was steadily in the direction of what came to be known as the 
‘one-drop rule,’ in which any evidence of any African ancestry whatsoever, no matter how far back 
or remote, meant that one was classified as black”); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, in 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39, at 283–85 (describing rules of hypodescent and other 
blood quantum approaches to determining blackness). As Harris notes, “The standards were 
designed to accomplish what mere observation could not: ‘That even Blacks who did not look Black 
were kept in their place.’” Id. at 284 (quoting R.T. Diamond & R.J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: 
Louisiana’s Racial Classification Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255, 
281 (1983)).  
154. See Harris, supra note 39, at 284–86; Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, at 
879–84, 886–88. The intensification of both forms of racialization is no coincidence. As Patrick 
Wolfe notes, “Despite [the] fundamental discrepancy between the racialization of Indians and of 
blacks, in either case we find race intensifying when social space becomes, or threatens to become, 
shared.” Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28, at 887. 
155. 94 U.S. 614 (1876), abrogated by United States. v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926).  
156. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006). 
157. See 94 U.S. at 615 (citing to various provisions prohibiting settlement on Indian lands in the 
Territories of New Mexico and Utah). The 1834 Act declared it illegal for anyone to settle on lands 
“belonging, secured, or granted by treaty with the United States to any Indian tribe.” Id. The 1851 
amendment extended the Act to the Territories of New Mexico and Utah. Id.  
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require the ward-guardian relationship that warranted protection from 
non-Indian settlement.158 Quoting the lower court, the Court stated: 
For centuries, . . . the pueblo Indians have lived in villages, in 
fixed communities, each having its own municipal or local 
government. As far as their history can be traced, they have been 
a pastoral and agricultural people, raising flocks and cultivating 
the soil. . . . They are as intelligent as most nations or people 
deprived of means or facilities for education. Their names, their 
customs, their habits, are similar to those of the people in whose 
midst they reside, or in the midst of whom their pueblos are 
situated. . . . In short, they are a peaceable, industrious, 
intelligent, honest, and virtuous people. They are Indians only in 
feature, complexion, and a few of their habits; in all other 
respects superior to all but a few of the civilized Indian tribes of 
the country, and the equal of the most civilized thereof.159 
The tribes protected by the Act, according to the Court, were “the 
nomadic Apaches, Comanches, Navajoes, and other tribes whose 
incapacity for self-government required both for themselves and for the 
citizens of the country this guardian care of the general government.”160 
The Court concluded that the Pueblo was not a tribe under the Act 
because their stability, degree of assimilation, and history of integration 
into the former Mexican government rendered them no different from 
other communally-oriented non-Indian communities: 
If the pueblo Indians differ from the other inhabitants of New 
Mexico in holding lands in common, and in a certain patriarchal 
form of domestic life, they only resemble in this regard the 
Shakers and other communistic societies in this country, and 
cannot for that reason be classed with the Indian tribes of whom 
we have been speaking.161 
Joseph’s definition, limited as it was to the Nonintercourse Act, 
nonetheless reflected the evolving idea that inferiority and incapacity 
inhered in the meaning of the word “tribe.” The Pueblo’s “superior” 
social organization, habits, and degree of assimilation rendered them, 
ironically, less protected in their lands than the “semi-independent tribes 
whom our government has always recognized as exempt from our laws, 
whether within or without the limits of an organized State or 
                                                     
158. Joseph’s holding with respect to whether Pueblos are tribes and Pueblo lands are Indian 
country has since been rejected. See, e.g., Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432. 
159. Joseph, 94 U.S. at 616–17 (emphasis added). 
160. Id. at 617. 
161. Id. at 617–18. 
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Territory.”162 Despite Joseph’s degraded view of the tribes warranting 
Nonintercourse Act protection, the Court nonetheless recognized that 
political and legal independence were key elements of the definition of a 
tribe: tribes were “in regard to their domestic government, left to their 
own rules and traditions; in whom we have recognized the capacity to 
make treaties, and with whom the governments, state and national, deal, 
with a few exceptions only, in their national or tribal character, not as 
individuals.”163 
In Montoya v. United States, decided in 1901, the question was 
whether a claim could be sustained against the United States under an 
act that provided compensation for depredations committed by “Indians 
belonging to any band, tribe, or nation in amity with the United 
States.”164 The alleged depredations had been committed by members of 
the Mescalero Apache Tribe, who had joined with a band of Chiricahua 
Apache Indians led by Victoria.165 The Court determined that these 
actions were not covered by the act because Victoria’s band, far from 
being “in amity with” the United States, had defied attempts to be settled 
and relocated, fled to Mexico, and been pursued by U.S. troops 
throughout the Southwest, all the while defying federal authority.166 
While the decision could have been confined to the question of what it 
meant to be “in amity” with the United States, the Court nonetheless 
gave considerable attention to the distinctions between the terms 
“nation,” “tribe,” and “band.” 
Despite the clear language of the Act, which included the term 
“nation” as a possible descriptor for a collection of Indian people, the 
Montoya Court was disdainful: “The North American Indians do not, 
and never have, constituted ‘nations’ as that word is used by writers 
upon international law, although in a great number of treaties they are 
designated as ‘nations’ as well as tribes.”167 The Court’s first basis for 
rejecting the term “nation” was purely formalistic.168 However, Montoya 
                                                     
162. Id. at 617. 
163. Id. 
164. 180 U.S. 261, 264 (1901) (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 538, 26 Stat. 851).  
165. Id. at 270.  
166. See id. at 269. 
167. Id. at 265. 
168. See id. According to Montoya, “The word ‘nation’ as ordinarily used presupposes or implies 
an independence of any other sovereign power more or less absolute, an organized government, 
recognized officials, a system of laws, definite boundaries, and the power to enter into negotiations 
with other nations.” Id. Rejecting nationhood for Native peoples on this basis reinforced a self-
referential imperialism, but it at least resonated with federal Indian law’s “domestic dependent 
nation” formula.  
06 - Krakoff Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:37 PM 
2012] INEXTRICABLY POLITICAL 1073 
 
did not rest there. According to the Court, their “natural” inferiority 
prevented Indians from forming nations: 
Owing to the natural infirmities of the Indian character, their 
fiery tempers, impatience of restraint, their mutual jealousies 
and animosities, their nomadic habits, and lack of mental 
training, they have as a rule shown a total want of that cohesive 
force necessary to the making up of a nation in the ordinary 
sense of the word.169 
These disparaging and uninformed generalizations were not unique to 
Montoya. Chief Justice Marshall relied on similar ones in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh.170 Yet the heightened rhetoric is a contrast to The Kansas 
Indians, decided thirty-five years earlier, which at least recognized the 
tribes’ well-established governmental and legal structures.171 The 
Montoya Court’s much more debased description of Indian political and 
legal organization, at the height of the Allotment period, served and 
reflected the policy priorities of the times. 
Consistent with those goals, after Montoya rejected the label “nation,” 
the opinion turned to the question of how to define “tribes,” and 
included the criterion of racial similarity: “By a ‘tribe’ we understand a 
body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community 
under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though 
sometimes ill-defined territory . . . .”172 Having concluded that Indians 
lacked the sophistication necessary to form governing structures that 
would allow for membership to be defined in ways other than by race, 
the Court inevitably defined “tribes” in racial terms. As William Quinn 
has correctly observed, Montoya is known in Indian law circles as the 
first case to articulate a set of criteria for defining a federally recognized 
tribe.173 It is therefore noteworthy that embedded in this early definition 
is a racialized understanding, rooted in the dogma of the times and 
departing from earlier articulations, that assumed Indian inferiority and 
lack of civilization. 
United States v. Sandoval, decided twelve years later, sounded a 
similar note.174 Like United States v. Joseph, the question involved the 
application of a federal law to one of the Pueblos of New Mexico. By its 
                                                     
169. Id. 
170. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823).  
171. See supra discussion at notes 121–26 and accompanying text (discussing The Kansas 
Indians). 
172. Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266. 
173. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 352.  
174. 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
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own terms, the law in Sandoval, which banned the introduction of 
alcohol into Indian country, applied to the Pueblos. The Court therefore 
addressed the prior question, which was the extent to which Congress 
could declare unilaterally that a group was an Indian tribe. The Court 
concluded that Congress had wide latitude in this arena, so long as its 
designation was not arbitrary.175 To act within its broad powers, 
Congress had to legislate with respect to “distinctly Indian 
communities.”176 Sandoval’s rough criteria included (1) whether the 
legislative and executive branches consistently treated the Pueblos as 
“dependent communities entitled to [their] aid and protection,” and (2) 
whether the Pueblos’ “Indian lineage, isolated and communal life, 
primitive customs and limited civilization,” rendered Congress’s 
decision well within its broad discretion.177 Sandoval’s definition, like 
Montoya’s, therefore included both some idea of lineage (dubbed “race” 
in Montoya)178 and separateness, but in both cases separateness was 
defined by inferiority and the need for the federal government’s 
paternalistic protection.179 Indeed, in an interesting reversal from Joseph, 
which relied on the Pueblos’ relative civilization to support the 
conclusion that their lands should not be covered by the Nonintercourse 
Act, the Sandoval Court referred at length to various Indian 
Commissioners’ reports that described the Pueblos as not ready for 
civilization, the main evidence of which was their refusal to abandon 
their traditional religious and political practices (described disparagingly 
as pagan and autocratic).180 
To summarize, at the dawn of the twentieth century, which was also 
the height of the Allotment era, the judicial and legislative definitions of 
tribes and tribal members reflected both the crushing and paternalistic 
versions of the federal government’s “ward-guardian” relationship with 
tribes (pursuant to Montoya and Sandoval) and the hardening of descent-
based understandings of tribal membership (under Allotment statutes 
and associated policies). Both served the larger political goals of, on the 
one hand, narrowing the federal government’s obligations to tribes to 
actions that would ready them for assimilation, and on the other, 
shrinking the tribal land base through allotment to individual tribal 
members. Politics were therefore entangled in these emerging 
                                                     
175. Id. at 46. 
176. Id.  
177. See id. at 47. 
178. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901). 
179. See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 47; Montoya, 180 U.S. at 256–66.  
180. See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 40–45. 
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jurisdictional definitions of the federally recognized tribe and its 
members, which simultaneously relied on and constructed racialized 
(and racially discriminatory) depictions of Indians. 
c.  1934–1978: The Indian Reorganization Act and the Formalization 
of Federal Recognition 
From 1913, when Sandoval was decided, until the end of the 
allotment era, there was relatively little activity with respect to defining 
tribes or tribal members.181 In 1934, the IRA swept aside Allotment 
policies, instituted the “Indian New Deal,” and for the first time 
standardized federal tribal status. The IRA listed three classifications of 
Indians authorized to form tribal governments and receive government 
services: “‘recognized’ tribes, descendants of recognized tribes residing 
on a reservation in 1934, and other persons of one-half or more Indian 
blood.”182 According to William Quinn, “[r]ecognition had become, at 
last, a declaration, and its usage had shifted from a cognitive sense to a 
wholly jurisdictional sense.”183 The IRA authorized a list of 258 tribes as 
eligible to participate in voting on the question of whether to reorganize 
under the Act or not. While not heralded as such, this was the first 
constructive list of federally recognized tribes.184 
The formalization of tribal status inevitably raised questions about 
how to gain that status. Many tribes were left off of the IRA’s initial list, 
and the question for them was how to obtain formal federal recognition, 
and what criteria would apply. Two groups, Alaska and Oklahoma 
Natives, were covered by subsequent IRA-style legislation.185 But for the 
many tribes that simply fell through the cracks, some additional process 
was required. The job of considering whether groups omitted from the 
list could be considered tribes fell to the Department of the Interior. 
Fortunately for the petitioning tribal groups, the post-IRA period 
                                                     
181. In 1916, the Ione Band of Miwok Indians submitted the first request for tribal recognition to 
the BIA. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 354. But in the absence of any standard policy, process or 
criteria for recognition, granting federal recognition was both arbitrary and uncertain in terms of its 
enduring effect. See ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 22 (2000). 
182. MARK EDWIN MILLER, FORGOTTEN TRIBES: UNRECOGNIZED INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS 28 (2004) (citing the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 
Stat. 934 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2006)).  
183. Quinn, supra note 64, at 356. 
184. Id.  
185. See id. at 356–57 (citing to the Alaska Reorganization Act of 1936, Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 
254, 49 Stat. 1250, and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 
1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501–509 (2006)). 
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coincided with Felix Cohen’s tenure at the Department of the Interior, 
during which he authored many of the Solicitor’s opinions concerning 
recognition. During that period, Cohen also compiled his masterful 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, which outlined the criteria for 
determining which tribes could be federally recognized. Factors that 
favored recognition included: (1) “[t]hat the group has had treaty 
relations with the United States;” (2) “[t]hat the group has been 
denominated a tribe by act of Congress or Executive Order;” (3) “[t]hat 
the group has been treated as having collective rights in tribal lands or 
funds, even though not expressly designated a tribe;” (4) “[t]hat the 
group has been treated as a tribe or band by other Indian tribes;” and (5) 
“[t]hat the group has exercised political authority over its members, 
through a tribal council or other governmental forms.”186 Notably, 
Cohen’s definition dropped the racial aspects of the common law tests 
from Montoya and Sandoval (both in their emphasis on race and lineage, 
as well as in their discriminatory assignment of inferior characteristics) 
and emphasized instead the federal government and other tribes’ de facto 
treatment of the group as a tribe as well as the group’s own internal 
political organization.187 
The IRA and its aftermath thus added a further dimension to the 
political nature of the federally recognized tribe. In the process of 
formalizing the list of tribes and articulating the criteria for getting on 
the list, internal political organization became more important than 
ethnographic history. Groups that were unquestionably lineal 
descendants of aboriginal peoples were nonetheless sometimes ineligible 
for federal recognition. For example, in an opinion rejecting tribal status 
for the St. Croix Chippewa, the Solicitor noted that the St. Croix had not 
retained a distinct political structure, as compared to other bands such as 
Mole Lake.188 Similarly, in interpreting the Oklahoma Indian Welfare 
Act,189 the Solicitor opined that: 
                                                     
186. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 271 (1942); see also COHEN, supra 
note 42, § 3.02; see generally DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN 
AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (2007).  
187. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 359 (describing ascendance, in Solicitor’s Opinions during the 
1930s, of criterion of internal political organization for tribal recognition).  
188. Id. (“While the St. Croix Indians . . . might have been recognized as a separate band at the 
time of the 1854 treaty, they now present no characteristics entitling them to recognition as a band, 
particularly as there exists no form of band organization, as there does in the Mole Lake group.”) 
(omission in original) (quoting Nathan R. Margold, Memorandum to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs (Feb. 8, 1937), in 1 OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1917–1974, 724, 725 (1974) [hereinafter OPINIONS OF THE 
SOLICITOR]). 
189. Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 501–509 (2006)). 
06 - Krakoff Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:37 PM 
2012] INEXTRICABLY POLITICAL 1077 
 
It is not enough that the ethnographic history [of the tribes in 
question] shows them in the past to have been distinct and well-
recognized tribes or bands. . . . There must be a currently 
existing group distinct and functioning as a group in certain 
respects and recognition of such activity must have been shown 
by [the U.S. government].190 
In the years following the IRA’s passage, questions about tribes that 
were omitted from the list arose periodically, and were decided 
according to the Cohen criteria described above.191 The recognition 
process slowed in the late 1930s, and then paused abruptly after World 
War II, when the federal government adopted policies aimed at 
eliminating the federal status of tribes. The Termination era, as it is 
known,192 included congressional action terminating the federal/tribal 
government-to-government relationship with 109 tribes.193 Termination 
decisions were based in part on a 1953 study commissioned by the 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which purported to 
assess tribes for their suitability to be set free from federal 
superintendence. The House Report relied on the IRA list for its 
definition of an existing federally recognized tribe.194 Ironically, it was 
therefore this anti-tribal initiative that formalized an administrative list 
and definition of tribes that persisted until 1978.195 The Termination era 
ended almost as suddenly as it began. The Secretary of the Interior 
declared, in 1959, that “no Indian tribe or group should end its 
relationship with the Federal Government unless . . . the tribe or group 
affected concurs in and supports the plan proposed.”196 In the early 
1960s, federal officials resumed the process of recognizing tribes that 
had been omitted from the IRA list. 
                                                     
190. Id. (quoting Nathan R. Margold, Memorandum for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
(Dec. 13, 1938), in OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR supra note 188, at 864, 864).  
191. The more complex cases are compiled in 1 OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR RELATING TO INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1917–1974 (1974). See also Quinn, 
supra note 64, at 358.  
192. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 142 (summarizing termination era and policies). 
193. See id. at 144. 
194. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 360–61 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 82-2503, at 139 (1953)).  
195. See id. at 361. 
196. COHEN, supra note 42, § 1.07, at 99 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 3105 (1959) (remarks of 
Sec’y of the Interior Fred A. Seaton)).  
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d.  1978–Present: Litigation to Prove Tribal Status and the Federal 
Acknowledgment Process 
The federal acknowledgment criteria and processes came under new 
scrutiny in the 1970s. Tribes and tribal members, invigorated by self-
determination policies, sought enforcement of long-neglected treaty 
rights as well as redress for the federal government’s many failures to 
support tribal communities.197 Responding to the surge of Indian 
activism, Congress established the American Indian Policy Review 
Commission, which examined a wide range of issues affecting Indian 
tribes and people, including the number and status of tribes that had 
never received federal recognition.198 The Commission’s Task Force on 
Terminated and Nonfederally Recognized Indians found that hundreds 
of tribes had been overlooked for federal status due to the absence of a 
uniform acknowledgement process, as well as the arbitrary 
interpretations and actions of federal officials.199 The Commission 
concluded that: 
The results of “non-recognition” . . . has [sic] been devastating, 
[including] the continued erosion of tribal lands, or the complete 
loss thereof; the deterioration of cohesive, effective tribal 
governments and social organizations; and the elimination of 
special federal services, through the continued denial of such 
services which the Indian communities in general appear to 
desperately need.200 
The Commission recommended an overhaul of the federal 
government’s acknowledgement criteria and processes to facilitate a 
resolution for the many tribes unfairly overlooked or terminated from 
recognition. 
During the same period, tribes and tribal members litigated a range of 
issues related to long-neglected treaty and statutory rights. In the Pacific 
Northwest, tribes with treaty rights to fish at traditional off-reservation 
sites won the right to take up to half of the commercial fish catch.201 The 
                                                     
197. See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS (2005) (recounting tribes’ activism during the 1960s and 1970s to revive their legal rights 
and invigorate tribal communities).  
198. See 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 457–84 (1977). 
199. See id.; see also TASK FORCE TEN: TERMINATED AND NONFEDERALLY RECOGNIZED 
INDIANS, FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION (1976) 
[hereinafter TASK FORCE TEN]. 
200. TASK FORCE TEN, supra note 199, at 1695. 
201. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 
676 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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outcome raised questions about whether unrecognized tribes had the 
same rights.202 In the Northeast, tribes whose land bases had been eroded 
by violations of the Nonintercourse Act sought long overdue redress. 
The Passamaquoddy Tribe of Maine, pursuing claims against Maine and 
Massachusetts for wrongful taking of Passamaquoddy property, 
requested representation from the United States.203 The Department of 
the Interior refused, arguing that the Passamaquoddy Tribe did not have 
a trust relationship with the United States, and that the Tribe was not 
entitled to protection under the Nonintercourse Act.204 To secure the 
federal government’s representation, and therefore, be able to pursue its 
claims against Maine, the Passamaquoddy first had to prevail on the 
question of whether it was a “tribe” under the Nonintercourse Act.205 
The First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision that the 
Passamaquoddy Tribe was a “tribe” within the meaning of the Act, 
notwithstanding the absence of a federal treaty and the disavowal of 
federal acknowledgement. The Passamaquoddy Tribe’s obvious 
distinctive political organization, its long history of treatment as a tribe 
by the state of Maine, as well as early acknowledgement by federal 
officials that the Tribe was entitled to federal protection, persuaded the 
court that the Tribe “plainly fit[]” the definition of an Indian tribe 
outlined in Montoya.206 
Other tribal status questions were not so easily resolved, however. 
Claims brought by the Mashpee Tribe of Indians raised difficult 
questions about the extent to which a tribe could adopt assimilative 
measures and still retain its status as a distinct political entity entitled to 
                                                     
202. See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirming tribal treaty rights 
to up to one half of the commercial catch in Washington, but limiting eligibility to treaty signatories 
and federally recognized tribes). The plight of unrecognized tribes whose fishing rights were never 
acknowledged persists. See GARROUTTE, supra note 145, at 27 (describing Samish Tribe’s plight 
with respect to access to traditional fishing grounds and rights to catch salmon for ceremonies).  
203. See Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir. 
1975). 
204. See id. at 372–73 (describing how the Tribe sought a declaratory judgment that it was 
entitled to federal protection under the Indian Nonintercourse Act after the federal government 
refused to represent the Tribe in its claims against Maine based on an opinion by the Acting 
Solicitor that the Tribe had no treaty with the United States and no other evidence of a trust 
relationship).  
205. See id. at 376.  
206. Id. at 377 n.8. The court quoted Montoya’s interpretation of “tribe” under the Act “to mean 
‘a body of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a community under one leadership or 
government, and inhabiting a particular, though sometimes ill-defined, territory.’” Id.; see also 
supra notes 153–61 and accompanying text (discussing Montoya).  
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federal protection.207 The Mashpee, who recently achieved federal 
recognition through the acknowledgement process,208 initially lost their 
case in the courts.209 
Passamaquoddy, Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee,210 and other 
contemporary legal battles over tribal recognition necessarily confront 
the problematic role that race has historically played in defining tribal 
status. Built into early attempts to distinguish Indian tribes from 
everyone else was a consistent, if protean, conception of inferiority. The 
mark of separateness was “separate because not civilized,” or “separate 
because not sophisticated.” Thus while the most disparaging racialized 
language from Montoya and Sandoval is excised in Passamaquoddy, the 
idea of dependence, inferiority, and absence of assimilation remains: 
The cases do, it is true, suggest that the Act’s coverage is limited 
to tribes consisting of “simple, uninformed people,” an 
interpretation understandable in light of the Act’s protective 
purpose. But it is not claimed that the Tribe and its members are 
so sophisticated or assimilated as to be other than those entitled 
to protection.211 
In Mashpee, the particular racialized expectations about tribal status 
were even more prominent. The Mashpee Tribe survived through 
colonial and post-revolutionary times (unlike many other Northeast 
tribes that were utterly destroyed) by engaging in various assimilative 
adaptations. Their success at doing so, which included their ability to 
maintain what they believed to be superior rights to their ancestral lands, 
was held against them in the legal determination of whether they had 
                                                     
207. See Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978). The Mashpee 
case was high profile for a number of reasons. The idea of an Indian tribe persisting in the crowded 
Northeast took many by surprise. The location of the Mashpee’s land claim—stunning beach front 
property on Cape Cod—caused consternation. And the mixed race appearance, and strong 
Massachusetts accents, of many Mashpee did not accord with stereotypical expectations about 
Indians. See Jo Carrillo, Identity as Idiom: Mashpee Reconsidered, 28 IND. L. REV. 511, 544 (1995); 
Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating ‘Yonnondio’ by Precedent and Evidence: The 
Mashpee Indian Case, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 39 at 177, 185–87 (describing 
Mashpee racial integration, political structure, and land claims). For an in-depth examination of the 
case and its meanings, see generally JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART 277–346 (1988). 
208. See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian 
Tribal Council, Inc. of Massachusetts, 72 Fed. Reg. 8007, 8007 (Feb. 22, 2007) (effective May 23, 
2007). 
209. See Mashpee Tribe, 447 F. Supp. 940. 
210. Id. 
211. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 378 (1st Cir. 1975).  
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remained a tribe.212 These cases heightened the need for a uniform way 
of addressing tribal recognition claims according to criteria that did not 
perpetuate the cycles of racialized paternalism embedded in the early 
recognition cases. 
The Commission’s recommendations, together with the increase in 
litigation over tribal status exemplified by Passamaquoddy and 
Mashpee, ultimately prompted regulatory action. The BIA, flooded with 
acknowledgment petitions, began the process of instituting uniform 
criteria and clear procedures for tribes to petition for federal 
recognition.213 It took yet another lawsuit, however, before the BIA 
promulgated the final regulations for federal acknowledgement and 
mandated publication of a list of all federally recognized tribes in 
1978.214 The regulations, most recently amended in 1994,215 establish 
seven criteria for tribal recognition. Tribes must show: (1) continuous 
existence since 1900; (2) that a predominant portion of their membership 
comes from a “distinct community”; (3) that the tribe has maintained 
political influence over the community; (4) that the group has 
membership criteria; (5) that they descend from a historical Indian tribe 
and have functioned as a single autonomous political entity; (6) that the 
membership does not comprise members of a current federally 
recognized tribe; and (7) that the group petitioning for acknowledgement 
was not terminated by Congress.216 
The federal acknowledgment criteria and processes have provided a 
bureaucratic forum for resolution of the many claims by tribes that were 
overlooked, inadvertently or otherwise. Yet, despite the BIA’s stated 
intention of removing both the politics and the caprice from the federal 
acknowledgement process, scholars have argued that the process 
remains rife with both.217 Furthermore, as Professor Cramer has argued, 
a tribe’s pursuit of recognition often stirs up racialized, and racist, 
                                                     
212. See Carrillo, supra note 207, at 544. 
213. See Quinn, supra note 64, at 363. 
214. See id. (describing lawsuit brought by the Stillaguamish Tribe, whose acknowledgement 
petition was caught up in the BIA’s moratorium on decision-making while it developed a system for 
federal recognition). The criteria were published in the Federal Register in 1978. Procedure for 
Establishing that an American Indian Group Exits as an Indian Tribe, 43 Fed. Reg. 23,743 (June 1, 
1978). The first list of federally recognized tribes was published in 1979. See Indian Tribal Entities 
that Have a Government-to-Government Relationship with the United States, 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 
(Feb. 6, 1979).  
215. See 25 C.F.R. pt 83 (2012).  
216. See id. § 83.7(a)–(g).  
217. See generally RENÉE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE POLITICS OF 
TRIBAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT (2005); MILLER, supra note 182.  
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reactions to tribes and Indian people.218 The public and the media, 
lacking the historical understanding of how federal policies both forced 
tribes to assimilate and arbitrarily excluded tribes from federal 
recognition, often assume or infer that “fake” Indians are pursuing 
gaming money.219 Public reactions reflect the unique ways that tribes 
have been racialized and stereotyped; the harshest accusations often 
come in the form of questioning of tribal authenticity because tribal 
members look either too white or too black.220 
The recognition criteria themselves entangle lineage with politics. 
Tribes petitioning for acknowledgment must show that they “descend 
from a historical Indian tribe.”221 Proof of “blood,” even if only traceable 
by descent, is therefore built into the legal foundation for being 
recognized as a tribe in the political sense. Furthermore, this criterion 
might be required by the Constitution. Indian tribes are referred to twice 
in the Constitution in ways that advert to their separate political status.222 
If any other group of U.S. citizens demanded a similar status, along with 
a direct government-to-government relationship with the United States, 
it would be called secession.223 While “lineage” is not the same as the 
socio-political construct of race, it is not at all clear that members of the 
Supreme Court accept that distinction.224 Yet if the Justices impose their 
colorblind understanding of racial discrimination on lineage 
requirements, they may find themselves subjecting the Constitution itself 
to strict scrutiny. 
There is a better way. Leave the historical origins of tribes’ separate 
                                                     
218. See generally CRAMER, supra note 217. 
219. See id. at 97–102 (describing some non-Indian reactions to tribes’ pursuit of recognition). 
220. See id. at 106, 124, 153.  
221. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e) (2012).  
222. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Treaty 
Clause); see also Fletcher, supra note 9, at 164. The Treaty Clause does not refer in the text to 
Indian tribes, but there is no serious doubt that the Treaty power was intended to extend to tribes, 
and it was widely exercised as such. 
223. See, e.g., Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of 
South Carolina from the Federal Union, reprinted in JOHN AMASA MAY & JOAN REYNOLDS 
FAUNT, SOUTH CAROLINA SECEDES 76, 76 (1960), available at http://sunsite.utk.edu/civil-
war/reasons.html. “And now the State of South Carolina having resumed her separate and equal 
place among nations, deems it due to herself, to the remaining United States of America, and to the 
nations of the world, that she should declare the immediate causes which have led to this act.” Id.  
224. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000) (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that 
proxy here. Even if the residents of Hawaii in 1778 had been of more diverse ethnic backgrounds 
and cultures, it is far from clear that a voting test favoring their descendants would not be a race-
based qualification.”); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 748 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).  
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political existence intact. History makes distinctions based on pre-
contact descent for this purpose the right thing, as well as the 
constitutionally defensible thing. Beyond this point of origin, courts and 
the federal government should allow tribes to determine their 
membership criteria as they see fit, with or without blood quantum or 
lineal descent.225 The origins of a separate political existence need not 
trap American Indian tribes in time and space with respect to developing 
meaningful, post-colonial understandings of themselves and their 
people. 
2.  Meanings and Effects of Tribal Membership 
The story of how the United States arrived at a list of “federally 
recognized tribes” is complicated enough, but the messy legal 
classifications that apply to Native people do not end there. Different 
programs and benefits depend on how membership in a federally 
recognized tribe is defined. Further, sometimes benefits and programs 
apply to Native people regardless of whether they are members of 
federally recognized tribes, however defined.226 
a.  BIA Employment Preferences 
The BIA employment preference, the very classification at issue in 
Mancari, is a fair place to start mapping the role that tribal membership 
and descent play in federal Indian programs. When Mancari was 
decided, the BIA employment preference applied to members of 
federally recognized tribes with a quarter or more Indian blood.227 Three 
years after Mancari was decided, the BIA modified its employment 
preference criteria “to conform to the definition of ‘Indian’ in the IRA, 
which had created the preference.”228 The IRA definition provides: 
The term “Indian” . . . shall include all persons of Indian descent 
who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under 
Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such 
                                                     
225. For a compelling proposal to tribes along these lines, see Matthew Fletcher, Tribal 
Membership and Indian Nationhood, __ AM. INDIAN L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2012–2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129813 (suggesting that tribes 
should, to express fully their status as sovereigns, move toward membership criteria rooted in 
affiliation and territory rather than blood quantum and descent).  
226. See O’Brien, supra note 91, at 1478 (describing eligibility of Native Hawaiians for certain 
federal programs notwithstanding lack of federally recognized tribal status).  
227. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974). 
228. Wayne R. Farnsworth, Bureau of Indian Affairs Hiring Preferences After Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 1996 BYU L. REV. 503, 513 (1996).  
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members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present 
boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include 
all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. For the 
purposes of this Act, Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of 
Alaska shall be considered Indians.229 
The BIA continues to base its hiring preference criteria on the IRA’s 
definition of Indian. BIA applicants have the option to fill out a form 
that establishes preference based on whether the applicant: (1) is a 
member of a federally-recognized tribe, band or community; (2) is a 
descendant of enrolled members of federally-recognized tribes who were 
residing on a reservation on June 1, 1934; (3) possesses at least one-half 
degree Indian blood; or (4) is “a member of an Alaska Native Tribe; or, 
an individual whose name appears on the roll of Alaska Natives prior to 
July 31, 1981, and not subsequently disenrolled; or, an individual who 
was issued stock in a Native corporation pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1606(g)(1)(B)(i).”230 The change from Mancari allows the BIA to 
apply the preference to all tribal members, rather than just tribal 
members who also possess one-quarter or more Indian blood, and also to 
non-tribal members who possess one-half or more Indian blood. 
b.  Statutory Benefits and Services 
Although the IRA itself defined “Indian” to include tribal members 
and Indians with one-half blood quantum, today most federal programs 
that provide services to individual Indians make eligibility contingent on 
membership in a federally recognized tribe.231 The Tribally Controlled 
Community College Assistance Act defines Indians as members of 
federally recognized tribes.232 Similarly, Indians are defined by federally 
recognized tribal membership under the BIA’s Job Placement and 
Training Program,233 and the Food Stamp Program.234 
Within programs that apply tribal enrollment as the main criteria, 
                                                     
229. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006).  
230. VERIFICATION OF INDIAN PREFERENCE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN THE BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS AND THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, FORM BIA-4432 (expires Nov. 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc015598.pdf. 
231. See Fletcher, supra note 25, at 302. 
232. See 25 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (2); see also 25 C.F.R. § 41.3(h) (2012) (implementing 
regulations).  
233. 25 C.F.R. § 26.1 (2012). 
234. 7 C.F.R. § 273.4(a)(3)(ii) (2012); see also USDA, AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA 
NATIVE: A GUIDE TO USDA PROGRAMS 78–79 (2007), available at http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/ 
supportdocuments/AmerIndianNativeAlaskGuide_07-11-07.pdf. 
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there are sometimes understandable expansions. For example, in the 
Tribally Controlled Community College Assistance Act, the definition 
of “Indian student” includes a member of a tribe, and also a “biological 
child of a member of an Indian tribe, living or deceased.”235 The Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA),236 which imposes limits on state authority to 
remove Indian children from their families,237 defines an Indian as “any 
person who is a member of an Indian tribe, or who is an Alaska Native 
and a member of a Regional Corporation as defined in section 7 of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1606.”238 The ICWA 
defines an Indian child as “any unmarried person who is under age 18 
and is either a member of an Indian tribe, or is eligible for membership 
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian 
tribe.”239 
The Indian Health Service (IHS) defines Indian even more broadly. 
An individual is eligible for IHS treatment if she is “of Indian and/or 
Alaska Native descent as evidenced by:” (1) the community regarding 
her as Indian or Alaska Native; (2) her membership—“enrolled or 
otherwise”—in an Indian or Alaska Native Tribe; (3) her residence on 
tax-exempt land or ownership of restricted property; (4) her active 
participation in tribal affairs; or (5) “any other reasonable factor 
indicative of Indian descent.”240 Indians of Canadian or Mexican origin 
also qualify for IHS as long as they are considered members of an Indian 
tribe that is served by IHS.241 Non-Indian women pregnant with the child 
of an eligible Indian also qualify, but only for the duration of the 
pregnancy plus six weeks.242 Last, non-Indians living in an Indian’s 
household may be eligible if they pose a threat to the public health, as 
determined by the medical officer in charge.243 
c.  Federal Criminal Jurisdiction 
Given the emphasis, for equal protection purposes, that Mancari 
                                                     
235. See 25 U.S.C. § 1801(7)(B) (Supp. II 2009).  
236. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2006).  
237. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(4)–(5), 1902. 
238. 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2012). 
239. Id.  
240. Indian Health Manual § 2-1.2 Persons to Whom Services May be Provided, INDIAN HEALTH 
SERV., http://www.ihs.gov/ihm/index.cfm?module=dsp_ihm_pc_p2c1 (last visited June 21, 2012). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id.  
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placed on the political distinction between members of federally 
recognized tribes versus non-members (whether American Indian or 
not), one might expect that distinctive federal treatment for criminal 
prosecution would likewise rest on enrollment in a federally recognized 
tribe. But it does not. The Major Crimes Act, passed in 1885 at the dawn 
of the Allotment era, subjects “Indians” to federal prosecution for listed 
felonies.244 The Act itself does not define “Indian.” Instead, courts rely 
on a definition that dates back to a case decided several decades before 
the passage of the Major Crimes Act. In 1846, in United States v. 
Rogers,245 the Court considered whether Rogers, a white man who had 
been adopted as a Cherokee citizen, was an “Indian” under federal 
statutes exempting Indian-on-Indian crimes from federal jurisdiction.246 
The Court held that Rogers (and the white man whom he was accused of 
murdering) could not be considered Indian because Indian tribes lacked 
power to naturalize anyone not of their “race.”247 The definition of 
Indian that emerged, and was later grafted onto prosecutions under the 
Major Crimes Act, required that the person (1) have some degree of 
Indian blood, and (2) be recognized within his or her community or by 
the federal government as an Indian.248 
Notwithstanding the distant and racist origins of the Rogers 
formulation, it persists in contemporary doctrine. When a defendant is 
prosecuted either under the Major Crimes Act or the Indian Country 
Crimes Act (ICCA),249 prosecutors and defense attorneys do battle over 
whether the defendant (or victim) has the requisite degree of “Indian 
                                                     
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). The Major Crimes Act was part of the larger assimilative 
agenda. Seizing on public dismay after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Kang-Gi-Shun-Ca 
(Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which held that the federal government lacked the power to 
prosecute a crime committed by a tribal member against another tribal member, Congress hastily 
passed a statute extending its powers of criminal prosecution to Indian defendants in Indian country. 
See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND 
UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 101, 134–38 (1994); Kevin K. Washburn, 
American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 770 (2006); Kevin K. Washburn, 
Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 803 (2006).  
245. 45 U.S. (1 How.) 567 (1846).  
246. Id. 
247. See id. at 572–73. For an illuminating history of the case, see Bethany R. Berger, “Power 
Over This Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004). 
248. See United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing two-part test 
and noting that it has been adopted by other circuits); Weston Meyring, “I’m an Indian Outlaw, 
Half Cherokee and Choctaw”: Criminal Jurisdiction and the Question of Indian Status, 67 MONT. 
L. REV. 177, 186 (2006).  
249. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
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blood.”250 With respect to the former, courts have varied in their 
conclusions about how much blood is required.251 Some courts require 
“some” Indian blood.252 Others look for a “significant” degree of Indian 
blood,253 others a “substantial” degree,254 and for others still, a 
“sufficient” degree will do.255 Even courts that have adopted the same 
terminology do not apply it uniformly, nor do they provide explanations 
regarding why certain percentages meet, or fail to meet, the threshold.256 
The second element of defining “Indian” for purposes of criminal 
jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act and the Indian Country Crimes 
Act—recognition as an Indian by the community or the federal 
government— has a similarly confusing array of interpretations.257 Most 
courts use the same language: the person must be “recognized as an 
Indian by a tribe or the federal government.”258 Beyond this, the 
consensus dwindles.259 In St. Cloud v. United States,260 the federal 
                                                     
250. Under the ICCA, the federal government has jurisdiction over crimes in which the defendant 
is a non-Indian and the victim is Indian, and pursuant to the ICCA in combination with the 
Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, also over most misdemeanors involving and 
Indian defendant and non-Indian victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152; COHEN, supra note 42, 
§ 9.02[1][b], at 731–34 (describing ICCA and ACA jurisdiction, and noting that while courts 
assume the ACA applies in Indian country, the Supreme Court has never addressed the question 
directly).  
251. See Meyring, supra note 248, at 190–93 (canvassing the cases concerning the degree of 
blood requirement); Katharine C. Oakley, Comment, Defining Indian Status for the Purpose of 
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 184–85 (2011).  
252. See, e.g., United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that someone 
having 3/32ds of Indian blood met the “some” requirement); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 
455–56 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that someone with 25/64ths and someone with 11/32ds Indian 
blood met the “some” requirement); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (D.S.D. 
1988) (holding that someone with 15/32ds of Indian blood met the “some” requirement). 
253. This degree has mostly been adopted by state courts. See, e.g., State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 
986–87 (Mont. 1990) (holding that an individual with 165/512ths of Indian blood met the 
“significant” requirement); Goforth v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (holding 
that a little less than 1/4th met the “significant” requirement); State v. Reber, 171 P.3d 406, 410–11 
(Utah 2007) (holding that an individual with 1/16th Indian blood did not meet the “significant” 
requirement). 
254. See, e.g., Ex parte Pero v. Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938) (holding that someone with 
3/4ths Indian blood met the “substantial” requirement); Vialpando v. State, 640 P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 
1982) (holding that someone with 1/8th Indian blood did not meet the “substantial” requirement). 
255. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 843, 845–46 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an 
individual with 29/128th Indian blood met the “sufficient” requirement). 
256. See Meyring, supra note 248, at 190–92; Oakley, supra note 251, at 185–87. 
257. Meyring, supra note 248, at 193; Oakley, supra note 251, at 191. 
258. Oakley, supra note 251, at 187 (quoting United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th 
Cir. 2009); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Torres, 
733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); State v. LaPier, 790 P.2d 983, 986 (Mont. 1990)). 
259. Id. 
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district court in South Dakota listed, “in declining order of importance,” 
the following factors: 
1) enrollment in a tribe; 
2) government recognition formally and informally through 
providing the person assistance reserved only to Indians; 
3) enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and 
4) social recognition as an Indian through living on a reservation 
and participating in Indian social life.261 
Although many courts have adopted the St. Cloud factors, they vary 
with respect to how they apply them.262 Most courts do not view tribal 
enrollment in a federally recognized tribe as necessary.263 Some courts, 
however, have required that the tribe that recognizes the person as a 
member (whether formally enrolled or not) be federally recognized.264 
Other courts do not use the St. Cloud factors at all, and instead analyze 
all of the facts collectively and determine the second prong on a case-by-
case basis.265 Yet another approach is to assess the defendant’s 
recognition of his or her tribal status, rather than the tribe’s acceptance 
or recognition.266 
Where, in all of this parsing of blood and membership, is the language 
embraced in Mancari and Antelope distinguishing political affiliation 
from race?267 Antelope did not address the “Indian by blood” portion of 
the Rogers test, presumably because the criminal defendants in that case 
were enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe. They challenged the 
Major Crimes Act distinction, and its unequal effects in their case, but 
                                                     
260. 702 F. Supp. 1456 (D.S.D. 1988). 
261. Id. at 1461. 
262. Oakley, supra note 251, at 188; see, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846–48 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendant did not meet the requirement of the second prong despite 
living on the reservation, going to the Indian school, and being eligible for tribal benefits); Stymiest, 
581 F.3d at 766 (holding that the defendant met the requirement of the second prong by satisfying 
only the third and fourth St. Cloud factors); United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1227 (9th Cir. 
2005) (holding that the defendant met the requirement of the second prong because she lived on the 
reservation, obtained Indian assistance, and was arrested under tribal authority); United States v. 
Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888–89 (D.S.D. 1991), aff’d, 945 F.2d 1410 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the defendant did not have Indian status because he was not an enrolled member, had not received 
assistance, and had limited affiliation with the tribe). 
263. Meyring, supra note 248, at 197; Oakley, supra note 251, at 188. 
264. LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304–05 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Meyring, supra note 
248, at 221, 224. 
265. Oakley, supra note 251, at 192–93. 
266. See United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2005). 
267. See supra Part I.A (discussing Mancari and Antelope). 
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did not distinguish between the Indian political status aspects of Mancari 
and the Rogers requirement of Indian blood.268 
The federal criminal jurisdiction cases beg the question of how the 
Rogers requirement has survived in contemporary jurisprudence. If the 
federal judiciary’s color-blind adherents were to begin scrutinizing 
federal classifications that affect American Indians, this would be the 
place to start. The “Indian by blood” criteria adds nothing but an overlay 
of dated biological notions of race to the requirement that the person be 
a political, social, or other kind of “member” of a federally recognized 
tribe. And the varying definitions of “membership” for the purposes of 
federal criminal prosecution embrace a more expansive understanding 
than Mancari seemed to endorse. Cases addressing equal protection 
challenges in the civil context rarely advert to this unruly body of law, 
and perhaps understandably so. It leads much more readily to a 
condemnation of the structure of federal criminal prosecution of Indians 
than it does to judicial second-guessing of economic or social legislation 
that benefits political sovereigns. 
d.  Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
The question of who is a “member” of a tribe for purposes of criminal 
prosecution also arises in the context of tribal criminal jurisdiction. 
Tribes have inherent sovereign authority to prosecute their own 
members.269 In Duro v. Reina,270 the Supreme Court held that tribes had 
been “implicitly divested” of their inherent authority over Indians who 
were members of other tribes (nonmember Indians).271 Congress, at the 
urging of tribes, reversed the Duro ruling by amending the Indian Civil 
Rights Act272 to recognize inherent tribal authority over nonmember 
Indians.273 Tribal courts can therefore prosecute Indians who are 
members of their own and other tribes. While tribal courts are not bound 
by the definition of “Indian” in the federal cases, including the Rogers 
criteria of Indian “by blood,” their decisions may be reviewed under the 
                                                     
268. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977) (“[T]he prosecution in this case 
offered proof that respondents are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe and thus not 
emancipated from tribal relations. Moreover, members of tribes whose official status has been 
terminated by congressional enactment are no longer subject, by virtue of their status, to federal 
criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act.”). 
269. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).  
270. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
271. See id. at 699.  
272. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–03 (2006) (amended in 2010). 
273. See id.  
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habeas corpus provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act and federal 
courts might then employ the same tests they use to determine Major 
Crimes Act jurisdiction (discussed above) to assess whether the tribal 
courts have exceeded their inherent authority.274 
C.  Concluding Thoughts About Recognition and Membership 
For American Indian tribes, the journey from pre-contact independent 
sovereigns to “federally recognized tribes” was a political one. The 
colonial process of absorbing aboriginal peoples into the United States 
included reformatting tribes’ independent sovereign status to fit within 
the domestic legal regime. The politics often included subordination 
through a complicated process of assigning certain inferior 
characteristics to tribes in order to justify the federal government’s 
unilateral imposition of authority. At the same time, the process imposed 
tribal membership definitions that foreclosed the pre-colonial fluidity of 
tribal identity. The racial and the political became inextricably linked as 
a result, imposing on tribes a lineal-descent framework that today both 
protects tribal ties to their aboriginal origins, but also renders them 
vulnerable to charges of defining membership by “race,” and consequent 
questioning of their separate political status on equal protection grounds. 
II.  LEGAL HISTORIES OF RECOGNITION, MEMBERSHIP, AND 
RACE 
The foregoing describes the general history of how indigenous 
nations within U.S. borders became folded into the domestic legal order 
and denominated “federally recognized tribes.” Each of the 566 tribes 
with that status also has its own unique history. The two histories 
discussed below represent different aspects of the project of 
transforming free and independent peoples into juridical entities subject 
to U.S. law. The CRIT reservation was a spot on a map, selected by 
federal agents and politicians who hoped that “if you designate it, they 
will come.” “They” included virtually all of the many distinct peoples 
that lived near the lower Colorado River valley. The aim was to 
consolidate many peoples into one geo-political unit for the purpose of 
clearing the land and facilitating control. By contrast, the Great Dakota 
Nation, comprised of bands and sub-groups with common origins and 
                                                     
274. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming tribal court conviction 
from equal protection challenge under habeas provisions of the ICRA), analyzed infra at notes 520–
28. 
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language, occupied a vast territory that initially seemed unimportant to 
the U.S. and, therefore, acceptable to concede to the Indians. As U.S. 
interest in the territory grew for a variety of economic and ideological 
reasons, the affiliated peoples of the Great Dakota Nation were dispersed 
and divided into many different federally recognized tribes. While these 
are only two of the many hundreds of stories that could be told, they 
echo and reinforce the larger narrative of the politics and law inherent in 
constructing federally recognized tribes. 
A.  The Colorado River Indian Tribes 
The CRIT’s reservation straddles the Arizona–California border as 
well as the Colorado River. Mohave and Chemehuevi people, who 
historically were adversaries, have occupied the CRIT reservation since 
1865, when it was established for “Indians of [the Colorado River] and 
its tributaries.”275 In 1945, the federal government persuaded the CRIT 
government to accept Navajo and Hopi tribal members onto the 
reservation, and a short-lived relocation program resulted in a small 
influx of Navajo and Hopi people who relinquished their political 
affiliations with those tribes and became members of the CRIT. 
According to CRIT tribal member Michael Tsosie: 
The reason that [Chemehuevi, Navajo and Hopi] were placed on 
the reservation was that the Federal government decided that 
Mohaves had too much land and not enough people, and the 
other tribes, had too many people and not enough 
land. . . . Unfortunately this situation has created more problems 
than it ever resolved for the tribes involved.276 
Tsosie describes his own tribal identity in the following way: 
“[R]acially I am identified by others as Native American, racially I am 
identified by other Native Americans as Mohave, Navajo, and Laguna, 
politically I am identified as a member of the Colorado River Indian 
Tribes, socially and culturally I am a Mohave.”277 
Tsosie’s succinct summary of his own identity is a fitting synecdoche 
for the CRIT’s situation as a whole. Several distinct ethnic, linguistic, 
and political groups were ushered onto a single reservation and 
identified as a single tribe, not because it was consistent with their own 
cultures or priorities, but because it was expedient for the federal 
                                                     
275. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 127, 13 Stat. 541, 559.  
276. MICHAEL TSOSIE, PRESERVATION OF MOHAVE HISTORY AND CULTURE 1 (Dec. 1993), 
available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED379115.pdf. 
277. Id. at 2.  
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government. Further, the history of the CRIT, while singular in many 
respects, nonetheless reflects the general process by which independent 
aboriginal peoples became today’s federally recognized American 
Indian tribes, and how the racial and the political are hopelessly 
entangled by that process. 
1.  Establishing the CRIT Reservation: For Whom and How Many? 
Historically, many tribes occupied and used the Colorado River 
Valley between Yuma and Fort Mohave, including the Mohave, 
Chemehuevi, Yuma, Yavapai, and Hualapai. In the mid-1800s, interest 
grew, due to non-Indian settlement and desire for land and access to the 
River, in addressing Indian land claims, settling the many tribes in one 
place, and quieting the frontier.278 The CRIT reservation was established 
by an Act of Congress in 1865, with no mention of negotiations with the 
many tribes in the region nor even a single name of any tribe that had 
agreed to settle there. The full text of the statute, which was embedded 
in a long list of other provisions affecting Indian affairs, reads: 
All that part of the public domain in the Territory of Arizona, 
lying west of a direct line from Half-Way Bend to Corner Rock 
on the Colorado River, containing about seventy-five thousand 
acres of land, shall be set apart for an Indian reservation for the 
Indians of said river and its tributaries.279 
The intent was to recognize several different tribes’ aboriginal claims 
to the territory, but also to concentrate the many Indian peoples who 
lived on or near the Colorado River into a single place in order to 
alleviate conflict with whites. The report of Charles D. Poston, the first 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Arizona, makes both of these aims 
clear: 
 It is proposed to colonize some ten thousand Indians 
within . . . [the proposed reservation site’s] boundaries. . . . By a 
fiction of law, founded on neither reason nor justice, the Indian 
title is ignored in all the territory acquired from Mexico, because 
the Spanish Conquerors and Mexicans did them this injustice. It 
is difficult for the Indians to understand this sophistry, and the 
absurdity of the action under it needs no argument. . . . 
 The rapid influx of population in this region renders it 
necessary that some provision should be made for the original 
                                                     
278. Charles D. Poston, Arizona Superintendency: No. 53, in REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
INDIAN AFFAIRS FOR THE YEAR 1864, at 150, 157 (1865). 
279. 13 Stat. at 559. 
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inhabitants. The plan of establishing them on a reservation, and 
providing them the great desideratum of water to aid their 
cultivation, will no doubt meet your approval. . . . 
 Difficulties are already growing up between the Indians and 
whites in that vicinity on account of the occupation of the Indian 
land, and unless prompt action is taken to regulate differences, 
by providing the Indians a home, the consequences will be 
painful.280 
The absence of any negotiation process, such as would have occurred 
prior to a treaty, meant that no tribes, not even the Mohave who had 
inhabited the majority of the area designated as the reservation, had 
promised to go or stay there. Not surprisingly, the years following the 
CRIT reservation’s establishment were, therefore, ones of uncertainty 
with respect to which tribes would actually make it home, let alone 
concede to giving up their broader territorial claims.281 In September 
1865, Mohaves, Yumas, and Yavapai engaged in skirmishes with the 
Chemehuevi and the Pintahs for claims to the reservation.282 The 
Mohave and their allies were determined to drive the Chemehuevi from 
the area, even though the Mohave and Chemehuevi were the only year-
round residents of the reservation at that time.283 When the fighting 
ended in 1867, an estimated 750 Mohave occupied the reservation.284 
Initially, some Yavapai also settled at the CRIT reservation.285 
According to an annual report, 2000 “Yavapais or Apache-Mohaves” 
were living on the reservation in 1868.286 Nonetheless, in the same 1868 
report, Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles E. Mix admitted 
that: 
The Colorado river reservation has not so far been very 
successful, yet it is believed, with additional aid from Congress, 
it can be made a suitable home for many of the tribes. It will not 
do, however, to withdraw the Indians from their hunting grounds 
unless adequate provision is made for them on the reservation.287 
Despite hopes that more tribes and greater numbers of Indian people 
                                                     
280. Poston, supra note 278, at 157.  
281. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 8–11. 
282. Id. at 10. 
283. Id. at 10–11.  
284. Id. at 14. 
285. See id. at 11. 
286. Id. at 14–15.  
287. Charles E. Mix, Annual Report on Indian Affairs by the Acting Commissioner, in REPORT ON 
INDIAN AFFAIRS, BY THE ACTING COMMISSIONER, FOR THE YEAR 1867, at 1, 10 (1868). 
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would settle at the CRIT reservation, initially only the Mohave and a 
much smaller number of Chemehuevi could be induced to stay. The 
other tribes who had been targeted for the CRIT reservation, including 
some Mohave, established their own reservations in the region between 
1876 and 1917.288 As a result, the CRIT reservation remained much 
more sparsely populated than the government had planned. Instead of 
Poston’s aspiration of 10,000, the number, largely composed of Mohave, 
reached barely over 800. Among the many reasons for the low numbers 
was the recurring failure to deliver irrigation water to the reservation. 
Repeatedly, the Indian agents expressed optimism that if the canal and 
irrigation infrastructure were completed, more Indians could be induced 
to stay and farm. Yet, appropriations to complete the project were 
perennially insufficient.289 To keep the Indians within the reservation 
boundaries, the Indian agents alternated between pleading for more 
provisions and demanding troops to “keep the Indians intimidated.”290 
As late as 1890, after the Pima and Maricopa, Tohono O’odham (then 
Papago), Yuma, Hualapai, Navajo, Havasupai, and Hopi had their own 
reservations recognized, the Indian agent for the region, George Allen, 
remained optimistic that more Indians would move to CRIT if the 
irrigation infrastructure were completed: 
[T]here is no reason in the world why the present state of affairs 
should continue on this reservation. With the expenditure of a 
few thousand dollars in a 6-horse-power boiler and two vacuum 
irrigating pumps, a perpetual supply of water can be had (the 
ditch already being constructed), and all the Mohaves, 
Hualapais, and Chimehuevi [sic] made self-sustaining. Besides 
there is land enough to support the Yumas, the Apache-
Mohaves, and Apache-Yumas.291 
                                                     
288. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 21–22.  
289. See id. at 15 (“The most important news was the beginning of the canal. . . . On December 
16th the canal was started with the Indian as willing laborers. Five miles of the canal had been 
completed, but, because of funds running out, the work had stopped.”); id. at 16 (“During the year 
the head-gate of the canal had been completed. . . . Very little needed to be done to complete the 
work, and admit water from the Colorado River. The Indians were very excited at the prospect.”); 
id. at 17 (“A continual optimism was expressed during these early years that as soon as the canal 
was completed the many problems connected with the Indians od western Arizona would be 
resolved.”); id. (“There was no overflow of the river and the canal was not completed in time.”); id. 
(“Because [the Indian agent] didn’t feel that the limited amount of money at his command would do 
any real good, he didn’t spend any at all for the canal.”).  
290. Id. at 18. 
291. Id. at 21 (quoting George Allen, Report of Colorado River Agency, in 59TH ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, 1, 4 
(1890)).  
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Allen’s optimism proved unwarranted. The CRIT reservation 
remained home only to Mohave and Chemehuevi people, and not even 
all of their numbers. Nonetheless, over the years the CRIT boundaries 
expanded. River bottom-lands were added by executive order in 
November 1873, and the reservation was again enlarged in 1874.292 
Other alterations over the years included boundary adjustments and sales 
to railroad companies. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
CRIT reservation comprised over 265,000 acres.293 
The next attempt to make CRIT into a more efficient and densely 
populated farming community came during the Allotment era. CRIT 
allotment was intimately tied to the era’s reclamation policies.294 In 
1902, the Reclamation Act295 authorized federally subsidized water 
storage projects throughout the West. The aim was to provide western 
agricultural interests with predictable irrigation flows.296 Reclamation’s 
primary intended beneficiaries were non-Indians, and the CRIT 
allotment statutes reflected that larger goal. Allotment and reclamation 
would finally deliver on the promise of irrigation for CRIT, but any 
unalloted lands would be opened to non-Indian settlement:297 
[T]he Indians were expected to accept increased allotment sizes 
and a government irrigation project to water their holdings, and 
to pay for this irrigation project with funds derived by the tribe 
for sale of lands they would have to sell under the provisions of 
the Reclamation Act. Moreover, the Act of March 3, 1911[,] 
provided that should the allottee receive patent in fee simple, his 
outstanding debt for his share of the irrigation cost would be a 
first lien on the patent.298 
The intent, in other words, was to divide up the CRIT reservation and 
provide long-promised irrigation, but also to charge the CRIT tribal 
members for that service and collect the fees by forcing the sale of 
unallotted lands and placing liens on the property of any tribal members 
who received fee patents for their allotments. To fully appreciate the 
near-diabolical nature of these schemes, it is important to recall that no 
                                                     
292. See id. at 22.  
293. Id. at 23. 
294. See id. at 23.  
295. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. from 
§ 371 to § 498). 
296. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 246–47 (1992) (describing the 
Reclamation Act of 1902 and associated policies).  
297. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
298. Id. 
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tribes ever negotiated to accept the CRIT reservation and its long-
promised “improvements” in exchange for their much larger aboriginal 
land claims.299 The bargain, or lack of one, was of the following nature: 
stay here, or else you will stay here with even less. 
For reasons that are not entirely clear from the historical record, the 
Secretary of the Interior never did exercise his authority under the CRIT 
allotment acts to open CRIT lands to non-Indian settlement.300 Yet 
Arizona refused to give up on the idea. The Second Arizona Legislature 
asked Congress “to take the necessary steps to open the reservation’s 
100,000 to 125,000 acres of irrigable land to entry.”301 In 1916, the 
Senate Indian Affairs Committee held hearings on the Indian 
Appropriation Bill and considered Arizona’s request, which asserted the 
following: 
That the town site of Parker is a barren desert, on land having an 
intrinsic value of less than $1 per acre. That whatever added 
value it may have arises from the fact that it is adjacent to the 
bottom lands of the Colorado River Indian Reservation, in which 
the surplus lands above referred to lie; and unless said lands are 
opened to settlement and entry the town site of Parker is worth 
little, or not more than any other desert land.  
. . . That the residents of Parker and numerous other residents of 
the State of Arizona interested therein, who were induced to 
purchase lots in the Parker town site by reason of the implied 
promise of the United States above set forth to open the 
reservation lands to entry, have repeatedly petitioned Congress 
and the Department of the Interior for the opening of the surplus 
lands. 
. . . . 
. . . That the surplus Indian lands described above are highly 
desirable as prospective farms, and hundreds of energetic and 
enterprising citizens of this State alone are awaiting the 
opportunity to secure tracts of lands for the purpose of making 
their homes thereon. That to the best knowledge and belief of 
                                                     
299. See Kenneth M. Stewart, The Aboriginal Territory of the Mohave Indians, 16 
ETHNOHISTORY 257, 263 (1969) (discussing how following its establishment in 1865, some 
Mohave Indians were “persuaded” to move onto the Colorado River Reservation while others 
“refused to move from their ancestral homeland in the Mohave Valley”); see also Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963) (asserting that Indians were “put” on the Colorado River 
reservation, which was “not considered . . . the most desirable area of the Nation”), judgment 
entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended by 383 U.S. 268 (1966) and 446 U.S. 144 (1984). 
300. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 24.  
301. See id.  
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your memorialists a large amount of the delay in opening the 
surplus lands of said reservation to settlement in accordance 
with the said implied promise of the United States has been 
caused by unnecessary entanglements of official red tape in the 
various bureaus at Washington having charge of reclamation 
work and Indian affairs.302 
Despite Arizona’s pleas, which relied on the expectations of non-
Indian real estate speculators, Congress did not open the CRIT lands for 
settlement.303 The federal government seemed poised to relent on trying 
to settle Indians other than the Mohave and Chemehuevi members of 
CRIT on the reservation. The concession did not last long. Soon, 
relocation of Navajo and Hopi people became the focus of the 
government’s plans to redeem CRIT’s apparently intolerably sparse 
population. 
2.  Battles over CRIT Membership 
In 1933, the Indian Service embarked on a new effort to increase the 
population of the CRIT reservation by reaching out to tribal members on 
other reservations. First, Superintendent C.H. Gensler focused on 
recruiting from the Tohono O’odham (Papago) Reservation.304 Next, he 
turned hopefully to the cause of bringing Navajo tribal members to 
CRIT.305 Gensler’s campaign met with receptive ears in Washington. In 
1934, Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier “sent a letter to all 
the reservation superintendents in Arizona calling their attention to the 
‘lands of the Colorado River Indian Reservation.’” He instructed, 
“‘make a careful canvas or check of your jurisdiction, ascertain the 
views of the Indians you believe might or should be interested and report 
the results to this office.’”306 The Indian Service’s settlement goals were, 
again, linked to their efforts to finalize irrigation projects. With only 700 
Mohave and Chemehuevi settled at CRIT in 1935, the Director of 
Irrigation for the Indian Office testified before a Senate Committee that 
the plans were to “bring in other Indians” in order to justify his request 
for funding to irrigate 100,000 acres at CRIT.307 
                                                     
302. Indian Appropriation Bill: Hearing on H.R. 10385 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
64th Cong. 186 (1916) (emphasis added) (statement of Henry F. Ashurst, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, quoting memorial from the Second Legislature of the State of Arizona).  
303. See id. at 25.  
304. See id. at 40. 
305. See id.  
306. Id.  
307. See id. at 41. 
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Parallel to the Indian Service’s colonization effort, CRIT was working 
to establish an approved tribal constitution under the IRA.308 This led the 
Indian Service to intensify its analysis of the exact nature of the legal 
rights the enrolled CRIT members had to the CRIT reservation. The BIA 
used this moment to further pressure the Tribe to allow for 
“colonization,” urging them to include a provision in the tribal 
constitution that would allow the federal government to settle other 
tribes on the CRIT reservation. The BIA maintained the position that the 
1865 Act establishing the Reservation for “Indians of [the Colorado 
River] and its tributaries” meant that the Mohave and Chemehuevi did 
not have exclusive rights to the land. The Indian Service clung to this 
view, notwithstanding three contrary opinions by U.S. Solicitor Nathan 
Margold, the last of which was quite definitive: “The Secretary of the 
Interior has no right to locate other Indians on this reservation without 
the consent of the tribes having jurisdiction over the reservation, and the 
Indians have a clear legal right to withhold their consent.”309 The 
Solicitor further warned that “it would be inconsistent with the intent of 
section 16” of the IRA to compel CRIT to surrender exclusive rights to 
the reservation by refusing to approve their proposed constitution.310 
Based on the Solicitor’s opinions, in 1937 the Acting Secretary of the 
Interior approved the CRIT constitution, which maintained that “[t]he 
jurisdiction of the Colorado River Indian Tribes shall include all the 
territory within the original confines of the Colorado River Indian 
Reservation,” and vested membership in all persons of Indian blood who 
appeared on the official census roll of the reservation as of January 1, 
1937, as well as offspring of one-half or more Indian blood born to non-
resident members of the Tribes.311 The Constitution also gave the tribe 
the power by popular referendum to promulgate ordinances regarding 
new membership requirements and resulting property rights.312 
Despite the adopted constitution, the Indian Service continued to 
stress to the CRIT that once the new government-funded irrigation 
project was in place, there would be 100,000 acres of irrigable land on 
the reservation, more than the existing CRIT members could farm. 
                                                     
308. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (describing IRA period).  
309. Nathan Margold, Colorado River Indian Tribes of Colorado River Reservation—Surrender 
of Rights of Exclusive Occupancy (Oct. 29, 1936), in OPINIONS OF THE SOLICITOR, supra note 188, 
at 697, 697. 
310. See id.  
311. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES OF THE COLORADO 
RIVER RESERVATION, Aug. 13, 1937, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/colcons.html.  
312. See id. 
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Federal officials warned that the white community was already 
pressuring the government for access to reservation lands. 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier was reported to say in a 
meeting with CRIT on September 20, 1939: 
What is the nature of your title, if any, to this great area? I think 
the answer is that nobody quite knows . . . . However, the real 
and the practically controlling fact is, the 100,000 acres are 
going to be irrigated, and you . . . cannot use all of it. 
Impossible! It will be used either by Indians or white people. If 
used by white people, it will soon be owned by white people. 
From your standpoint and that of Indians as a whole, it is better 
that Indians be located here.313 
At the time there were about 875 Mohaves and 312 Chemehuevis on 
the reservation.314 It is important to recall that Commissioner Collier’s 
Solicitor, Nathan Margold, had answered the very question Collier posed 
about the nature of CRIT title, and Margold’s answer was wholly 
supportive of the Mohave and Chemehuevi’s position. Collier’s notable 
omission of Margold’s answer, and the substitution of Collier’s own 
wistful statement that “nobody quite knows” is curious to say the least. 
Consistent with Collier’s position, the BIA continued for the next five 
years to cajole the tribe to agree to colonization, even overtly threatening 
that if Congress got involved, the land was likely to go to white 
community members.315 A BIA memo dated November 15, 1940, 
summarized the BIA position: 
The Mojaves and Chemehuevis cannot possibly utilize this vast 
natural resource properly. Careful study of the needs of these 
Indians including those now residing at Needles and Ft. Mojave, 
has led to the conclusion that their present and ultimate land 
requirements will aggregate but not exceed 25,000 acres of 
irrigated land. This leaves a balance or surplus of 75,000 acres, 
which, if not utilized by the Indians, may be disposed of to non-
Indians at the express direction of Congress, or the appurtenant 
and extremely valuable water rights without which the land is 
                                                     
313. See HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 46 (emphasis 
added). 
314. Id. at 47. 
315. Id. at 48 (“On January 19, 1943, Superintendent Gensler wrote a letter to Dr. S.D. Aberle. In 
it he mentions the proposed division of the reservation for colonization purposes; the need of 
working slowly with the Tribal Council, and to convince them that ‘Congress will take it away from 
them and give it to whites probably before they will agree to other Indians taking it.’”) (emphasis 
added).  
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practically useless, be lost.316 
In addition to threatening congressional action, federal officials 
predicted that if the Tribe pursued a case in the Court of Claims (based 
on Solicitor Margold’s memos and other sources indicating that the 
Mohave and Chemehuevi had exclusive rights to the CRIT reservation 
absent their consent otherwise), the government’s off-sets for 
improvements and irrigation systems to date, plus any future 
expenditures to render the irrigation functional on the reservation, would 
be more than the value of the land taken: 
In view of this right to go to court if you are not satisfied, let us 
look at this matter in a practical and common sense 
way. . . . [T]here would be an accounting for everything the 
Government has expended for your benefit since the reservation 
was established in 1865, and the total of these expenditures 
would be an offset against the value of the land taken away from 
you. From a careful study of expenditures already made and a 
conservative estimate of expenditures still necessary to be made 
in order to construct a gravity system to deliver water to your 
lands, it is evident that even if such an accounting were made, 
the balance would be found to be in favor of the Government.317 
To summarize, throughout this period, the BIA threatened, coerced, 
and otherwise urged the CRIT leadership to allow other Indians to settle 
on the CRIT reservation.318 Moreover, despite prior notions that “tribes” 
were composed of individuals from the same or common lineage,319 in 
the CRIT’s case the government’s goal of consolidating all Indians 
together in a single space overrode the distinctions among different 
ethnic and linguistic groups. The racialization of CRIT was more of a 
binary—Indians (any of them) on one side, and whites on the other. The 
BIA Commissioner John Collier, whose highest charge was 
safeguarding tribal interests, instead played the age-old role of stern 
paternalist, warning CRIT that they had better accept more Indians to 
stave off what would otherwise be unstoppable: white settlement and 
divestment of the tribal land base.320 Collier did so even in the face of 
                                                     
316. Id. at 55 (quoting Statement, A Program from the Utilization of the Colorado River Indian 
Reservation, Bureau of Indian Affairs (Nov. 15, 1940)). 
317. Id. at 47 (quoting Remarks of H.W. Shipe, Special Assistant to the Dir. of Irrigation for the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, addressed to the Colorado River Tribal Council (Dec. 23, 1940)). 
318. See Bernard L. Fontana, The Hopi-Navajo Colony on the Lower Colorado River: A Problem 
in Ethnohistorical Interpretation, 10 ETHNOHISTORY 162, 169–73 (1963). 
319. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing judicial definitions of Indian tribe).  
320. See supra text accompanying note 313.  
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memos from his Solicitor indicating that the federal government would 
be violating the Mohave and Chemehuevi’s rights under the 1865 statute 
if they forced them to accept other Indians onto the CRIT reservation.321 
3.  Ordinance Number Five 
On February 8, 1945, the Colorado River Tribal Council finally gave 
in to relentless pressure from the BIA and passed Ordinance No. Five 
(“Ordinance Five”), agreeing to open tribal membership and reservation 
lands to other Indians.322 The Assistant Secretary of the Interior hastily 
approved the Ordinance on March 9, 1945.323 Ordinance Five divided 
the CRIT reservation into two parts—a Northern Reserve of about 
25,000 irrigable acres that belonged exclusively to currently enrolled 
members of CRIT, and a Southern Reserve of about 75,000 irrigable 
acres that would be colonized by other tribes of the Colorado River 
drainage including Hualapai, Hopi, Apache, Zuni, Papago, Havasupai, 
Yuma, and any other approved tribes.324 To receive land in the Southern 
Reserve the “colonists,” as they were called without irony, would have 
to become members of the CRIT.325 The colonists could apply for tribal 
membership after one year of residence on the reservation, and the CRIT 
had to accept their applications unless there was cause not to.326 In 
exchange, the government agreed to provide irrigation for an additional 
15,000 acres of tribal land in the Northern Reserve.327 
Once Ordinance Five was passed, the BIA acted quickly. In 1948, 
thirty-two colonist families were moved on to the reservation.328 Still, 
the relocation effort was hardly a big success. By May 17, 1949, only 
twenty-nine Hopi families and fourteen Navajo families had relocated to 
CRIT. This was due in part to the relatively slow pace of congressional 
appropriations for the relocation effort. Despite the many years of 
federal coercion leading up to the plan to move more Indians onto CRIT, 
Congress had not appropriated large sums of money to develop the land 
proposed for the colonists until 1948. By 1950, Congress had 
appropriated $5.75 million for the relocation and resettlement of Navajo 
                                                     
321. See supra text accompanying notes 309–10 (discussing the Margold memos).  
322. HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 36. 
323. Id. at 57. 
324. Id. at 36. 
325. Id. at 37. 
326. Id. at 58. 
327. Id. at 36. 
328. Id. at 49. 
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and Hopi Indians on the Reservation, resulting in sixty-two more people 
willing to move.329 In a disturbing twist, the Navajo and Hopi families 
who relocated were initially housed in the former Japanese-American 
internment camp at Poston while awaiting their new homes on the CRIT 
reservation.330 Collier had initially hoped to convert the barracks into 
Indian housing after the Japanese left, but the buildings were torn down 
before he had the chance.331 Whether Collier and his department 
intended it or not, the use of the former internment barracks heightens 
the sense that certain communities were fungible, if not disposable, in 
the government’s eyes. 
Meanwhile, tribal resistance to the Ordinance was growing. By 1949, 
the CRIT Tribal Council was “dead set” against it.332 In 1951, the 
Council attempted to rescind Ordinance Five, but the Secretary of the 
Interior refused to accept the rescission.333 Finally, in 1952, pursuant to 
Article IX of the Tribal Constitution, the Ordinance was put to popular 
referendum and rejected by the tribal membership.334 That put an end to 
colonization. CRIT membership, however, was already affected. The 
Navajo and Hopi families who relocated shortly after Ordinance Five 
(and decided to stay)335 eventually became tribal members at CRIT. By 
1966, CRIT had embraced its mixed membership and a seal was created 
to honor and memorialize the four tribes that constitute its 
membership.336 
4.  CRIT Today 
Today, there are more than 3700 enrolled members of the CRIT,337 
approximately 2500 of whom live on the CRIT reservation. CRIT’s total 
population, including non-Indian residents, is 7151.338 The CRIT tribal 
                                                     
329. Id. at 54. 
330. See TRUDY GRIFFIN-PIERCE, NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE SOUTHWEST 251 (2000); see also 
HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 35–36. 
331. ALISON R. BERNSTEIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND WORLD WAR II: TOWARD A NEW ERA IN 
INDIAN AFFAIRS 85 (1999). 
332. HISTORY OF THE COLORADO RIVER RESERVATION, supra note 2, at 50. 
333. Id. at 51. 
334. Id. 
335. See Fontana, supra note 318, at 176–77.  
336. See GRIFFIN-PIERCE, supra note 330, at 250.  
337. Enrollment, COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, http://www.crit-nsn.gov/critenrollment/ (last 
visited July 2, 2012). 
338. See Colorado River Indian Tribes Primary Care Area Statistical Profile 2011, ARIZ. DEP’T 
HEALTH SERVS. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.azdhs.gov/hsd/profiles/12404.pdf (data gathered from 
the Arizona Department of Commerce and 2010 U.S. Census indicating that the total population of 
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government is headed by its nine-member Tribal Council,339 and has 
thirty-six departments, including an attorney general’s office, tribal 
police, and tribal utilities.340 Economic activity at CRIT includes 
agriculture, gaming, recreation, tourism, and some industrial and service 
activities.341 
CRIT’s water rights, along with those of four other lower Colorado 
River tribes, were decreed in Arizona v. California.342 CRIT therefore 
has senior water rights to 719,248 acre-feet of water (or the amount 
necessary to irrigate 11,694 acres, whichever is less), which comprises 
roughly one-third of Arizona’s allotment under the Colorado River 
Compact.343 With established water rights and irrigation systems, a total 
of 84,500 acres are under agricultural cultivation on the CRIT 
reservation.344 CRIT has also invested in a model riparian restoration 
project along the banks of the Colorado.345 
In short, despite the history of pressure, coercion, and outright 
manipulation by the federal government to try to expand the CRIT 
population or, in the alternative, shrink its land base, CRIT employed its 
legal sovereignty as a federally recognized tribe, including associated 
reserved rights to water, to create a vital and evolving homeland for its 
multi-ethnic membership. Still, the imposition of a tribal identity that 
was not organic to the Mohave, Chemehuevi, Navajo, or Hopi remains a 
source of difficulty.346 Conflicts arise for which there are no shared 
cultural norms, and intra-tribal clashes ensue.347 This is part of the 
legacy of the government’s project of consolidation, though fortunately 
                                                     
the CRIT is 7151 and that 35.2% of the reservation residents are American Indian).  
339. CRIT Tribal Council and Administration, COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, http://www.crit-
nsn.gov/crit_contents/government/ (last visited July 2, 2012). 
340. CRIT Tribal Departments, COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, http://www.crit-nsn.gov/crit_ 
contents/departments/ (last visited July 2, 2012). 
341. See id.  
342. 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963), judgment entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), amended by 383 U.S. 268 
(1966) and 446 U.S. 144 (1984) (recognizing water rights for the Chemehuevi, Cocopah, CRIT, 
Fort Mohave, and Quechan (Fort Yuma) tribes).  
343. NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE 
POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST 335–36 n.65 (2009).  
344. Colorado River Indian Reservation Community Profile, ARIZ. DEP’T COM., (Sept. 2009), 
available at http://old.azcommerce.com/doclib/COMMUNE/colorado%20river.pdf. 
345. See LINDA S. MASTERS & SABRINA TUTTLE, THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES 
(C.R.I.T.) RESERVATION AND EXTENSION PROGRAMS (2008), available at 
http://cals.arizona.edu/pubs/natresources/az1461.pdf.  
346. See TSOSIE, supra note 276, at 1–2 (describing legacy of identity problems that flow from 
the government’s consolidation of the tribes on the CRIT reservation).  
347. See generally TSOSIE, supra note 276.  
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for CRIT and its people, the ultimate goal of elimination was never 
achieved. 
B.  The Great Dakota Nation (Sioux People of North America) 
Consolidation was the overriding effect of U.S. policies on CRIT; the 
contrasting effects on the Sioux people were scattering and 
concentrating. The Sioux, a large group of affiliated peoples, albeit with 
distinct expressions of language and culture, were separated into many 
federally recognized tribes on islands of land much smaller than their 
aboriginal (and prior treaty) lands. As a result, contemporary Sioux 
identity comprises a mosaic of affiliations that include language, history, 
and geography as well as membership in one of more than sixteen 
federally recognized tribes located in four states.348 None of these 
individual levels of identity are likely adequate to capture the full 
meaning of “Sioux-ness.”349 In fact, certain affiliations might be in 
tension with one another, as in the case of the majority of tribes that are 
associated primarily with one or two bands or sub-bands, but also 
include Sioux from other bands and even other divisions.350 Figure 1 
illustrates the layers of identity for the contemporary Sioux tribes of 
North and South Dakota: 
Figure 1 – Sioux Affiliations 
Dakota Nation (OCeti Sakawin) 
Santee (Eastern) Yankton (Middle or 
Wiciyela) 
Teton (Western) 
Dakota dialect Nakota dialect Lakota dialect 
(Council Fires – bands:) (Council Fires – bands:) (Council Fires – bands:) 
Mdewakanton 
Sisseton 
Wahpekute 
Wahpeton 
Yankton 
Yanktonai 
Teton (Titunwan) 
                                                     
348. See GIBBON, supra note 4, at 199; MICHAEL JOHNSON, TRIBES OF THE SIOUX NATION 9 
(2001) (listing contemporary Sioux tribes and their respective reservations and reserves in the 
United States and Canada).  
349. See, e.g., Robert E. Daniels, Cultural Identities Among the Oglala Sioux, in THE MODERN 
SIOUX: SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND RESERVATION CULTURE 198, 217 (Ethel Nurge ed., 1970). 
350. See infra text accompanying notes 464–68 (describing movement among tribes by tribal 
members); see also Sarah Krakoff, The Last Indian Raid in Kansas: Context, Colonialism, and 
Philip P. Frickey’s Contributions to American Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1253, 1275–77 
(2010) (describing Northern Cheyenne tribal members who fled to Sioux Reservations and became 
tribal members whose descendants are there to this day).  
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  Teton Sub-tribes/sub-
bands351 
Miniconjou, Sincanju, 
Oglala, Hunkpapa, 
Itizipco, Sihasapa, 
Ohenumpa 
Associated 
Tribe/Reservation352 
Associated 
Tribe/Reservation353 
Associated 
Tribe/Reservation354 
Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate / 
Lake Traverse 
Spirit Lake 
Flandreau Colony 
Crow Creek 
Yankton Reservation 
Standing Rock 
Crow Creek 
Oglala Sioux 
Rosebud Sioux 
Standing Rock 
Lower Brule 
Cheyenne River 
 
Before the creation of reservations and individual tribes, the Great 
Dakota Nation was not a nation-state in our modern concept of the 
phrase, but rather an alliance of entities with shared history and 
language.355 The Nation was organized into three sub-groups, the Santee, 
Teton, and Yankton, and beneath each were bands (Yankton, Teton) or 
clans (Santee).  The bands were composed of extended family groupings 
(Tiyospayes), which governed themselves independently despite being 
affiliated with the bands or clans for various functions.356 Anthropologist 
Guy Gibbon summarizes: “Today, ties among the Sioux remain strong, 
even though they are divided by attitudes, tribal politics, and territory,” 
and “it is difficult to distinguish one group of Sioux from 
another . . . although some dialectical differences persist.”357 
Nonetheless, the Sioux collective identity has diminished, and, Gibbon 
concludes, “Since most tribes are scattered through different, 
occasionally multi-tribal, reservations and in towns and cities, their 
integrity as a distinctive people has gradually faded.”358 
                                                     
351. Lakota Winter Counts: Social Structure, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM NAT. HIST., 
http://wintercounts.si.edu/html_version/html/socialstructure.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).  
352. Nine Tribes in South Dakota, S.D. OFF. TRIBAL GOV’T REL., 
http://www.sdtribalrelations.com/ninetribes.aspx (last visited June 29, 2012).  
353. Id. 
354. Id.  
355. See GIBBON, supra note 4, at 213. 
356. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 11. 
357. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 198, 199. 
358. Id. at 199. 
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How these numerous and interconnected peoples, whose aboriginal 
territory stretched across vast plains and mountains, became distinct 
federally recognized tribes, separated onto jurisdictional islands of 
Indian country, is a story characterized by violent conflict, legal 
wrangling, and accommodation to the relentless forces of non-Indian 
settlement. To some extent, a bare narrative timeline (and accompanying 
map) of U.S. treaties with the Sioux tells the story. 
In 1851, the United States entered into treaties with the “Sioux or 
Dahcotahs” and other tribes in order to settle questions about non-Indian 
passage through the territory.359 The Sioux’s territory was clearly 
defined and included western South Dakota, northwestern North Dakota, 
a chunk of Wyoming, and bits of Montana, as well as northeastern 
Nebraska.360 Seventeen years later, the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868361 
put an end to the Plains wars between the Sioux tribes and the U.S. and 
established new boundaries for the Great Sioux Nation that were more 
confined than those in 1851.362 The discovery of gold in the Black Hills 
as well as persistent pressure from railroads and other constituencies to 
settle non-Indians in the territories eventually led to the disintegration of 
the 1868 boundaries. After more than two decades of recurring pressure, 
both legal and military, the Sioux that had not already retreated to 
smaller reservations signed an 1889 agreement that broke up the Great 
Sioux Reservation, created six smaller reservations, and put an end to 
the military battles, though not to the legal ones.363 By the end of the 
nineteenth century, with Allotment and Assimilation policies in full 
swing, the scattering and concentrating of the Great Dakota Nation had 
been accomplished. The Sections below chronicle the story of scattering 
and concentrating in greater detail. 
                                                     
359. See Treaty of Ft. Laramie with Sioux, etc., U.S.-Sioux or Dahcotah, Cheyenne, Arrapahoe, 
Crow, Assiniboine, Gros-Ventre Mandan, and Arrickara Nations, Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749.  
360. See id. art. V (describing the boundaries of the “Sioux or Dahcotah Nation”). 
361. Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, U.S.-Sioux Nations, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635.  
362. See id. art. II, XI, XVI. The 1868 Treaty also included extensive reservations of unceded 
lands and hunting grounds. See id. 
363. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, chs. 404, 405, 25 Stat. 888. For information on the ongoing legal 
battles, see JEFFREY OSTLER, THE LAKOTAS AND THE BLACK HILLS: THE STRUGGLE FOR SACRED 
GROUND 139–66 (2010). 
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1.  Sioux Tribes of the Dakotas History364 
a.  Early Dakota Nation, 1500–1800 
In aboriginal times the Sioux shared the same language, which 
evolved into the three dialects of Dakota, Nakota, and Lakota as the 
bands expanded their territories and migrated.365 Dakota/Nakota/Lakota 
means “those who consider themselves kindred,” describing the 
collective identity of the Sioux.366 Europeans made contact with the 
Sioux in the 1500s, by which time the separate Dakota dialects and 
cultural differences between divisions were firmly established.367 During 
the 1500s and early 1600s the Dakota lived on the eastern seaboard near 
the Lumber and Santee rivers of modern-day North Carolina, and near 
the Ohio and Arkansas rivers in modern-day Ohio and Indiana.368 
The Dakota began their westward migration in the 1600s due to 
increased pressure from European settlement.369 In the early 1600s the 
Dakota resided largely in the area now known as north-central 
Minnesota and the northwestern corner of Wisconsin.370 The various 
bands lived a relatively sedentary river-based lifestyle, practicing some 
agricultural cultivation, as well as hunting and fishing.371 In the 1700s, 
population pressure from both Europeans and other tribes forced the 
Dakota further westward: the Teton settled in the Lake Traverse area, the 
Santee settled in the Mille Lacs area of central Minnesota, and the 
Yankton settled in southern Minnesota.372 By 1803, at the time of the 
Louisiana Purchase, the Sioux were widely “distributed across the 
prairie from Mississippi Valley . . . to just across the Missouri River in 
the Dakotas.”373 They were “more numerous, powerful, and widespread 
                                                     
364. For a map outlining the historical and current boundaries of the Sioux reservation see 
Kmusser (username), Sioux Reservation Map, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
File:Siouxreservationmap.png (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).  
365. Lakota Winter Counts: Who are the Lakota, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM NAT. HIST., 
http://wintercounts.si.edu/html_version/html/whoare.html (last visited June 7, 2012). 
366. Dakota, SASKATCHEWAN INDIAN CULTURAL CENTER, http://www.sicc.sk.ca/dakota_use_ 
existing_our_languages_sections.html (last visited July 3, 2012).  
367. PALMER, supra note 4, at 41. 
368. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 10. 
369. Id. 
370. See id.; see also Lakota Winter Counts: Who Are The Lakota, supra note 365. 
371. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 10. 
372. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 12. 
373. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 76. 
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than they had ever been.”374 
b.  The Sioux Westward Migration, Early Reservation Era, and 
Dismantling of the Great Sioux Nation, 1800–1900 
Under growing pressure from eastern tribes and white settlers, in the 
early 1800s the Dakota divisions began to disperse even further 
westward, beginning a process whereby the Western Sioux (Lakota) 
came to look more like Plains nomads, the Eastern Sioux (Santee) 
retained a woodland lifestyle, and the Middle Sioux adopted a mixed 
lifestyle.375 The “Seven Council Fires” outlined in Figure 1 emerged at 
the time of the Sioux migration to the Great Plains.376 As of the 1800s, 
the separate divisions of the Sioux (Santee, Yankton, and Teton) carried 
more meaning than the Sioux nation as a whole. Nonetheless, 
individuals have also always moved fluidly between bands, divisions, 
and reservations.377 
i.  Eastern Sioux (Dakota Dialect/Santee) 
When the Sioux divisions dispersed, the Santee division remained 
furthest east, retaining an ethos much closer to that of woodland tribes 
such as the Ojibwa and the Potawatomi, than to that of the Nakota or 
Lakota divisions of the Sioux tribe.378 The Eastern Sioux maintained a 
more sedentary, agricultural life, while the Yankton and Teton divisions 
migrated west and focused on a nomadic way of life.379 The Santee are 
the oldest division of the original Sioux nation.380 The Yankton and 
Teton divisions based their governing structure on the Tiyospayes (the 
extended family units), whereas the Santee’s sedentary life allowed for 
greater interaction between clans.381 
The Santee became a separate band when they moved away from the 
larger group in search of food and then became named for the place 
where they settled.382 The group then further divided into four of the 
                                                     
374. Id. 
375. Id. at 77, 84. 
376. Lakota Winter Counts: Social Structure, supra note 351. 
377. See, e.g., GIBBON, supra note 4, at 208. 
378. Stephen A. Feraca & James H. Howard, The Identity and Demography of the Dakota or 
Sioux Tribe, 8 PLAINS ANTHROPOLOGIST 80, 80–82 (1963). 
379. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 19. 
380. Feraca & Howard, supra note 378, at 82. 
381. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 20–21. 
382. PALMER, supra note 4, at 42–43. 
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seven council fires in the 1800s (Mdewakanton, Wahpekute, Wahpeton, 
and Sisseton).383 Exemplifying the fluidity of Sioux affiliations, some of 
the Wahpeton bands lived with the Sisseton and Yankton in the 1800s.384 
The Sisseton were the fourth Santee council fire to form.385 Eroding the 
idea of a monolithic Sioux identity, each band was considered to have its 
own character.386 
By 1803, most Eastern Santee Sioux lived between the Mississippi 
and Missouri rivers, east of the 100th meridian.387 However, they faced 
intense pressure from the north, south, and east by whites and other 
tribes throughout the 1830s.388 In 1837, the Santee sold its land east of 
Mississippi to the U.S. government, resulting in the tribe’s dependence 
on government support during the ensuing decades.389 The Santee 
migrated west and by 1839 around 4000 Santee lived in southern 
Minnesota and the eastern Dakotas.390 
With the 1851 Second Treaty of Traverse des Sioux and the Treaty of 
Mendota,391 the Santee moved farther west and ceded all of its all 
Dakota land between the Mississippi and Big Sioux rivers, from central 
Minnesota into northern Iowa.392 The resulting Santee reservation 
consisted of a ten-mile swath of land on both sides of the upper 
Minnesota River that ran about 150 miles from Lake Traverse in the 
west, to Little Rock Creek in the east.393 Upon Minnesota statehood in 
1858, government officials forced the Santee to cede the north side of 
the Minnesota River to the new state or risk seeing the state claim the 
entire reservation.394 
The incessant encroachment on their land, and Santee concern over 
                                                     
383. Id. at 42–46. The Mdewakanton was considered the first tribe from which all the other 
council fires originated. The Wahpekute and Wahpeton were the second or third hearths to form. (It 
is not clear which came first.) See id. at 43–44. 
384. Id. at 46. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. at 44–46. 
387. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 78. 
388. Id. at 81. 
389. Id. at 83. 
390. Id. at 79. 
391. See Treaty of Traverse des Sioux, U.S.-See-see-toan and Wah-pay-toan Bands of the Dakota 
or Sioux Indians, July 23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949 (spelling in original); Treaty of Mendota, U.S.-Med-
ay-wa-kan-toan and Wah-pay-koo-tay bands of the Dakota and Sioux Indians, Aug. 5, 1851, 10 
Stat. 954 (spelling in original). 
392. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 109. 
393. Id.  
394. Id. 
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intermarriage and acculturation, set the stage for the 1862 Minnesota 
Sioux Uprising, in which the Santee Sioux besieged a non-Indian town 
and took over the Indian Agency offices.395 The aftermath led to further 
blurring of Sioux divisions and affiliations. The federal government, in 
retaliation for the uprising, negated all Dakota treaty rights, confiscated 
the Santee’s land, and banished the Mdewakanton and Wahpekute from 
Minnesota.396 While the Sisseton and Wahpeton were allowed to stay in 
Minnesota, almost all left out of fear of reprisal.397 At least 3000 Santee 
fled westward to live with the Yanktonai and Lakota in North Dakota.398 
In general, there was much Eastern Sioux migration during the 1860s 
and 1870s due to disillusionment with certain reservations (Crow 
Creek), and the aftermath of the 1862 Uprising.399 Some Santee Sioux 
mixed with the Western Teton Sioux and adopted that lifestyle, while 
other Santee Sioux acculturated with white communities in Minnesota 
and at the Flandreau settlement (discussed further below).400 
For the Santee who did not merge with other cultural entities, on 
February 19, 1867, two reservations were established—Lake Traverse 
and Devil’s Lake (now Spirit Lake).401 The Devil’s Lake reservation was 
established for Santee who migrated across the plains, as well as 
Yanktonai who had previously occupied the area.402 Most of the 
Christianized Sioux were on the Sisseton reservation (Lake Traverse), 
while Indians who held closer to traditional religion were placed on 
Devil’s Lake.403 Devil’s Lake also had an influx of Teton families 
nominally assigned to the Standing Rock reservation, as well as some 
lower Sioux from the Turtle Mountain area.404 As a result, there was a 
high degree of cultural diversity among the Indians on the Devil’s Lake 
reservation compared to the Lake Traverse reservation.405 
In one of the most unique expressions of the complexity of Sioux 
                                                     
395. Id. at 110. 
396. Id. at 111. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. 
399. CLIFFORD ALLEN ET AL., FLANDREAU SANTEE SIOUX TRIBE, HISTORY OF THE FLANDREAU 
SANTEE SIOUX TRIBE 61 (1971). 
400. Id. 
401. RON MEYER, HISTORY OF THE SANTEE SIOUX: UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY ON TRIAL 
220 (rev. ed. 1993).  
402. Id. 
403. Id. at 223. 
404. Id. at 223–24. 
405. Id. at 224. 
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tribal identity, in 1869, twenty-five families left the Santee reservations 
without Indian Agency authorization and settled on unoccupied land in 
the valley of the Big Sioux River.406 They renounced their tribal ties and 
claims to benefits, and applied for homesteads in order to create the 
Flandreau settlement.407 The families doubled to fifty in the fall of 1869 
and their population hovered around 300 during 1890s.408 The Flandreau 
community’s living conditions through the 1800s were similar to those 
of their white pioneer neighbors, and by the end of 1800s they were 
better off economically than the Sisseton, Devil’s Lake Tribe, or the 
Minnesota Santee.409 While the Flandreau residents were Sioux by 
blood, they relinquished their tribal affiliation to become citizens of the 
United States.410 In an interesting twist, the Flandreau community was 
nonetheless recognized as a tribe in the Sioux Treaty of 1889.411 Their 
tribal affiliation proved critical for the Flandreau in the early twentieth 
century when they relied on their government-to-government 
relationship to obtain assistance during economically challenging 
times.412 
ii.  Middle Sioux (Nakota Dialect/Yankton and Yanktonai) 
During the late eighteenth century, the Nakota moved into the eastern 
Dakotas; by 1804 Lewis and Clark reported that the Yankton lived 
among the James, Des Moines, and Big Sioux rivers in eastern South 
Dakota and northwestern Iowa, and Yanktonai lived along the 
headwaters of the Big Sioux, James, and Red rivers in what is now 
North Dakota.413 By the 1830s around 4000 Yanktonai had moved 
westward beyond the Dakotas, with around 1000 staying east with the 
Sisseton (Santee).414 
As the Nakota migrated, they maintained some gardening and villages 
like the Eastern Sioux, but also adopted new habits such as hunting 
bison in the summer and living in lodges during the winter.415 Unlike 
                                                     
406. Id. at 242. 
407. Id. at 245–46. 
408. Id. at 247, 256. 
409. Id. at 252, 256. 
410. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 399, at 116. 
411. Id.; see Act of Mar. 2, 1889, chs. 404, 405, 25 Stat. 888. 
412. Id. at 87–89. 
413. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 83. 
414. Id. at 84. 
415. Id. at 84, 108. 
06 - Krakoff Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:37 PM 
1112 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1041 
 
either their eastern or western cousins, the Nakota spent most of the year 
in permanent villages.416 As mentioned above, the basic unit of the 
Nakota (and of the Teton division below) was the Tiyospayes, which 
consisted of ten to twenty conjugal families that functioned essentially as 
one large familial unit.417 
With the Treaty of Prairie de Chine in 1830, the Yankton ceded title 
to their land in the Des Moines River region in return for a $3000 
annuity and services.418 Although they ceded interest to an additional 
two million acres in the Treaty of October 21, 1837, in general the land 
base of the Middle Sioux was not as heavily affected during this period 
as that of the Eastern Sioux.419 
In yet another example of the fluidity of band affiliation among the 
Sioux, in 1830 the Yankton were joined by a small group of dissident 
Wahpekute Dakota who retained their Santee identity for many years, 
but operated politically as part of Yankton tribe.420 Interaction was 
common between the Middle and Eastern Sioux, and Santees by birth 
might be Yankton in terms of tribal allegiance.421 
By the 1850s American settlers were encroaching on the Yankton 
territory in large numbers, and on April 19, 1858, a number of Yankton 
Chiefs were pressured to sign a treaty ceding the remaining majority of 
their territory.422 In the Treaty of Washington in 1858, they gave up over 
eleven million acres on the delta between the Big Sioux and Missouri 
rivers in exchange for a 430,000-acre reservation in the Missouri Hills of 
South Dakota and fifty years of government services and rations.423 In 
1896, the Yankton were forced to sell more than half of this reservation 
land through the allotment program.424 Meanwhile, the Yankton and 
Yanktonai who did not settle on the reservation land in the late 1800s 
followed the retreating bison herds westward into Lakota Territory.425 
Most modern Yankton still live on or nearby the reservation lands 
established in the 1800s, with concentrations in the towns of Yankton, 
                                                     
416. Id. at 84. 
417. SATTERLEE & MALAN, supra note 6, at 13. 
418. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 86. 
419. See id. 
420. Id. 
421. Id. 
422. See HOOVER, supra note 4, at 30. 
423. Id.  
424. Id.  
425. See GIBBON, supra note 4, at 113. 
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Wagner, Greenwood, Marty, Ravinia, and Lake Andes.426 The tribes and 
reservations primarily associated with the Middle Sioux include the 
Yankton Reservation, Standing Rock, and Crow Creek.427 The size of 
the Yankton population is average for tribes in the Sioux federation, and 
their economic and cultural situation is considered representative of the 
Sioux in general.428 
iii.  Western Sioux (The Seven Lakota or Teton Tribes) 
Various influences, including the lure of abundant beaver populations 
and migrating buffalo herds, drove the migration of the Western Sioux 
tribes in the late eighteenth century and through much of the nineteenth 
century, while the Eastern Sioux remained in the eastern woodlands.429 
At their height, the Western Sioux consisted of twenty sub-bands.430 
Seven sub-bands survive: Oglala, Brule (Sicangu), Sans Arcs (Itazipco), 
Sihasapa (Black Foot), Minikonjou, Oohenonpa (Two Kettles of 
Cheyenne River), and the Hunkpapa.431 Both the Oglala and Brule claim 
that they are the parent group of all the Lakota sub-bands, but most 
experts believe it was the Oglala from which the other sub-bands 
emerged.432 While Lakota sub-bands appear as yet another layer of 
Sioux identity, it is unclear how effectively they capture ethnic unity. 
Sub-bands merged and separated as needed for hunting, or for military 
purposes.433 Bands such as the Brules were rarely together as one unit 
(pre-reservation) due to the requirements of hunting,434 and the 
Hunkpapa (the last Lakota sub-band to form) often allied with the 
Yankton.435 
During the early 1800s, the Lakota began to move onto the western 
plains because of conflict with neighboring tribes and encroaching 
whites, as well as to follow the large herds of buffalo.436 By 1804, the 
Lakota were already migrating as far west as the Rockies and the Platte 
                                                     
426. See HOOVER, supra note 4, at 95–96, 105. 
427. See id. at 105. 
428. See HOOVER, supra note 4, at 22. 
429. See Richard White, The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 65 J. AM. HIST. 321–22, 334–35 (1978). 
430. PALMER, supra note 4, at 43. 
431. DANIELS, supra note 349, at 215. 
432. JOSEPH CASH, THE SIOUX PEOPLE 6 (1971). 
433. Id. at 20–23. 
434. Id. at 6. 
435. PALMER, supra note 4, at 51. 
436. Lakota Winter Counts: Social Structure, supra note 351.  
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River, and north to the Saskatchewan River.437 Their adaptation to the 
plains was greatly accelerated and their lifestyle radically altered by 
acquiring horses.438 By the 1830s, the Lakota had moved so far west that 
they were warring with the Crow for control of the Powder River 
country south of Yellowstone River in eastern Wyoming.439 In response 
to the declining bison population and the Oglala, Brules, and 
Miniconjous migration into hunting grounds of the Platte River Valley, 
the Sioux Alliance formed in the 1820s. The alliance, which provides yet 
another example of fluid Sioux affiliations, consisted of Oglalas, Brules, 
Miniconjou, Yankton, Yanktonai, Northern Cheyenne, and Northern 
Arapaho.440 The Lakota and their successful Sioux Alliance eventually 
seized territory from the Iowa, Ponca, Pawnee, Arikara, Mandan, 
Hidatsa, Assiniboin, Kiowa, Crow, and Cheyenne.441 
The Lakota prospered on the plains, and outnumbered the combined 
Eastern and Middle Sioux.442 There were an estimated 25,000 Lakota in 
the 1800s.443 The Lakota lifestyle (also adopted by some Middle Sioux) 
differed significantly from the majority of the Middle and Eastern 
Sioux’s lifestyle.444 They acquired horses, lived in tipis, and were 
nomadic. They exhibited the “classic Plains complex” that existed from 
1800 to 1880 including: war bonnets, bison robes, medicine bundles, 
horse gear, horsemanship, and the Sun Dance.445 Their itinerancy 
protected them somewhat from the devastation of infectious diseases 
that swept through more sedentary tribes, allowing them to flourish and 
dominate their territory.446 The bison was central to Lakota culture and 
wealth, and due to hunting and hide trading, the early to mid- nineteenth 
century was a period of unprecedented wealth for the Lakota.447 
The 1860s and 1870s were the climax of northern plains warfare and 
the military glory of the Sioux Alliance, which numbered 20,000 Indians 
in 1865, 5000 of whom were warriors.448 Despite this Alliance, by the 
                                                     
437. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 86–87. 
438. See Lakota Winter Counts: Who Are The Lakota, supra note 365.  
439. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 87. 
440. Id. at 88. 
441. Id. 
442. Id. 
443. PALMER, supra note 4, at 48. 
444. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 89. 
445. Id. 
446. Id. 
447. Id. at 90. 
448. Id. at 115. 
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late 1800s the Western Sioux would succumb to the federal 
government’s splintering and dividing forces. In 1868, some Lakota 
bands gave in to the relentless pressure to live on reservations and avoid 
conflict with the whites, and they signed the Treaty of Fort Laramie to 
create the Great Sioux Reservation.449 Other Lakota who refused to be 
confined to reservations saw their livelihood destroyed when, between 
1872 and 1874, non-Indian hunters killed over three million bison on the 
plains, driving the species to extinction by the end of the decade.450 In 
1876, the U.S. Government ordered the remaining itinerant hunting 
bands of Sioux to report to the reservations, and set out to destroy the 
camps of non-complying bands in order to force them to do so.451 This 
led to Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse’s war with the U.S. government, 
culminating in the Battle of Little Bighorn.452 Little Big Horn instigated 
fierce retribution from the U.S. government, and the Winter of 1877 
campaign forced most of the remaining Lakota Sioux onto reservations 
or into Canada, thus shattering the mighty federation of Lakota bands.453 
The well-known story of the Lakota’s loss of the Black Hills in 
particular illustrates the relentless pressure to seize aboriginal lands 
whenever resources valuable to the non-Indian community came to 
light.454 
The current-day Lakota reservations were carved from the Great 
Sioux Reservation as it was dismantled during the late 1800s. The Great 
Sioux Settlement of 1889 reduced the Great Sioux Reservation to six 
separate reservations: Rosebud, Lower Brule, Standing Rock, Cheyenne 
River, Crow Creek, and Pine Ridge.455 The reservations were chosen for 
a variety of reasons, including their proximity to agencies for the 
purpose of military control.456 About one-half of modern Lakota live on 
                                                     
449. Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, U.S.-Sioux, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635. 
450. GIBBON, supra note 4, at 114. 
451. Id. at 116. 
452. Id. at 116–17. 
453. Id. at 117. 
454. See OSTLER, supra note 363, at 69–74 (describing the immediate conflicts in interpretation 
of the 1868 Treaty between Lakota leaders and the federal government, stemming in large part from 
pressure to seek gold in the Black Hills); id. at 85–92 (describing role that Custer’s reports of gold 
in the Black Hills had on subsequent efforts to divest Lakota of those lands). For a detailed legal 
history of this conflict, see generally EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS, WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX 
NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT (1991). 
455. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, chs. 404, 405, 25 Stat. 888.  
456. See OSTLER, supra note 363, at 73–74 (describing process of selecting agencies for the 
Dakota bands, which would eventually become their reservations). 
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or near these reservations.457 Similar to the Eastern and Middle Sioux, 
the Western Sioux reservations and tribes offer diverse examples of both 
intermixed and cohesive cultural units.458 The Pine Ridge and Lower 
Brule Reservations were noteworthy because their inhabitants (until the 
1970s) were nearly all descendants of one pre-reservation social unit.459 
However, as of 1975 the Lower Brule Reservation population was 
divided approximately equally between mixed-bloods and full-bloods—
with tension between the two groups.460 Similarly, the Oohenunpa band 
(or Two Kettles) survived into modern times as a separate entity on the 
Cheyenne River Reservation.461 In comparison, the Rosebud Reservation 
has many members with Brule ancestry,462 Oglala ancestry, and Lakota-
Ponca ancestry; the Standing Rock tribe includes both Hunkpapa Lakota 
and Yanktonai Nakotas; and the Cheyenne River Sioux include 
individuals from the Minikonjou, Oohenonpa, Itazipco, and Shasapa 
sub-tribes.463 
2.  The Dakota Today: A Snapshot of the Federally Recognized Tribes 
in North and South Dakota 
Sioux history continues to unfold for the ten federally recognized 
Sioux tribes of North and South Dakota: Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Sisseton 
Wahpeton Oyate of The Lake Traverse Reservation, Oglala Sioux Tribe, 
Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, Yankton Sioux 
Reservation, Crow Creek Sioux Reservation, and the Spirit Lake Tribe. 
The mixed membership and shifting enrollments within some of these 
tribes indicate the complexities of tribal membership as an affiliation. 
The migration of members between tribes reflects the continuity of 
Indian and/or Sioux identity notwithstanding the legal boundaries 
established by reservations and distinct federally recognized tribes. For 
example, two tribes include in their enrollment statistics the number of 
tribal members who have relinquished their membership to join other 
tribes. The Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, which has a total enrollment of 
                                                     
457. Lakota Winter Counts: Who Are The Lakota, supra note 365.  
458. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 349, at 223. 
459. Id. at 216. 
460. ERNEST L. SCHUSKY, THE FORGOTTEN SIOUX: AN ETHNOHISTORY OF THE LOWER BRULE 
RESERVATION 227 (1975). 
461. PALMER, supra note 44, at 51. 
462. CASH, supra note 432, at 54. 
463. DANIELS, supra note 349, at 233. 
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5069 members, 1230 of whom live on the Crow Creek Reservation, 
reported in 2011 that 180 individuals had relinquished their Crow Creek 
enrollment to join other tribes.464 The Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 
which has 759 enrolled members and 1266 members of other tribes 
residing on their lands (mostly attributable to the Flandreau Indian 
School), reported that approximately forty of their members disenrolled 
to join other tribes, and 250 relinquished other tribal affiliations to join 
Flandreau.465 Similar phenomena of enrollment and relinquishment are 
evident for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe,466 a much larger tribe with over 
21,000 enrolled members living on its reservation.467 
Given the static boundaries imposed on the Dakota people as a result 
of carving up their aboriginal territory into discrete reservations, it is not 
surprising that membership in a federally recognized tribe is, for some, 
not necessarily paramount to tribal identity. The degree of migration, 
disenrollment, and reenrollment reflects the extent to which Dakota 
people still identify with the larger Dakota Nation, notwithstanding the 
political and legal significance of membership in a particular tribe.468 At 
the same time, the federally recognized tribe has become the primary site 
of identity for many, as well as the symbol for the persistence of separate 
Dakota political and cultural existence. For members of the ten federally 
recognized tribes that once comprised part of the Great Dakota Nation, 
identity (including its racial, political, and cultural aspects) derives from 
the history and politics that lie within current legal distinctions. 
                                                     
464. E-mails from Rozelle Lockwood, Enrollment Specialist, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, to 
Nancy Smith (Jan. 26, 2011 and Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author).  
465. E-mail from Scott Anderson, Benefits Eligibility Specialist, Tribal Enrollment Office, 
Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, to author (Jan. 25, 2011) (on file with author).  
466. At one time, general enrollment and relinquishment numbers were available on the internet. 
See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Culture, Le Oyate Ki, http://www.rosebudsiouxtribe-nsn.gov/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61&ltemid=68 (last visited June 7, 2012, but no 
longer available). The general information is no longer publicly available, but Rosebud Tribal 
Council Meeting minutes corroborate that enrollment and relinquishment do occur. See Rosebud 
Sioux Tribal Council Minutes of Oct. 4, 2011 (documenting Tribal Council approval of motions to 
enroll new members and to accept relinquishment by existing members) (on file with author).  
467. Nine Tribes in South Dakota, S.D. DEPARTMENT TRIBAL GOV’T REL., 
http://www.sdtribalrelations.com/rosebud.aspx (last visited June 7, 2012). 
468. The phenomenon of migration and changing membership also reflects the evolution of a 
broader pan-Indian identity. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal 
Members: The Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1123, 1140–45 (1994) 
(describing rise of pan-Indian political and social organizing in response to policies and actions 
threatening all tribes). 
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III.  SETTLER COLONIALISM, THE ELIMINATIONIST AGENDA, 
AND THE RACIAL FORMATION OF NATIVE PEOPLES 
The general history of tribal federal recognition and membership in 
Part I and the specific histories of the CRIT and Sioux Tribes in Part II 
reveal how race was constructed in the American Indian context. The 
concept of the inferior and disappearing tribe justified laws and policies 
that fixed tribes in time and space in order to diminish their separate 
status and claims to land. The means of achieving Indian elimination 
varied. In the CRIT context, the predominant approach was to 
consolidate distinct ethnic and linguistic groups into one tribe on one 
reservation. The Sioux story, by contrast, is characterized by scattering 
connected groups into many smaller tribes (with smaller reservations). 
Throughout these two histories, as well as the broader history of federal 
recognition, the government’s role in entangling race, blood, and tribal 
status to achieve the ends of shrinking Indian tribes and their claims to 
land is evident. 
In their influential work on racism in the United States, Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant coined the term “racial formation,” which they 
defined as “the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are 
created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”469 Omi and Winant 
posit that the initial essentialist construction of race, which ascribed 
inferior characteristics to groups based on allegedly biological traits, 
performed certain key historical functions (such as the expropriation of 
land and labor.) Yet once the category of race is created, and social 
ordering based on racism occurs, neither the category nor the social 
ordering disappear despite the absence of biological bases for racial 
distinctions. Race, though a social construct and not a biological trait, 
thus acquires and produces cultural meanings that continue to infuse our 
everyday encounters and structure aspects of our society.470 Rather than 
jettison race as an archaic misconception, Omi and Winant urge that “[a] 
more effective starting point is the recognition that despite its 
uncertainties and contradictions, the concept of race continues to play a 
fundamental role in structuring and representing the social world.”471 
Although they mention American Indians in passing, Omi and Winant 
do not account separately for the racial formation of indigenous peoples 
historically, nor do they grapple with the unique legacies of racism on 
                                                     
469. OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 55. 
470. See id. at 54–61. 
471. Id. at 55. 
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American Indian communities and individuals.472 Patrick Wolfe, 
however, has applied a similar framework when analyzing the 
racialization of indigenous peoples in settler-colonial societies.473 As 
theorized by Wolfe, settler-colonial societies, such as Australia and the 
United States, are those where the colonizing people came to stay and 
quickly outnumbered the indigenous inhabitants.474 Traditional 
colonialism, as was imposed in much of Africa and India, was 
characterized by small numbers of colonizers dependent on much larger 
numbers of native people for labor.475 To extract value from the land, 
traditional colonial societies required the continued presence of their 
subordinated labor force.476 By contrast, “settler colonies were not 
primarily established to extract surplus value from indigenous labour. 
Rather, they are premised on displacing indigenes from (or replacing 
them on) the land.”477 The racial project for indigenous peoples was 
therefore one of elimination: “Settler colonies were (are) premised on 
the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a 
determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to 
stay—invasion is a structure not an event.”478 
Wolfe’s work on the racialization of indigenous people focuses 
largely on miscegenation and assimilation laws and policies.479 The 
histories of federal recognition and membership composition discussed 
above add yet another dimension to explicating the eliminationist 
project: Federally recognized tribes were consolidated and concentrated 
from the previously un-quantified (and therefore, beyond state control) 
                                                     
472. Omi and Winant discuss Native Americans specifically in just two places in their book. See 
id. at 61–62 (discussing the age of “discovery” and religiously inspired precursors to racialization of 
American Indians); id. at 80 (describing Native opposition to racism). 
473. See generally Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28.  
474. See WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 8, at 1–2. 
475. See id.  
476. See id. 
477. Id. at 1 (emphasis in original); see also Berger, supra note 9. Berger traces the divergent 
paths of racism against African Americans and American Indians, and concludes that Indians’ 
racialization took the form of denigration of their collective tribal existence. Breaking up the tribe, 
and liberating the land and resources, was the political and economic objective served:  
European Americans were not primarily concerned with using Indian people as a source of 
labor, and so did not have to theorize Indians as inferior individuals to justify the unfair terms 
of that labor. Rather, colonists’ primary concern with respect to Indians was to obtain tribal 
resources and use tribes as a flattering foil for American society and culture.  
Id. at 593.  
478. WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 8, at 2.  
479. See generally id.; see also Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference, supra note 28. But see 
Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, supra note 8, at 391–92 (addressing 
treaty interpretation and property law manifestations of the eliminationist agenda).  
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groups of tribally affiliated Indians. The very process of recognition 
reduced tribes from free and independent peoples (with potentially vast 
claims to land) to manageable units, which could be bargained with, 
reduced, and ultimately displaced.480 
The CRIT and Dakota stories contain characteristics that are 
generalizable, particularly when placed in the larger historical context of 
how tribes evolved from free and independent nations to federally 
recognized tribes. First, the politics that constructed federally recognized 
tribes included recurring pressures to shrink aboriginal claims to 
territory.481 Second, justifications for shrinking territory were often 
couched in narratives of the tribe’s waste (or non-use) of resources, with 
necessarily negative characterizations of Indian people.482 Third, the 
fluidity with which Indian tribes defined their own members prior to 
European contact was necessarily compromised by the federal 
government’s imposition on tribes of regimes of land and resource 
scarcity.483 Fourth, today, federally recognized tribes nonetheless include 
considerable ethnic diversity among enrolled members, as well as 
varying kinds of political and social affiliations that extend beyond 
enrolled membership.484 
Folded within each history are the forms of racialization that applied 
to American Indians more generally. First, to justify divisions among 
tribes between those that were considered allies and those that were not, 
Indian agents and the federal government (including the courts) ascribed 
wild and unruly characteristics to some tribes and friendly and docile 
(assimilable) characteristics to others.485 Then, as it became clear that no 
tribe was docile or friendly enough to justify standing in the way of non-
Indian settlement, assimilation of individuals and the destruction of the 
tribe qua tribe became the dominant objective.486 Thus, during the 
allotment era, all tribes, regardless of degree of assimilation, were 
deemed to have inferior qualities that were ineradicable except by 
                                                     
480. See supra Part II.B.  
481. See supra Part II.A.4.  
482. See supra Part II.A.2; see also OSTLER, supra note 363, at 88–89 (describing justifications 
for taking the Black Hills from the Lakota). Ostler recounts that Custer declared the Black Hills 
region as unoccupied and “‘seldom visited by [the Indians.] It is used as sort of a back-room to 
which they may escape after committing depredations.’” Id. at 88. Another commentator of the 
times put it this way: “‘The grand and beautiful Eden just discovered . . .’ should not be left in the 
hands of ‘the most obstinately depraved nomad that bears the ‘human form divine.’” Id.  
483. See supra Part I.B.1.b.  
484. See supra Parts II.A and II.B.1.  
485. See supra text accompanying notes 169–71.  
486. See supra text accompanying notes 132–50.  
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dissolution of group status. Winnowing the number of people with tribal 
affiliation (through the creation of membership rolls and the inclusion of 
descent or blood quantum based criteria) was a way to ensure the 
eventual extinction of tribes themselves. By the time policies of self-
determination became ascendant, all of this history was baked into what 
it meant to be an American Indian tribe. 
For the CRIT, the overriding sense from history is that, from the 
federal government’s perspective, all Indians in the area were fungible 
and ultimately disposable. The Indian Service attempted repeatedly to 
justify its failure to consolidate all tribes of the lower Colorado River 
onto one reservation with efforts to increase the CRIT population in 
other ways. When early attempts to locate tribes other than the Mohave 
and Chemehuevi failed, allotment seemed to be the best solution. When 
allotment efforts failed to shrink the CRIT reservation by opening it for 
non-Indian settlement, federal agents tried yet another strategy: 
relocating Navajo and Hopi tribal members who themselves were 
objects of failed government policies to contain and control tribes and 
their homelands. Throughout, federal officials referred to the waste of 
resources that would otherwise result if lands set aside in the 1865 
statute (with subsequent additions) were home only to a paltry number 
of Indians. The multi-linguistic, multi-cultural composition of today’s 
Colorado River Indian Tribe is the outcome of that statist project of 
racialized consolidation,487 even while today CRIT itself exercises its 
powers of self-government and inherent sovereignty to further a living, 
complicated culture with ties to its several indigenous peoples. 
The history of the ten federally recognized tribes in North and South 
Dakota reflects the eliminationist agenda in similar as well as distinct 
ways. For the affiliated peoples of the Great Dakota Nation, their 
presence throughout the upper Midwest and Great Plains seemed 
initially to require a global territorial solution.488 After the Civil War, 
when pressure and desire to settle the western territories increased, that 
solution was inadequate. The subsequent break-up of the Great Sioux 
Nation followed the dictates of non-Indian desire for land and resources 
rather than any pre-existing identities claimed by the many Dakota bands 
and affiliations. To some extent, peoples of common language, political 
structure, and tradition were assembled within a federally recognized 
tribe on a reservation having some connection to their aboriginal lands. 
                                                     
487. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 26, at 56 (defining “racial projects”).  
488. See supra Part II.B.1.b; see also Treaty of Traverse des Sioux, U.S. See-see-toan and Wah-
pay-toan Bands of the Dakota or Sioux Indians, July 23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949 (spelling in original).  
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But that was due more to the will and agency of the bands themselves 
than the design of the federal government. 
Wolfe’s observation that “invasion is a structure not an event,”489 
applies forcefully to the CRIT and Sioux tribes today. Invasion 
structured the membership composition of the CRIT and Sioux tribes 
according to non-Indian desire for land and resources, and the political 
and legal consequences for the tribes persist. Internally, the CRIT and 
Sioux tribal governments struggle to reconcile the divergent cultures and 
backgrounds of their members. Externally, the tribes must defend their 
legal and political sovereignty (derived from their pre-contact status as 
independent peoples and recognized in the US constitution) even though 
the form it takes necessarily reflects the history of invasion. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
Politics and law construct race, and the racial characteristics assigned 
to certain groups then generate their own politics and law. Accepting 
those premises necessarily implies acceptance of the conclusion that 
different politico-legal goals motivated the construction of different 
racial groups. As discussed above, for American Indian tribes, the 
overriding characteristic of their racialization was the goal of 
elimination. Therefore, the overriding characteristic of redress for tribes 
is to perpetuate their existence as distinct peoples.490 Today, that means 
supporting classifications that further the unique obligations that 
Congress has to tribes regardless of whether they incorporate 
membership criteria that (inevitably) reflect the racializing project 
imposed on them. A source no less than the leading Indian law treatise 
makes the same point: “A sound reading of Morton v. Mancari would 
acknowledge that even though ancestry may figure into some Indian 
classifications, ultimately the most important inquiry is whether the law 
can be justified as fulfilling ‘Congress’ unique obligation toward the 
                                                     
489. WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM, supra note 8, at 2. 
490. This overriding characteristic applies to classifications affecting tribes and, by extension, 
classifications (largely in the form of preferences and benefits) that apply to Indians as members of 
tribes. There are also still many instances and forms of racism against individual Indians that require 
the full range of individual civil rights remedies, including those of perpetuating their tribal 
connection. See Rolnick, supra note 9, at 959–68; see also Berger, supra note 9, at 594–95. In other 
words, redress for the eliminationist harms perpetrated against tribes requires certain forms of 
response (support for tribes as peoples). Redress—for lack of a better word—for more generic 
forms of racism against Indians requires the full range of civil rights remedies, including sometimes 
restoring connections to their tribe. See Rolnick, supra note 9, at 1036–45 (coming to similar 
conclusions).  
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Indians.’”491 The legal histories of CRIT and the Great Dakota Nation 
illuminate the wisdom of this view, and highlight the thicket that lies 
behind any judicial attempt to unwind the racial from the political with 
respect to that aspect of Mancari. 
The following brief review of how courts have addressed equal 
protection issues since Mancari reinforces the conclusion that courts risk 
furthering the settler-colonial project rather than reversing it when they 
stray from inquiring whether a classification can be justified as fulfilling 
“Congress’s unique obligation toward the Indians.” Post-Mancari, courts 
have faced four types of equal protection challenges in the American 
Indian context. First, similar to Mancari itself, non-Indians continue to 
challenge laws that confer benefits on Indians and tribes.492 Second, 
nonmember Indians have challenged a federal law, known as the Duro-
fix legislation, that recognized inherent tribal powers to prosecute 
nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians, for tribal crimes.493 Third, 
courts have addressed equal protection challenges brought by 
nonmember Indians to legislation that gives preference to tribal 
members.494 Fourth, Indians have brought equal protection challenges to 
federal criminal prosecution.495 While most courts that address these 
questions find them easily resolved under Mancari, the creep of color-
blind jurisprudence and its ahistorical approach to racial formation 
generally, and Indian law specifically, is evident in a few cases that fall 
in the first two categories. Those categories are, therefore, addressed in 
                                                     
491. COHEN, supra note 42, § 14.03[2][b], at 927 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 
(1974)). 
492. See infra IV.A; see also Alaska Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Pierce, 
694 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding HUD preference for Indian-owned companies to build 
housing for Indians); Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1980) (upholding tribal 
employment preference against equal protection challenge brought by non-Indian former police 
chief); Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding New Mexico statute 
granting only Indians the right to display and sell handcrafted jewelry on grounds of public 
museum).  
493. See infra Part IV.B. 
494. See Mullenberg v. United States, 857 F.2d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting equal protection 
challenge by nonmember Indian to IHS Indian employment preference). But see Dawavenda v. Salt 
River Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 154 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Indian 
preference policy that favored members of one federally recognized tribe over another violated Title 
VII prohibition on national origin discrimination).  
495. See United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting equal protection 
challenge to federal criminal prosecution, reasoning that the claim was indistinguishable from the 
one rejected in Antelope); cf. United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
conviction of defendant for assault on an Indian child on grounds that government had met its 
burden to prove victim was a member of an Indian tribe and that classification was political, 
pursuant to Antelope).  
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more detail below. 
A.  Challenges by Non-Indians to Classifications Conferring Benefits 
on Indians 
Since Mancari, non-Indian plaintiffs have continued to bring equal 
protection challenges to classifications that afford distinctive treatment 
to American Indians and American Indian tribes. These challenges can 
be divided into two groups: challenges to religious exemptions specific 
to Indians and challenges to economic legislation, in particular Indian 
gaming laws. 
The religious exemption cases, when brought as equal protection 
challenges, have generally been rejected based on Mancari.496 In Peyote 
Way Church of God v. Thornburgh,497 the Fifth Circuit upheld federal 
legislation exempting Native American Church (NAC) members from 
statutes prohibiting peyote possession against an equal protection 
challenge.498 The court had no difficulty concluding that the NAC 
membership requirements, which included twenty-five percent Native 
ancestry as well as membership in a federally recognized tribe, met the 
“political classification” test, and therefore applied Mancari’s rational 
basis approach.499 The court then concluded that the NAC exemption 
furthered the legitimate governmental purpose of preserving Native 
American religion.500 Other religious exemption cases have had similar 
outcomes.501 
Viewed in the context of the racial formation of tribes, for which the 
perpetuation of tribal culture is an appropriate form of redress, the 
approach followed in Peyote Way Church of God is the right one. Part of 
the eliminationist agenda was the destruction of tribal religion and 
culture.502 Affirming congressional and administrative efforts to 
                                                     
496. Some challenges to religious exemptions have succeeded when brought under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, however. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002).  
497. 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991). 
498. See id. at 1211.  
499. See id. at 1216. 
500. See id. 
501. See, e.g., Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(upholding Indian religious exemption for eagle feather possession). The court applied equal 
protection analysis to the claim, which had been brought as an establishment clause challenge. See 
id.  
502. See generally Allison Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-
Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 773 (1997) (describing Allotment era’s destruction of religion); see also Berger, 
supra note 9, at 628–39 (discussing destruction of culture as linked to racialization of the tribe 
 
06 - Krakoff Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:37 PM 
2012] INEXTRICABLY POLITICAL 1125 
 
perpetuate American Indian religious practices, even as they evolve in 
pan-Indian forms like the NAC, is a constructive step toward reversing 
elimination. At the same time, the “religion and culture” equal protection 
cases may not be the most challenging ones in terms of unsettling the 
paradigm of the disappearing Indian. Perpetuating Native culture is 
crucial, yet (with important exceptions) can coexist with stereotypical 
notions of Indians fixed in time and space, and importantly, pose no 
threat to economic interests.503 
The harder cases, in terms of unsettling racially constructed ideas 
about Indians, are the ones recognizing tribal powers to engage in 
economic activity. In particular, non-Indian plaintiffs have brought 
challenges to laws that recognize tribes’ exclusive powers to operate 
gaming activities within states. Similar to the equal protection/religion 
cases, to date, these challenges have been rejected.504 But language in 
the recent case of KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick505 adverts to 
the ease with which some courts might start to employ racial vocabulary 
to undermine tribal sovereignty. In KG Urban Enterprises, a federal 
district court in Massachusetts upheld a Massachusetts gaming law that 
authorized casino-style gaming and established a scheme for issuing 
licenses for different categories of gaming.506 Consistent with the federal 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,507 the Massachusetts law authorized 
gaming compacts with federally recognized Indian tribes and required at 
least one member of the state’s Gaming Policy Advisory Committee to 
be a representative of a federally recognized Indian tribe. The 
Massachusetts Act also provided that if the state “enters into a Tribal 
State gaming compact with an Indian tribe, the Gaming commission will 
not issue a Category One license” for one of the designated geographic 
                                                     
during allotment).  
503. The exceptions include cases in which Indian claims to culture and religion raise questions 
about land use. These are more threatening to the established order because they raise the specter, 
realistic or not, of Indians reclaiming vast swaths of land. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see also Kristen Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to 
Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061 (2005) 
(analyzing Lyng and related cases and proposing property rights approach in light of repeated poor 
outcomes in the First Amendment context). 
504. See Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
gaming compacts under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act between the state of California and 
Indian tribes).  
505. 839 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D. Mass.) aff’d in part, vacated and remanded in part, 693 F.3d 1 (1st 
Cir. 2012). 
506. See id. 
507. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2721 (2006).  
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regions of the state.508 KG Urban Enterprises, a non-Indian company that 
had acquired a former brownfields site in order to develop a multi-level 
casino and shopping/retail and conference center, challenged the 
Massachusetts law on equal protection and other grounds.509 
The district court upheld the law, but first questioned the Mancari 
distinction between the “political” category of the federal recognized 
tribe and the “racial” composition of tribal membership: 
The government’s power to regulate Indian affairs, which 
implicates weighty constitutional issues, should not rise or fall 
on a facile distinction. “Federally recognized tribes” are quasi-
sovereign political entities, to be sure, which is why some courts 
characterize the classification as political. Their members, 
however, share more than a like-minded spirit of civic 
participation; they share the same racial heritage.510 
The court then cited to articles by Indian law scholars to support this 
conclusion.511 The court used the nuanced work of these scholars, whose 
analyses are embedded in the history of ideological and structural forces 
that shaped tribal membership into membership by descent,512 to 
conclude that tribal membership relies on “racial heritage.” That the 
court used the term “racial heritage” is significant. The term implies a 
distinctly biological and essentialist understanding of tribal membership 
requirements, as opposed to the more accurate understanding that the 
descent-based requirements were (and in many cases still are) an 
inevitable artifact of the political relationship (wrought by historical, 
ideological, and structural forces) between tribes and the federal 
government.513 
Despite the court’s disquiet over the Supreme Court’s failure to 
grapple “with complex constitutional issues such as the scope of 
congressional power to regulate Indian affairs and the inherent tension 
between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause,” 
it concluded that the state gaming law survives Mancari rational basis 
                                                     
508. KG Urban Enters., 839 F. Supp. 2d. at 394. 
509. See id. at 392. 
510. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
511. See id. at 403–04 (citing Spruhan, supra note 77, at 12; Kirsty Gover, Geneology as 
Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in Membership 
Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243 (2009); Rolnick, supra note 9, at 
1001).  
512. See Gover, supra note 511, at 248–54; Rolnick, supra note 9, at 1008–10; Spruhan, supra 
note 77, at 47–49.  
513. See supra Parts II.B and III; see also Goldberg, supra note 41, at 958–64; Carole Goldberg, 
Descent Into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1673 (2002). 
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review.514 But, if the court could have addressed the issue as one of first 
impression: 
[I]t would treat Indian tribal status as a quasi-political, quasi-
racial classification subject to varying levels of scrutiny 
depending on the authority making it and the interests at stake. 
Federal laws relating to native land, tribal status or Indian 
culture would require minimal review because such laws fall 
squarely within the historical and constitutional authority of 
Congress to regulate core Indian affairs. Laws granting 
gratuitous preference divorced from those interests, such as . . . a 
law granting tribes a quasi-monopoly on casino gaming, would 
be subject to more searching scrutiny.515 
The district court’s proposed multi-tiered scrutiny reveals precisely 
why the Supreme Court should resist the invitation to grapple with the 
“inherent tension” between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause.516 If it does so, it will be likely to misconceive the 
tension in precisely the way the Massachusetts court did. The tension is 
not bi-polar: “Indian Commerce Clause versus Equal Protection.” The 
tension is multi-directional and dynamic. The historical racialization of 
tribes and the lingering effects of that eliminationist project cannot be 
redressed by empowering courts, for the first time, to scrutinize 
economic legislation that allows tribes to carry out inherent 
governmental powers. To the contrary, embedded in the court’s 
proposed approach is a re-racialization that boxes tribes into traditional 
cultural projects while pre-judging as “gratuitous” contemporary 
economic benefits.517 If the Supreme Court opts to grapple with the 
tensions inherent in federal Indian law, it should take in the full scope of 
how the federal government’s relationship with tribes has racialized the 
political relationship and politicized “race” in ways that defy ahistorical 
and colorblind scrutiny. Otherwise, tugging on just one strand might 
well unravel all that is moving in the right direction in terms of 
perpetuating tribal survival, and leave intact the most crushing forms of 
eliminationist law and policy. 
B.  Challenges by Nonmember Indians to Duro-fix Legislation 
Tribal governments exercise inherent criminal authority over tribal 
                                                     
514. See KG Urban Enters., 839 F. Supp. 2d. at 405.  
515. Id. at 404.  
516. Id. 
517. See id.  
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members and also over members of other Indian tribes.518 The history of 
how tribes became “federally recognized tribes,” and the more particular 
histories of CRIT and the Great Dakota Nation recounted in Parts II.B 
and III above, echo the broader historical justification for recognizing 
tribal powers over their own and other members, in that the distinction 
between a tribe’s members and those of another tribe was, and remains, 
fluid and historically contingent.519 Nonetheless, as discussed above, in 
Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court held that tribes did not have inherent 
authority to prosecute nonmember Indians.520 Tribal leaders and 
academics immediately and roundly criticized Duro.521 Not only did 
Duro misconceive history, the decision created a jurisdictional vacuum 
for criminal law enforcement in Indian country. States do not have 
criminal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in Indian country committed by 
Indians, and the federal government lacks the authority to prosecute 
misdemeanor crimes committed by Indian perpetrators against Indian 
victims.522 The only government with the authority to prosecute 
nonmember Indians for certain categories of crimes against other Indians 
was and remains the tribal government.523 As a result, Congress 
overturned the result in Duro just a year after the case was decided.524 
The Supreme Court upheld the Duro-fix legislation in United States v. 
Lara525 on the grounds that Congress’s power in Indian affairs includes 
the ability to affirm the inherent authority of tribes to subject 
nonmember Indians to criminal prosecution.526 Lara was brought as a 
double jeopardy case.527 The defendant, Billy Jo Lara, had already been 
convicted in tribal court.528 He argued that Congress lacked the power to 
                                                     
518. See supra Part I.B.2.d. 
519. See supra Parts II.B and III; see also Krakoff, supra note 350, at 1280–82 (describing 
incorporation of Northern Cheyenne tribal members into the Pine Ridge/Oglala Lakota Tribe).  
520. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990), discussed supra at note 256.  
521. See Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 
5 (2004) (describing strong negative response from tribal leaders and academics).  
522. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 310–21 (describing criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
country).  
523. Public Law 280 jurisdictions where states have assumed criminal authority over Indian 
Country are the only exception to this. The weakness of PL 280 law enforcement further highlights 
the impracticality of turning to states to address Indian country crime. See Carole Goldberg-
Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1405 (1997).  
524. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (2006).  
525. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).  
526. See id. at 200.  
527. Id. at 196–97. 
528. Id. 
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restore tribal inherent sovereignty and that his tribal prosecution, 
therefore, was federal in nature and barred a second prosecution by the 
same sovereign—the federal government.529 Lara also challenged his 
federal prosecution on equal protection and due process grounds, but the 
Court set those issues aside as relevant only to the tribal prosecution.530 
The Court indicated that there might well be equal protection and due 
process concerns, but they would have to be raised in a challenge to the 
tribal court’s criminal jurisdiction.531 
Russell Means brought that challenge. In Means v. Navajo Nation,532 
Means, a member of the Oglala Lakota Nation, had been charged in the 
Navajo Nation tribal court for various crimes, including assault.533 He 
disputed the Navajo Nation’s criminal power, arguing that subjecting 
him to the tribal court’s jurisdiction was no different than subjecting a 
non-Indian because Means could never become a member of the Navajo 
Nation. The Duro-fix subjected only other Indians, and not non-Indians, 
to tribal court jurisdiction, a distinction that Means argued violated the 
equal protection component of the Due Process clause. The Ninth 
Circuit, though noting that Means’ argument had “real force,”534 upheld 
the Duro-fix and Means’ tribal court prosecution under Mancari. The 
court first noted that the Duro-fix did not subject all “ethnic Indians” to 
criminal prosecution, but only those Indians who met the Major Crimes 
Act definition that requires Indian ancestry and political affiliation.535 
Therefore, the classification, like the one in Mancari itself, “is political 
rather than racial, and the only Indians subjected to tribal court 
jurisdiction are enrolled or de facto members of tribes, not all ethnic 
Indians.”536 Furthermore, Means’ enrollment in another tribe satisfied 
the statute’s requirements: “The statute subjects Means to Navajo 
criminal jurisdiction not because of his race but because of his political 
status as an enrolled member of a different Indian tribe.”537 
Despite Means’ relatively straightforward application of Mancari, the 
court expressed concern about the turbulent backdrop of politics and 
race. The “force” it found in Means’ claims consisted of three factors, 
                                                     
529. See id. at 208–09.  
530. See id.  
531. See id.  
532. 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005). 
533. Id. 
534. Id. at 932. 
535. See id. at 930.  
536. Id. at 933 (emphasis in original).  
537. Id. at 934.  
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the first two of which are relevant here.538 First, Means, although not 
Navajo, could be prosecuted by the Navajo Nation, which situated him 
differently from “whites, blacks, Asians, or any other non-Navajos who 
are accused of crimes on the reservation.”539 The court’s concern was 
that the Duro-fix, therefore, exposed a certain category of nonmembers 
to tribal prosecution, but not others. The appeal of Means’ argument is 
that he was being “checked off” by race in ways that “whites, blacks, 
Asians” were not. A response (that the court did not provide) is that 
Means is simply incorrect. White, black, and Asian people who are also 
members of federally recognized tribes (in other words, people of mixed 
ancestry who nonetheless meet their tribes’ membership requirements) 
would also be subject to tribal prosecution. This can only be disputed on 
the basis that some “races” are not susceptible to mixed ancestry. While 
there was a time that such an assertion, in the context of whiteness, was 
unproblematic,540 presumably it would be a reactionary one to make 
today. The court, therefore, missed an opportunity to explain the 
political (and legal) nature of all racial categories inherent in Means’ 
assumption that some “races” (whites, blacks, Asians) cannot also be 
Indian. The Means court’s second concern was that Means could never 
become Navajo.541 The history of tribal recognition, including the 
overriding forces limiting tribal territory and membership, should inform 
current judgments about tribal enrollment criteria. Against the backdrop 
of relentless historical pressure to define “tribes” and “tribal 
membership” in ways convenient for the settler society’s goals of 
clearing the land, the only appropriate judicial role is to refrain from 
holding that very history against tribes today. 
To date, courts are following Mancari, though some appear to bristle 
at what they perceive to be its blind spots. The foregoing histories of 
tribal recognition and tribal membership indicate that the failure of 
vision is much larger than an unsatisfying doctrinal distinction between 
the “political” and the “racial.” It is a failure to grapple with the ways 
that tribes and their members were racialized in order to divest them of 
                                                     
538. The court’s third concern was that the Navajo Nation, like all tribes, is not subject to the Bill 
of Rights. See id. at 932. Tribal courts are, however, subject to the Indian Civil Rights Act, which 
includes most of the same protections. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–
1303 (2006). The most significant exception is the right to free counsel for indigent defendants. The 
Navajo Nation, however, provides representation to indigent defendants through a public defender 
service and requires pro bono representation. See NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 606(A) 
(2010).  
539. Means, 432 F.2d at 932.  
540. See Harris, supra note 86, at 1737. 
541. Means, 432 F.2d at 932.  
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land and, ultimately, ensure their orderly disappearance. There is no 
distinction between the political and the racial in that larger story, yet the 
story reinforces the importance of judicial restraint when it comes to 
unpacking those categories today. 
CONCLUSION 
Race and politics are deeply entangled by and throughout our history. 
The construction of racial categories has served distinct political ends for 
all subordinated groups. In the case of indigenous peoples, that end was 
their eventual erasure from the continent. The resulting eliminationist 
policies shaped early conceptions of tribes and have had sticky effects 
on all aspects of federal Indian law, including the federal government’s 
trust relationship with tribes as well as understandings of tribal political 
status, tribal membership, and tribal inherent powers. For the past 
several decades, the federal government’s policies with respect to tribes 
have generally supported tribal self-governance and self-determination. 
Laws affecting Indian tribes and people no longer overtly embrace the 
racial logic of elimination. Yet the current laws operate in a context 
inevitably soaked in the racialized and eliminationist policies of the past. 
For contemporary federal policies to reach fruition, tribes and their allies 
must continue to work their way out of that racial and political thicket. 
Untangling the ways in which American Indian tribes have been 
constructed by the racial and eliminationist logic of our past is no mean 
feat. The first crucial step, however, is to understand the history in all of 
its complexity. The legal histories of the Colorado River Indian Tribes 
and the tribes of the Great Dakota Nation provide two different windows 
into that larger history. The CRIT story is one of constructing a single 
tribe out of many distinct peoples. The “race” of the single tribe was 
subordinate to the larger distinction between Indians and whites. The 
overriding need to clear the West for non-Indian settlement resulted in a 
multi-ethnic polity that had no precedence in the governing or social 
structures of the Mohave, Chemehuevi, Navajo, and Hopi people. The 
Dakota story, on the other hand, is one of scattering and concentrating 
peoples of various and overlapping ethnic, social, and political structures 
onto separate reservations. The result today is a much greater degree of 
affiliation between and among the Sioux Tribes than is generally 
appreciated. 
Both of these histories are set in the larger context of the federal 
government’s imposition of static definitions of “tribe” and 
“membership.” Whatever membership might have meant for tribes in 
pre-contact times, today it is shaped by the complicated process of 
having traveled the route from independent people to “domestic 
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dependent nation.” Part of that process entailed a shift from fluid and 
territorially-based absorptions of new people to bureaucratized 
accountings that incorporated blood quantum and descent.542 That shift 
was imposed on tribes by the federal government’s overriding 
objectives, during different policy periods, of quantifying and ultimately 
shrinking the number of indigenous people who inconveniently occupied 
and had legitimate claims to land and resources. 
In terms of current legal doctrine, the Mancari rule—that federal 
courts should not subject classifications based on tribal political status to 
heightened scrutiny when those classifications “can be tied rationally to 
the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians”543—is 
probably the best courts can do. The categories “federally recognized 
tribe” and “tribal member” are political, even while they also include the 
racialized history of the federal government’s treatment of Native 
peoples. Given that courts are unlikely to engage in the deep, contextual 
analysis necessary to untangle the racial from the political in ways that 
will reverse eliminationist policies, it is better to stick with Mancari’s 
good-enough formulation. If courts move in the direction of scrutinizing 
tribes’ distinctive status in today’s color-blind climate, they are more 
likely to entrench historical discrimination against indigenous peoples 
than to reverse it. Thus, while courts should continue to subject racial 
discrimination against Indian people to heightened scrutiny, they should 
not reassess Mancari’s approach toward federal classifications that 
further the unique government-to-government relationship between 
tribes and the federal government. 
Despite the dominance of eliminationist policies toward indigenous 
peoples, there has always been a tensile counter-thread. As a nation, we 
pulled up short of severing completely the ties that American Indian 
tribes had to their pre-contact status as independent sovereigns. And 
American Indian tribes have seized each opportunity to continue as 
distinct peoples, exercising tribal self-governance in the shadow of the 
law when necessary, as well as through the convoluted forms made 
available through law. The legal forms of the federally recognized tribe 
and tribal member, and the legal doctrines assigning meaning to those 
forms, are a product of that complicated history of subordination and 
survival. The ultimate goals of Indian law today should be to overthrow 
the remnants of elimination in favor of indigenous survival. 
 
                                                     
542. See supra Part I.B. 
543. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
